The History of the Twentieth Century
Episode 449
"All for the Front"
Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

Throughout the brief history of the USSR, the government in Moscow had been exhorting the Soviet public to work harder and produce more, for the sake of the Soviet people and also to close the gap between the Soviet economy and those of the advanced Western nations.

Then came 1941. A cruel and ruthless enemy launched an unprovoked invasion. Moscow still wanted Soviet citizens to work harder and produce more, but now the reason was simple and obvious and easily communicated. The soldiers at the front were giving their all; it was up to the civilian population, as the new slogan had it, to give "All for the Front."

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century.*

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 449. All for the Front.

Longtime listeners know that the citizens of the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union, have suffered a lot since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Serfdom had not been abolished in Russia until 1861. At that time, the Empire's peasant farmers largely practiced subsistence agriculture. After the end of serfdom, the farming of cash crops gradually emerged.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia was a huge country with agriculture accounting for half of the Empire's GDP, but it employed 65% of Russia's population. Russian agriculture was backward, inefficient, and hampered by the nation's notoriously severe winters.

But Russia's population increased rapidly over this period. Of the Great Powers of that age, only the United States experienced a higher rate of population growth. In Russia, agricultural production did not increase at the same rate. The cold equations will tell you that by the second decade of the twentieth century, Russia was already struggling with hunger, inflation, and inequitable distribution of the food supply.

When the First World War came, Russia mobilized a large army, which exacerbated food shortages, while Germany and the Ottoman Empire cut off much of Russia's foreign trade by denying the Russians the use of the Baltic and Black Seas and hampering the Russian economy. The War began with the usual rally-round-the-flag patriotism, but by 1915, industrial workers in St. Petersburg and Moscow were striking over sharply rising food prices.

Long-time listeners know what happened next. The war went badly, and the year 1917 saw not one but two revolutions in Russia. The first ousted the Emperor and formed a republic; the second created the world's first socialist government, led by Vladimir Lenin, and rebranded the nation as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the Soviet Union for short.

Long-time listeners also know that the birth of the USSR was not the end of its people's woes. Hunger, and the struggle to produce food sufficient to feed everyone, remained. The Russian Civil War led to famine, caused partly by drought, partly by the Civil War, and partly by the Soviet adoption of what was called "war communism," with tight government control over the economy, and particularly in the requisitioning of food from reluctant peasant farmers to feed factory workers in the city, who were of course the Communist Party's base of support.

After the Communists won the Civil War, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy, which allowed for a little bit of private enterprise in the socialist state. In particular, farmers were taxed rather than subjected to requisitions, creating an incentive for farmers in increase their production. It worked, and the Soviet agricultural sector grew rapidly. Perhaps it worked too well. The agricultural sector grew faster than the industrial sector, which caused its own problems, such as inflation.

Lenin died and Stalin ended the New Economic Policy, reverting to agricultural requisitions and collectivization of farms. He introduced the Five-Year Plans, which rapidly developed the industrial sector and manufacturing output, but unrealistic requisitions of grain to feed the growing populations of factory workers led to famine in the countryside. An inability or unwillingness to comprehend that you can't squeeze blood from a turnip led to the starvation deaths of perhaps six million Soviet citizens, the majority of them ethnic Ukrainians.

Why am I reminding you of all this? It's to point out that in 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, any Soviet citizen above the age of 38 or so would have memories of all these events, from the February Revolution forward. Hunger and deprivation were familiar challenges to a large portion of the Soviet population.

Hold that thought for a few minutes while we turn to the subject of evacuations. Many local and regional Soviet government entities had drawn up plans for emergency evacuations in the event of war, but these plans were vague and general. No one considered the possibility of simultaneous evacuations across large swaths of the USSR, and why would they? Nothing of the kind had ever happened before.

But it did happen, beginning on June 22, 1941.

The government in Moscow created a council, or soviet, to oversee evacuations, just two days after the German invasion began, but as we've seen, those early days of the invasion were a story of mass confusion. German forces were advancing so rapidly, encircling Red Army units and cutting communications, that the government was getting no clear information about what was going on at the front, or even where the front was. Regarding people, the most vulnerable were the first to be evacuated: children, the disabled, the sick, and the elderly. Those not in the categories of the vulnerable often fled by their own means, self-evacuation, they called it. More Soviet citizens self-evacuated than were evacuated by the state. Regarding property, the Soviet goal was to evacuate valuable assets to keep them away from the Germans. I'm speaking of such things as vehicles, factory machines, agricultural equipment, livestock, and stockpiles of grain and various raw materials. In the words of a Soviet decree, if the enemy was approaching:

> *[D]rive off the railroad rolling stock. Do not leave the enemy a single locomotive, a single boxcar. Do not leave the enemy a kilogram of bread, not a liter of gasoline. Collective farmers: drive off the cattle; deliver grain to the state for shipment to the rear. All valuable property, including nonferrous metals, grain, and gasoline, which cannot be shipped out should be unconditionally destroyed.*

A "scorched-earth" policy, as they say in the history books.

In many cases, the first warning a community got that the Germans were approaching was in the form of bombs and artillery shells, meaning these evacuations had to be carried out under fire. Local officials had to decide, in the midst of deafening explosions, what to do with the grain, the animals, the industrial equipment, and the people, and where to start in the midst of the chaos.

The Soviet for Evacuation did what it could. It designated train lines and allocated rail cars to ship people and materials east to towns and cities selected to receive them. Woe to the farm villages and small towns that did not have rail access.

In mid-August, the Party and the Soviet government hit on an ambitious idea. They would not merely evacuate factory equipment; they would devise plans to move whole factories—the machines and the workers—from the western Soviet Union into the regions of the Urals, the Volga, Siberia, and the Central Asian republics, where the factories would be re-established and resume production.

Factory workers struggled to dismantle their machinery and load it into rail cars, often with little time. At one large electric power station in the Donbas in eastern Ukraine, the staff estimated it would take a week to dismantle and ship out the generator, but when German bombs began to fall, they got the job done in ten hours.

Deciding when to start dismantling a factory was a tricky proposition. Tools and machinery packed into boxcars do not produce, and in the difficult days of summer and fall 1941, the Red Army needed every rifle and every shell it could get. Packing up the factory too soon would mean a loss of vital military production; on the other hand, delaying the evacuation too long might lead to the destruction of the factory machines, or worse, they could fall into German hands.

For Jewish and Roma people, the decision on how, when, and whether to evacuate was especially fraught. Stories were circulating about German soldiers slaughtering innocent civilians, but they were hard to believe. Older people who remembered the German occupation of 1918 recalled those German soldiers as polite and proper. They assured their family and friends they had nothing to fear from Germans.

A government decree issued June 29 urged local soviets and Party officials to show "initiative, courage, and daring." But these people remembered the Great Purge and had learned the opposite lesson: take no action without written orders from a superior, denounce others before they denounce you, and keep your distance from anyone who has already been denounced. Some local officials sent complaints to Moscow about evacuees fleeing from the west and claiming the Germans had captured Minsk. Clearly, they were panic mongers attempting to destroy public morale. Others had more valid complaints, including local officials who fled at the first hint of approaching Germans, leaving the communities for which they were responsible little or no direction on what to do.

Overall though, considering the magnitude of the challenge, the Soviet response was surprisingly effective. At its peak, the German occupation controlled territory which had been home to 40% of the nation's population and 30% of its industry. The USSR was able to evacuate around 25% of the population and 30% of the industry from these lands before the Germans seized them.

Not all these evacuations were voluntary. Some ethnic minorities within the Soviet Union were deemed by the government to present a risk they would support the Germans, and so they were deported to Siberia and Central Asia as a security measure. The first of these was the Volga Germans. These people were descendants of ethnic Germans who in the 18th century had been invited by the old Imperial government to resettle in the region along the Volga River. The offer included promises the immigrants would be allowed to retain their language, religion, and culture and be exempt from military service. This last promise made the offer especially appealing to German Mennonites, who were pacifists.

The Volga Germans were the first ethnic group to be relocated, but they were far from the only one. Over the course of the war, the government identified dozens of ethnic groups and millions of people as potential threats requiring deportation. After the war, most of the deportees were permitted to return to their homes, with two exceptions: the Volga Germans and the Tatars of Crimea.

I enumerated earlier the several times the Soviet Union experienced food shortages between 1918 and 1941. When you consider that the Germans occupied land accounting for 40% of the USSR's pre-war food production, it's easy to understand why the USSR experienced another round of food shortages during the war. The twenty million or more evacuees fleeing German occupation for the unoccupied USSR only exacerbated the problem, especially since most of these people were resettled into hastily built camps and barracks where there were no cooking facilities, which meant someone else had not only to provide food for them but prepare it as well.

The silver lining to those earlier periods of famine was that the Soviet government was experienced at rationing food and the Soviet public was experienced at coping with it. I'm sure you all will remember the episodes on the siege of Leningrad, 406 and 407. As a large city surrounded and under siege, Leningrad obviously represents an extreme case, but hunger, vitamin deficiencies, and even death by starvation existed across the country.

Outside of those various famine emergencies I talked about, the peacetime Soviet Union did not normally ration food. The Communist government was content to subsidize staples and otherwise permit the buying and selling of food in an open market. The food subsidies sometimes produced bizarre and unwanted outcomes, such as farmers feeding bread to their livestock because it was cheaper than grain.

Within three weeks of the German invasion, the Soviet government set up a system to ration food in Moscow and Leningrad; the system gradually spread to all the Soviet Union's cities, and to smaller towns and communities. In small communities, only bread and sugar was rationed, while in the cities it was those foods plus meat, fish, noodles, and fats.

By the way, sugar was rationed because in the pre-war Soviet Union, sugar was produced from beets, and the German invasion hit this agricultural sector harder than most, seizing something like 80% of the nation's sugar production.

Food purchased on ration was subsidized and inexpensive, but the price of food sold outside the rationing system skyrocketed, until the government decided to ban all private trade in food. Soon virtually the nation's entire food distribution was controlled by the rationing system. Even so, there simply wasn't enough for everyone and hunger was universal, particularly in 1942 and 1943, when food shortages were most severe.

Not even the basic staples such as bread and meat were rationed in rural agricultural communities; the farmers were presumed to be able to feed themselves. They each had small private plots of land to work in addition to the collective land.

Historically speaking, shortages of food often trigger revolutions, such as in France in 1789 or Germany in 1918, and of course in Russia in 1917. Wartime food shortages during the Second World War were worse than anything the USSR or Russia had ever experienced before, including 1917, but despite the hardships this time around, there were no revolts, no food riots,

no protests. The Soviet state's rationing system was generally successful and had public support. It helped that this time around it was easy to understand why food was in short supply and who deserved the blame: the Germans, not the government.

Keep in mind that your food ration sets the maximum for your food consumption, but it also sets a minimum. Bread was the centerpiece of the Soviet rationing system, and the government devoted a great deal of effort to ensure that everyone got freshly baked bread every day.

In the episodes on the Siege of Leningrad, I outlined for you the basic Soviet rationing system: everyone went into one of five categories, and how much food they allocated to you depended on your category. Soldiers in the Red Army got the largest allocation, then in descending order of allocation, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and their dependents. One last category, children 12 and under, got extra rations that put them ahead of the dependent category. This had the unfortunate effect that when twelve-year-old children reached their thirteenth birthday, their ration went down, even though their calorie needs were more likely going up.

In addition to the basic staples like bread that you picked up at the store, Soviet workplaces created canteens or cafeterias where their workers, and sometimes their families, could get a hot lunch. For many Soviet workers, this was the only hot meal they got in a day. Where did these canteens get food? They got allocations from local and regional farms. The canteens could also buy whatever the farmers were willing to sell that came from their private plots.

The Soviet government also worked to provide private plots of land for townsfolk and villagers who were not farmers. People were encouraged to grow as much of their own food on these plots as they could. This of course was comparable to the "victory gardens" in the UK and the US. Another program, this one uniquely Soviet, allocated unused land to factories and workplaces, where the workers could grow food to help supply their factory canteen. Farmers were usually more interested in bartering than in cash, so they could acquire consumer goods, which were scarce in wartime. Some factories set up shops to manufacture substitute consumer goods out of whatever scrap materials were left over from their principal production, which they then traded to farmers and cooperatives in exchange for their crops.

And what did Soviet citizens grow in their private plots? During the hard times of 1942-43, far and away the most popular crop was the potato. Potatoes were already a staple food in Eastern Europe. They are relatively easy to grow, provide protein and vitamins, and produce more calories per unit of land than most crops.

And as we've seen in other countries, people in the Soviet Union experimented with new recipes and new techniques to save food, such as reducing water that had been used to boil potatoes down to a sort of edible gel, which could be sweetened and eaten as a dessert.

The loss of so many factories, and the need for factories still under Soviet control to produce for the war effort made many consumer goods difficult to obtain, if not impossible. I'm speaking of

items like clothing, shoes, boots, needles, and thread. Available rubber was allocated entirely to the war effort, meaning no rubber goods of any kind reached civilians.

Loss of factories also meant loss of factory-processed foods like butter, margarine, jellies and jams, or canned meats and vegetables.

During the darkest days of the war, state-provided rations accounted for some 80% of the calories consumed by Soviet citizens. This number began to decline in 1944.

[music: Sakałoŭski, "Anthem of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic."]

With such a huge rationing system, providing most of the food eaten by virtually the entire civilian population of the USSR, cheating was inevitable. To begin with, take note of how blue-collar factory workers were supposed to get a larger ration than white-collar workers. That's logical, since blue-collar workers do more physical labor and therefore would need more calories to sustain themselves. But some white-collar workers organize and supervise blue-collar workers, including the allocation of food rations. The potential for corruption is obvious.

Some white-collar managers took the notion of wartime sacrifice seriously and restricted themselves to their allotted rations. Many others did not. In the wartime Soviet Union, they called it "self-provisioning," a euphemism for people in charge of the allocation and distribution of food taking a larger share for themselves. This could take the form of a worker in a bakery cutting loaves of bread into pieces that were a little short of what the customer was entitled to, leaving them with extra bread to take home at the end of the day.

Such petty corruption was common; more serious was the corruption in workplace canteens. This often took place when white-collar managers organized the canteens. It was common for a workplace to have two or three or as many as four different canteens for different categories of employee, and then allocate extra rations, especially of the hardest-to-get foods such as sugar, oil, and vodka, to upper-level employees. There might be one canteen for senior management only, a second canteen for professionals, engineers, and the most skilled workers, and a third canteen for ordinary workers.

Managers justified the hierarchy by claiming that the time of their most important employees was too valuable to have them spend it standing in line at the canteen waiting for lunch, but inevitably the canteens for higher-ranking employees got better food. The disparities were so great that the upper-level employees, who might represent 10-20% of the total workforce would get 50% of the food, leaving the rest of the workers to divvy up the other half.

These elite canteens weren't only for top-level employees; they were also a means to earn good will with such people as suppliers, other factory managers, and government and Party officials, who were given privileges at these special canteens in exchange for favors of various kinds. This didn't only happen in canteens. For example, trains carrying foodstuffs might have to hand out

portions of their cargo to local railway officials in exchange for permission to proceed to their next destination.

These losses meant that the ordinary worker, who was officially entitled to one “hot meal” at the workplace canteen, often found that his “hot meal” was a bowl of thin soup made by boiling whatever meat, fish, or vegetables were left over after management took their cut. If they were lucky, it was thickened some with barley or oats. If they were very lucky, it had some salt in it.

Self-provisioning turned the rationing system upside down. Instead of providing those who did physical labor with extra calories, in practice those who did the least physical work got the richest food.

But in the wartime Soviet Union, workers could and did write long, detailed letters of complaint to the country’s top government and Party officials in Moscow, carefully describing the corruption they witnessed, and often accompanied by remarks along the lines of: “I believe in the Revolution. I fought in the Revolution. But this seems not much different from what we had before.” Government officials could and often did investigate these complaints when they were brought to their attention. Self-provisioning by workplace managers became a serious-enough problem that in July 1943, Moscow issued regulations setting limits on how generous the meals could be in any workplace canteen. Of course, making a rule and getting people to comply with it are two different things.

A second form of ration loss was known as “leveling,” and this is one that’s much hard to condemn, as it meant factories and other workplaces opening up their canteens to people who otherwise had no access to one. These could be children of workers, or children from the local orphanages. They could be recently resettled evacuees. They could even be prisoners. In the wartime Soviet Union, prisoners were forced to do work in factories for the war effort, though they were entitled only to the rations the prison offered, which were meager even by wartime standards. Sympathetic managers in the factories to which they were assigned often opened the canteen to the prison laborers, if for no other reason than that they could get more work out of them if they were better fed.

A third category of ration loss was outright theft, theft from food stockpiles, which were then sold on the black market for profit. This was outright criminality, although evidence from the time suggests that the customers who bought stolen food from the black market were often the poor and deprived, who turned to the black market out of desperation, trading valuable consumer goods they owned from pre-war times, such as boots or overcoats, in exchange for something to eat. On the plus side, you could say that the black market provided hungry people with a last-ditch option to avoid starvation. On the minus side, you could also say that the black market took advantage of the poorest members of society and made them poorer. Trading your winter coat for a few loaves of bread might save your life today, but you might not make it through the next winter.

Other combatant nations had food rationing, but nowhere was the system as strict and as Spartan as in the Soviet Union. Other combatant nations had shortages of consumer goods, but nowhere else had consumer goods virtually disappeared, except in Axis-occupied countries. But the most dramatic difference between life in the Soviet Union during the war and life anywhere else was in the allocation of labor. In the Soviet Union, every citizen was subject to a labor draft and most everyone was working a job assigned to them by the government.

Every one of the major combatant nations felt a civilian labor shortage during the war. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the governments sponsored campaigns to encourage new workers, mostly but not exclusively women, to enter defense industries in place of those who had been drafted into the military, but in most cases were not forced to do such work and even those who were forced were allowed to choose the kind of work they wanted to do. Germany used millions of slave laborers from occupied countries to fill the jobs vacated by Germans entering the military. Japan also relied on slave labor, as we've seen, but only in the Soviet Union was the entire labor force assigned to work in positions chosen for them by central planners, something never seen before, not even in the peacetime Soviet Union.

Granted, the Soviet Union had labor shortages like no other combatant nation. More than a third of the working-age population was behind enemy lines, either living in occupied lands or in POW camps or working for the Germans. Even before the USSR became part of the war, in 1940, there were laws enacted making it a crime to change jobs or fail to come to work without official permission. After the war began, new laws permitted managers to require up to three hours of overtime from every worker and suspended all holidays. In no time, the eleven-hour day, six days a week, became the new normal.

A week after the German invasion began, the government created an agency to allocate labor. It began by recruiting women and retired people and reassigning workers from positions in nonessential industries. I should note here that because of the five-year industrialization plans, the USSR already had a shortage of factory workers in the 1930s and more than a third of working-age women already had jobs in factories or offices. There were also draft-age people who were found unfit for military service. The Soviet Union's local draft boards would refer them for civilian labor.

It only took until the end of 1941 for the government to exhaust the supply of workers recruited by these means, and the demand for workers only increased. The following year, 1942, saw even greater effort to recruit workers and match them to jobs. In the early months of the war, drafted laborers were assigned work near their homes, where they could return at the end of the day. But as the need for workers became greater, and with factories relocating to the sparsely populated regions of the country, the government began relocating workers over great distances.

In early 1942, the government began recruiting farmers and their families from rural collectives. They were taken away to work in factories only for a few months at a time, during the seasons

when there was less farm work, and sent back during the busy spring planting and autumn harvesting seasons.

Then they began recruiting prisoners from the gulags, the labor camps in Siberia. Then teenagers too young for military service, as young as fifteen. Some of the saddest stories involve these workers. These were young people who had not yet learned how to care for themselves and they were taken away from their families, sometimes over great distances, to work in factories and live in dormitories, often filthy, jammed together in bunk beds that were no more than wooden planks without bedding or blankets, boys and girls housed together, with little food and no medical care.

In many cases, the factory managers did not consider the welfare of these kids to be their responsibility and shrugged off their suffering. Fortunately for the teenagers, there was at least Komsomol, the Young Communists League. Members complained to the organization, which began advocating for young people within the government. Komsomol had its own magazine and publicity machine, so when it spoke, even the labor allocation committee had to listen. They sent investigators who reported on the treatment of these young workers. Late in 1942, the government began issuing mandates setting minimum living standards. For example, factories that could not acquire proper beds and bedding for their teenage workers were directed to manufacture their own. Not every workplace fully complied with the government standards, but it was a start.

In 1943, with labor shortages still plaguing war production, the government began to turn to the population of rural people in the Central Asian republics and sending them to work in the newly-established factories in the Ural Mountains and western Siberia. They were called *natsmeny,* a contraction of the Russian words for "national minority," and they suffered severe discrimination. They were also packed too many into dormitories with wooden planks for beds. Some workplaces had a separate canteen for the *natsmeny* that served what was left over from the workers' canteen—potato peels and vegetable scraps. Racism, hostility, and even violence against *natsmeny* were common. The death rate for *natsmeny* workers was notably higher than that of ethnic Russian workers in the same factories. Their pay was less than what it cost to eat in the canteen, and most of them couldn't speak Russian. Who could they complain to?

They could complain to the governments and Party committees in their home republics, that's who. Again, the organizations receiving the complaints passed them along to Moscow and demanded investigations. In July 1943, the government issued regulations requiring workplaces to set up separate canteens for Central Asian workers to be supplied separately and to be operated by cooks from Central Asia who knew how to cook the traditional dishes of the region. The government also required interpreters to be made available at every workplace that used Central Asian workers and loosened postal regulations for parcels from Central Asia, so the workers' relatives back home could easily send them clothing and personal items.

By late 1943, the Red Army was beginning to reclaim lands previously lost to the Germans. The inhabitants of these lands rejoiced when the Red Army liberated them, but the war was still on, and there was much work to do, beginning with the reconstruction of the villages and farms and mines and factories the Germans destroyed during their retreat. Soon the newly liberated were also drafted for their labor.

By 1944, with the momentum of the war clearly turning in the Soviet Union's favor, many relocated workers were no longer willing to put up with the appalling living conditions at their new workplace. Hundreds of thousands simply left to return home. This was technically against the law and these workers liable for severe penalties, but, ironically, understaffed law enforcement and prosecutorial offices couldn't keep up. Some were punished, others escaped the system untouched. In many cases, offenders were "sentenced" to work in factories back in their home towns, albeit at reduced pay.

By the end of the war, only a small minority of Soviet citizens were living in the same home they had lived in when the Germans invaded. When we think of war mobilizations, we think of soldiers marching back and forth across nations. We don't think about the so-called "home front" in that way, but in the Soviet Union, civilians were literally mobilized, in much the same way as the uniformed soldiers.

You can't understand the Allied victory in the Second World War without considering the contribution of the Red Army, which alone took on and defeated three-quarters of the German military. And you can't understand the Red Army's victory without considering the contributions of the Soviet public, who truly did sacrifice all for the front.

We'll have to stop there for today. I thank you for listening, and I'd like to thank Sheril for her kind donation, and thank you to Diederik for becoming a patron of the podcast. Donors and patrons like Sheril and Diederik help cover the costs of making this show, which in turn keeps the podcast available free for everyone always, so my thanks to them and to all of you who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd like to become a patron or make a donation, you are most welcome; just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

As always, the podcast website also contains notes about the music used on the podcast. You know the drill. If you hear a piece of music on the podcast and you would like to know more about it, including the composer, the performers, and a link to where you can download it, that would be the place to go. While you're there, you can leave a comment and let me know what you thought about today's show.

Next week is a bye week for the podcast, but I hope you'll join me in two weeks' time, here on *The History of the Twentieth Century*; as we revisit the American atomic bomb project. By 1943, the US had plants producing uranium-235 and plutonium in significant quantities. All they had to do now was figure out how to build a device that would initiate a fission chain reaction when you

wanted it to, but not any sooner. The Gadget, in two week's time, here, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. Before I go, I want to give the last word to a Red Army veteran, a man named Arkadiy Redko, who reflected after the war and concluded:

Of course, many nations and many countries suffered in this war, but I think that the heaviest hardships fell on our people. Would any other country have endured this? Not one army or state. I think any other country would have had to surrender…

Germans were merciless to so many peoples and particularly so to Jewish people. Only the Soviet people, united by the Party and Stalin could win after suffering such great losses…

[music: Closing War Theme]