The History of the Twentieth Century
Episode 463
"A Blind Man Speaking about Color"
Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

The more dire Germany's position in the war became, the less rational became the response from the Nazi government.

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 463. A Blind Man Speaking About Color.

January 30, 1945 marked the twelfth anniversary of Hitler assuming the leadership of Germany. Those twelve years can be divided neatly into two almost exactly equal halves: six years as peacetime leader of Germany and six years as wartime leader.

Over the six years of his peacetime rule, Hitler became more confident and more polished as a leader. He also became proud and arrogant, the predictable result of six years of living in a bubble where his every utterance was praised, his every idea lauded as genius.

The one important German institution that had not completely bowed to Hitler's rule, that still regarded him with a certain wariness, was the Wehrmacht. Ever since the last war, the German military functioned as a virtually independent entity within the German state. It had operated under an unspoken pact with the civilian government: we don't interfere with your administration of the nation; you don't interfere with our administration of the military.

In the last days of peace, even after six years of his leadership, the military remained leery of Hitler. They regarded his diplomatic brinkmanship with France and Britain as reckless and dangerous. But the Munich Agreement seemed to demonstrate that Hitler had in fact known what he was doing, which impressed them. When Germany invaded Poland at the beginning of the war, Hitler closely observed the campaign but did little to interfere. He left military decisions to the career military officers.

Then came the campaign against France. Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to follow his strategy of an offensive through the Ardennes. Some military officers thought it brilliant; most saw it, again, as reckless and dangerous.

What happened in France was an amazing stroke of luck. Hitler's strategy had succeeded beyond expectation, even beyond his expectations. He had directed the Wehrmacht to throw everything it had into one punch, and that punch found the French Army's glass jaw.

After France agreed to a humiliating armistice, the prevailing view of Hitler among senior military officers was no longer that of a civilian dilettante meddling in matters he did not understand, but rather that of a skillful politician who had also proved himself a skilled diplomat, and now a skilled military commander. And the love affair was mutual. Hitler heaped praise on his military commanders for ably carrying out his plans; few of them escaped Hitler's promiscuous distribution of promotions and medals.

Hitler spent the war studying military history and weapons technology until he had it all memorized and astonished the experts with his command of the facts. One German general said of Hitler in 1940, "With this war and what is sure to be the equally great peace with which he will end this most enormous of conflicts, Hitler will go down as the greatest man in three millennia."

The man who wrote those words was General Walther von Seydlitz. As you know, less than two years later and after being taken prisoner at Stalingrad, the same General Seydlitz would assume leadership of the Soviet-backed League of German Officers, which issued calls for Hitler's overthrow.

What happened during those two years? The trouble began with the winter of 1941-42 and the Soviet counteroffensive. The generals counseled withdrawal to save the Army. Hitler ordered every unit to hold its ground. The outcome was bloody and gruesome, but the Wehrmacht made it through the winter with only minor losses of territory. The lesson Hitler took from this was that he had personally saved the day. Had he followed the generals' advice, it would have been a replay of Napoleon in 1812.

By the 1942 campaign season, Hitler was no longer taking advice from his military commanders, but when that campaign ended with the Stalingrad disaster, Hitler blamed them. They were deliberately undermining him because they resented how he kept showing them up. Every reversal the German Army suffered on the Eastern Front was further evidence of their treachery. The assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 was the final straw. It destroyed whatever was left of Hitler's trust in his generals. Now he saw the military leadership as his enemies.

To put it another way, Hitler's career trajectory went from paranoid rabble-rouser to confident, hard-nosed conqueror and back again to paranoid rabble-rouser. Or, as one German journalist in

exile in Britain wrote, describing how Hitler had reverted to his former self, the "loser stewing in his hatred for the entire world."

Early in the war, Hitler was fond of dressing in military uniform and appearing before soldiers in the field. For their part, the soldiers cheered him enthusiastically. After things began to go wrong, he no longer paid visits to his troops. He never went to see the bombed German cities or offer comfort to the victims. He became a workaholic, denying himself rest in order to manage the war in increasingly obsessive detail. By 1945, he seldom appeared in public at all and rarely even spoke over the radio or appeared in newsreels, to the point that Goebbels was begging him to engage more with the German public, while rumors claimed Hitler was dead or incapacitated and that Goebbels and/or Himmler were secretly running the country.

And this brings me to the subject of the succession. Hitler no longer trusted anyone save his closest associates in the Nazi Party, several of whom were jockeying for the position of Hitler's heir, even though by this late in the war, the title of *Führer* was becoming less meaningful by the day. The public rightly identified Himmler and Goebbels as two of the most powerful Party leaders after Hitler himself, and two of the candidates most likely to replace him.

Goebbels had always been close to Hitler and his loyalty was above question. Hitler granted him powers that went far beyond those of his principal job, minister for propaganda. Goebbels likely saw himself as the logical choice to succeed Hitler, but in early 1945, he was preoccupied with exhorting the public to join or support the *Volkssturm*. His ministry released films of old men and boys marching together and declared "The *Führer's* call is our sacred order!" "Believe! Fight! Win!"

The *Volkssturm* was what it was because virtually all men between the ages of 17 and 45 had already been conscripted into the Army. Speaking of the Army, many German soldiers on the front lines did not welcome news of the *Volkssturm*. They were instead distressed to learn that their sons, their little brothers, their uncles, their fathers, even their grandfathers, were now forced into the war.

Once upon a time, most people inside and outside Germany would have identified Hermann Göring as Hitler's logical successor. Back in 1941, Hitler had formally decreed Göring his successor, in the event of his death or incapacitation. But much had happened since then. The Luftwaffe, which Göring commanded, had not been able to keep Göring's promise to supply the encircled German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and by 1944, the Luftwaffe had been so reduced that it no longer played a meaningful role on the Eastern Front, the Western Front, or in defending the Reich against Allied bombers.

Hitler did not remove Göring as head of the Luftwaffe, or as chief of economic development under the Four-Year Plans, but Göring was no longer welcome at staff meetings nor did Hitler seek his advice.

Heinrich Himmler was one of the most powerful Nazis in Germany aside from Hitler himself. As leader of the SS, Himmler controlled the only two Nazi institutions that even the military feared: the Waffen-SS and the Gestapo, the secret police. Hitler trusted him and had confidence in him. Himmler also saw himself as the logical successor to Hitler.

Himmler frequently met with Hitler, and even when he didn't, he had a man inside Hitler's staff: Hermann Fegelein, an SS officer who was Eva Braun's brother-in-law and who served as SS liaison to Hitler's headquarters.

Himmler did not realize there was also a dark-horse candidate for Hitler's successor. That was Martin Bormann, a high-ranking Party member who was close to Hitler. Hitler made Bormann his Personal Secretary in 1943, a position which made Bormann quite powerful, as he controlled access to the *Führer*, and with Hitler spending all his time on military matters, Bormann effectively oversaw the civilian government of the Reich.

Bormann and Fegelein liked and respected each other, until Fegelein became not so much Himmler's man inside Hitler's staff as he was Bormann's man in the SS. Bormann disliked Himmler and mocked him as "Uncle Heinrich."

As you know, the July 20 assassination and coup plot was centered in the German *Ersatzheer*, the Replacement Army. The Replacement Army was based in Germany and its function was to oversee conscription and training of new soldiers, and then transfer them to units in the field as needed. Since it was located in Germany, it made a useful base from which to launch a coup, as most German armies were in other countries at this time. Recognizing this, Hitler appointed Himmler, someone he could trust, to command the Replacement Army following the coup.

Himmler had no military background. On the other hand, how much of a military background do you really need to oversee the training of new recruits? Yet the assignment revealed a new side to the SS chief. It seemed he really, really liked being a military commander. You might wonder why the head of the SS, a position arguably more important than any military command, craved a role in the military, but there it was.

Recall, for example, how back when Heinz Guderian was trying to warn Hitler and his staff of the pending Soviet offensive along the Vistula, Himmler had been one of the voices dismissing Guderian's warning. The Bolsheviks couldn't possibly have collected so large a force as Guderian was claiming, he'd said, as if commanding the Replacement Army in Germany gave him special insight into what was going on behind Soviet lines in Poland.

Martin Bormann picked up on how much fun Himmler was having with his new hobby of military cosplay. In December, he suggested to Hitler that Himmler be given command of the new Army Group Upper Rhine, a formation created to defend, well, the Upper Rhine, meaning the southernmost section of the Western Front, just north of Switzerland.

Army Group Upper Rhine consisted of one German Army, the Nineteenth, and it's a sign of Hitler's increasing detachment from reality that he seriously believed that taking one solitary Army and putting Himmler in charge of it somehow transformed it into an army group. It did on the map at Hitler's headquarters, at least, but increasingly Hitler cared more about what was on the map than what was on the battlefield. Not that Germany's position in December 1944 was salvageable, but sinking into fantasies would only make a bad situation worse. For his part, Himmler's army group did not answer to Gerd von Rundstedt, the titular commander on the Western Front. Himmler reported directly to Hitler and received his orders directly from Hitler, which complicated command and communication on the Western Front.

On the other hand, Himmler's new assignment was a win for Martin Bormann, as it removed Uncle Heinrich from Berlin, so there was that.

Himmler's "army group" participated in Operation Northwind, the January offensive in Alsace and Lorraine that was meant to take some of the pressure off the failing Ardennes offensive farther north, but the operation proved fruitless.

On January 15, three days into the Soviet offensive along the Vistula front, Hitler left the Eagle's Nest and transferred his command to Berlin, specifically, to the *Führerbunker* that had been built underneath the Chancellery garden. This bunker would remain Hitler's headquarters until the end of the war.

The Soviet advance from the Vistula put the Red Army within striking distance of Berlin itself. Joseph Goebbels, in his capacity as Nazi Party leader in Berlin, set to work organizing a defense of the city, one he hoped could serve as a model for other German cities.

In Berlin, the news of the Soviet advance set off something close to panic. The city was already crowded with refugees from East Prussia, with more arriving every day. These refugees, having already lost everything, felt much freer than the average Berliner to speak their minds about the collapse in the East and what it implied for the future of Germany. Berliners themselves were chilled by the stories the refugees told, stories amplified by the Ministry of Propaganda, of the violence and destruction meted out by the Red Army in East Prussia. The Russians were clearly out for revenge, and thoughts of what they might do in Berlin were terrifying.

Berliners were not permitted to leave the city, although individuals could apply for special exemptions from the rules if they were needed elsewhere in the Reich: an engineer needed to help rebuild a hydrogenation plant, for example. When a Berliner secured this coveted permission to leave the city, friends and neighbors would offer the whispered advice: once you get there, whatever you do, don't come back.

One of the refugees arriving in Berlin was Ilsa Fucke-Michels, sister of Eva Braun and Gretl Fegelein, both of whom were now living in the Old Reich Chancellery building as was Adolf

Hitler. Ilsa had been working as a journalist at the *Schlesische Zeitung*, a newspaper based in Breslau, and unlike her sisters, had avoided involvement with Hitler and the Nazi leadership.

On the evening of Ilsa's arrival in Berlin, she and sister Eva had a private dinner together in the Chancellery. Eva chatted gaily, and spoke with Ilsa as if her sister had taken a brief vacation to visit family. She seemed to think Ilsa would soon return to Breslau and showed no sign she understood the situation. Ilsa became angry. She described to Eva the pitiful circumstances of families with children trudging westward though drifts of snow. Then she told Eva that her boyfriend had led Germany into disaster. Eva was appalled by her sister's words. The *Führer* had been generous to Ilsa, even offering to put her up in the Berghof. How could she say such things. If anyone else heard her talk like that, Eva declared, Ilsa would be put up against a wall and shot. And she would deserve it.

[music: Strauss, *Burleske*.]

Adolf Hitler reacted to Zhukov's advance from the Vistula, through western Poland, and into the Reich, predictably. He blamed the defeat on the senior military officers on that portion of the front, who were once again betraying him. Several of these commanders were removed from their commands, to be replaced by officers with immaculate Nazi credentials.

Hitler reorganized the army groups on the Eastern Front, and as part of that effort, renamed them. The former Army Group North was redesignated Army Group Courland, in recognition of the peninsula they were now trapped on. The former Army Group Center, what was left of it after last summer's Soviet offensive, was now designated Army Group North. The former Army Group North Ukraine was redesignated Army Group Center, an implicit admission that it wouldn't be returning to Ukraine anytime soon; similarly, the former Army Group South Ukraine was redesignated Army Group South.

Heinz Guderian had recommended to Hitler the creation of a new army group to bolster the defense of Berlin by plugging the gap in the German line between the new Army Group North and Army Group Center. It was through this gap that Zhukov and his front were pressing toward the Oder. Hitler took his advice and created Army Group Vistula, but Guderian was appalled by Hitler's choice to command the new army group: Heinrich Himmler, who was relieved of his command of Army Group North Rhine, and sent east to command Army Group Vistula.

The appointment of Himmler was a clear sign of how little Hitler trusted his senior military commanders, but the assignment was a joke. Himmler had no military experience. On the other hand, Army Group North Rhine wasn't really anything more than one army, and the new Army Group Vistula would exist only on paper until proper military units were assigned to it.

A genuine career Army officer, Colonel Hans Georg Eismann, received orders that same day to assume the position of chief of staff of Army Group Vistula and report at once to army group headquarters in the town of Schneidemühl. Eismann was puzzled. He'd never heard of Army

Group Vistula. Another officer explained to him that it had just been created that day, so Eismann dutifully set off toward the front, riding in a *Kübelwagen*, the German answer to the American jeep.

Eismann's driver took him east along *Reichstraße* 1, the main east-west highway across Germany. It ran all the way from Aachen in the west to Königsberg in the east. As they traveled through the frigid night, Eismann and his driver passed the unending streams of refugees from eastern Germany trudging in the opposite direction, fleeing the Soviet advance. When they arrived at Schneidemühl, they asked some soldiers directions to army group headquarters, but it seemed the location of army group headquarters was top secret and they didn't know or wouldn't tell. Finally, Colonel Eismann found an officer he knew personally, who gave him directions.

Headquarters were inside Himmler's personal train, which had cars that served as his dining room, sitting room, and bedroom, among others, along with a railcar that carried an anti-aircraft gun. The train was surrounded by SS sentries. Eismann was escorted to the sitting room, where Himmler was looking over a map laid out on a large table. Eismann noted that this was yesterday's map and therefore out of date. There was only one telephone line available aboard the train to talk to field commanders.

Eismann asked what units the army group had available to close the gap on the German front line. It quickly became clear to him that Himmler had no idea what forces were under his command, but he answered by telling Eismann that his army group would "pound" the Russians, "smash in their flank," and "throw them back." He disparaged the regular military commanders, saying they were only good at worrying and were "incapable of improvising."

In other words, he was spouting Nazi clichés about how the war was to be fought, while evincing no understanding whatsoever of how an army actually worked. Instead of positioning his soldiers in front of the Soviet advance, Himmler wanted to put them all on the Soviet flank, because he had wholly unrealistic ideas of trapping the Red Army. In Eismann's words, he was "a blind man…speaking about color."

In fact, Army Group Vistula consisted of the German Second Army, and that was only because the Soviet advance had cut it off from its former parent unit, Army Group Center, along with the Ninth Army, which had been all but annihilated during the Soviet offensive and badly needed new soldiers and equipment, and the newly-created 11th SS Panzer Army. This last unit was actually the III SS Panzer Corps, which had been bottled up with Army Group Courland until it was withdrawn by sea and reassigned to Army Group Vistula.

Note that it was only a corps-sized formation, suddenly dubbed an army, because that "has a better ring to it," in Eismann's words. It also must have been reassuring to Himmler and to Hitler to look at their maps and see a whole new army appear on the Eastern Front. But from the Soviet side of the line, the Red Army saw only a corps.

The creation of a new army also offered opportunity to hand out promotions. The SS officer who had commanded the III SS Panzer Corps was one such beneficiary. He got promoted when his unit got its new designation. This SS officer, by the way, was the 48-year-old Felix Steiner. I assume some of you will recognize the name. If you don't, you'll hear more about him in a future episode.

To summarize then, the new Army Group Vistula consisted of maybe three corps' worth of units, making it barely an army and certainly no army group, and it was commanded by a Nazi fanatic who had no idea what he was doing.

As millions of German refugees streamed westward, Hitler came up with the bright idea of shipping them to Bohemia. He reasoned that if the Czech population saw these miserable German refugees, they would learn to fear the Russians and be deterred from rising up against Germany. In fact, the opposite happened. On seeing the misery of the refugees, the Czechs concluded that Germany would soon lose the war and began preparations for the return of the government-in-exile.

Meanwhile, Zhukov's front advanced from the Vistula to the Oder so rapidly that sometimes even Zhukov himself didn't know where they were. His headquarters occasionally assigned its armies objectives that had already been taken.

Vasily Chuikov and his Eighth Guards Army, the veterans who had defended Stalingrad, reached the outskirts of the Polish city of Łódź on January 18, ahead of schedule. Chuikov ordered an attack without consulting Zhukov, whom Chuikov despised. The city was in their hands within a matter of hours, with the help of Polish resistance fighters in the city who rose up and slaughtered the German occupiers. Soon after, Chuikov was ordered to advance to Poznań.

To his south, the First Ukrainian Front surprised the Germans defending Kraków and took the city without a fight. But the rapidity of the Soviet advance left tens of thousands of German soldiers isolated in their rear. Red Army soldiers in the rear areas were getting ambushed by desperate German soldiers attempting to seize their food and supplies. German motorized units tried to find their way westward along back roads, hoping to evade the Red Army.

On January 27, Red Army reconnaissance troops, some on horseback, emerged from the forest into a snowy clearing and discovered the complex of concentration camps at Auschwitz.

In early November of 1944, Himmler had ordered the SS to shut down the mass murder operation there. Later that month, he ordered the gas chambers and crematoria to be demolished.

In January 1945, with the Red Army approaching, the SS evacuated the camp, taking with them around 58,000 prisoners who had been slave laborers in one or another of the industrial sites at Auschwitz. These prisoners were marched west on foot in the freezing cold, then boarded into

trains to be carried to labor camps in the Reich. The SS shot and killed prisoners unable to keep up the pace, an estimated 10,000 in all.

A further 9,000 prisoners were left behind in the camps, as they were too sick to move. These were the prisoners the Red Army soldiers found when they entered the camps. At first, the soldiers stared wordlessly at the scene around them, gripped by a sense of shame. Not for anything they did, but the shame decent human beings feel when confronted by the worst deeds that their fellow humans prove capable of.

The soldiers called out to the prisoners, but the prisoners just stared at them in silence. They thought this was some cruel Nazi trick. Then a Jewish Red Army officer tried calling out to them in Yiddish, saying he was a Jew and these were Soviet soldiers come to liberate them. Suddenly, the dam broke and prisoners, many of whom looked like walking skeletons, rushed forward, in many cases falling on their knees before the startled soldiers and hugging their legs or kissing the hems of their overcoats.

The officers present called for all available Red Army medical personnel in the area to come to the camp, where they set up a makeshift hospital and began treating the survivors, who were suffering symptoms of starvation and disease, most commonly tuberculosis. They saved those they could, but many were too far gone.

A Red Army photographer took pictures of the living skeletons, the tattooed numbers visible on their arms, and of the corpses lying everywhere. He also photographed the infamous gate decorated with the words *Arbeit Macht Frei*. The soldiers found more than a million articles of clothing, these apart from the stockpiles of clothing the SS took with them when they abandoned the camp. They also found over 40,000 pairs of shoes, huge mounds of eyeglasses, and seven metric tons of human hair, grim evidence of the mass murder committed there. Testing of the hair showed it had been exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas.

One of the liberated prisoners was a 54-year-old Polish man named Adam Kuryłowicz. Before the German invasion, he had been president of the Polish Railwaymen's Trade Union and a member of the Polish parliament, representing the Polish Socialist Party. He had been imprisoned at Auschwitz since July 1941. He described to the Red Army what he had witnessed in his three-and-a-half years there, including the construction of the gas chambers, their testing on Polish prisoners and Red Army POWs, the depraved medical experiments, and the mass murder machine that had operated since early 1942, shutting down only when the Red Army drew too near.

Brief reports of the liberation of Auschwitz were printed in *Pravda* in February 1945, and in *Stalinskoe Znamya*, or *Stalin's Banner*, a Red Army newspaper, although, per Soviet government dictates, the prisoners were described only as "victims of fascism." The full account of the horrors the Red Army discovered at Auschwitz did not become public until after Germany surrendered.

When Zhukov's forces reached the Oder River, even crossed it at some points, he was itching to proceed forward to Berlin, but to his frustration, in early February, Stavka ordered him to hold position at the river. They were concerned about Zhukov's wide flanks, both to the north and south, where other Soviet fronts had not advanced nearly so far. Zhukov wasn't worried. He had seen how feeble had been the German Army's defense.

Guderian was as aware as Zhukov of how weak the German front line was at the Oder. He was also aware that Himmler was completely unqualified for the important position which Hitler had given him. At a staff meeting on February 13, and with a German armored counteroffensive coming up, dubbed Operation Solstice, Guderian demanded that Hitler appoint a general of Guderian's choice, Walther Wenck, to the post of chief of staff of Army Group Vistula with full power to command the army group's units during the upcoming offensive. Hitler flew off the handle once again, yelling and screaming until the veins in his forehead became visible, according to Guderian.

Finally he calmed down, sat at his desk, and gave the order assigning Wenck to Army Group Vistula. Then he smiled and told Guderian, "the general staff has won a battle today."

But although Hitler gave Wenck the position, and Wenck helped lead Operation Solstice, Hitler insisted that Wenck report directly to him at the daily briefings at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, forcing Wenck and his driver to travel a round-trip of 300 kilometers every day. Just four days into his new position, and with his driver too tired to continue, Wenck took the wheel of the *Kübelwagen* himself. Unfortunately for him, he was also too tired to drive and crashed the vehicle. The accident fractured his skull and he was hospitalized.

Ultimately, Operation Solstice accomplished nothing in terms of pushing back the Red Army, although as far as Stavka was concerned, it was evidence that their decision to be cautious and hold the line at the Oder was correct, much to the chagrin of Zhukov, who insisted to no avail that the German Army was broken and he had a clear path to Berlin.

We'll have to stop there for today. I thank you for listening, and I'd like to thank Miles for his kind donation, and thank you to Simon for becoming a patron of the podcast. Donors and patrons like Miles and Simon help cover the costs of making this show, which in turn keeps the podcast available free for everyone always, so my thanks to them and to all of you who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd like to become a patron or make a donation, you are most welcome; just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

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Next week is a bye week for the podcast, but I hope you'll join me in two weeks' time, here on *The History of the Twentieth Century*, as take a look at events in Hungary and then examine the meeting of the Allied Big Three at the Soviet resort town of Yalta. That's in two weeks' time, here, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. On February 3, 1945, the US carried out its biggest bomber attack yet on the city of Berlin. Some 3,000 Berliners were killed and over 100,000 left homeless. It took several days for water and electricity to be restored.

One American bomb struck the Old Reich Chancellery building, completely destroying part of the building, including Adolf Hitler's private rooms. Hitler moved into the underground bunker beneath the Chancellery garden.

Shortly after becoming chancellor, Hitler had ordered an underground bunker built beneath the Old Chancellery building. When the New Chancellery building was constructed in 1939, that project included the construction of a larger and more elaborate bunker under the new building, including a tunnel to link it to the bunker under the old building.

After repeated raids on Berlin by the RAF, Hitler decided these existing bunkers weren't secure enough and ordered an even deeper bunker be dug under the Chancellery garden. A flight of stairs led down to it from the older bunkers. This project was completed in late 1944.

The newest bunker consisted of eighteen small rooms, walled with concrete and lit with electric lights. Once Hitler moved into the bunker, he seldom left it, and then only for brief walks in the Chancellery garden. Inside the bunker, where day and night were arbitrary, Hitler slipped into a schedule in which he woke up around 1:00 in the afternoon. The day's first situation meeting usually ran from about 4:00 to 6:00 PM. The second was held after midnight. Hitler would end his day around dawn with his usual practice of having tea with his secretaries, forcing them to stay up until he was ready for them. One of the secretaries recalled the conversations during this period as focused endlessly on the same subjects: in her words, "dog training, nutrition, and the stupidity and badness of the world." Hitler would offer "monotone repetitions of the same stories."

Visitors to the bunker were shocked at how frail and wilted Hitler had become. One of Heinz Guderian's aides described his limp handshake and the unnatural look in his eyes. "All of his movements were those of an ill, senile man. He reminded me of a burnt-out piece of iron."

[music: Closing War Theme]

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