

The History of the Twentieth Century

Episode 386

“Do or Die”

Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

*Lay the proud Usurpers low!
Tyrants fall in every foe!
Liberty's in every blow!
Let us Do or Die!!!*

Robert Burns, “Robert Bruce’s March to Bannockburn”

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 386. Do or Die.

We last talked about India in episode 360. I told you how the advance of Japanese troops through Burma and to the Indian border sent shock waves through the Indian nationalist movement. Reactions varied wildly. Some responded by declaring support for the British, on the argument that whatever Britain’s faults, Nazi Germany was infinitely worse. Others looked to the Axis for India’s liberation.

The Japanese led the creation of the Indian National Army, a nationalist force aligned with Japan and made up of Indian POWs captured by the Japanese and ethnic Indian civilians from Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia who were keen to take up arms for Indian independence and weren’t too picky about who their allies were.

On October 2, 1942, the Indian National Army put on its first public display: a parade through the streets of Singapore. The force numbered about 12,000 and was divided into three regiments named after Indian nationalist leaders: Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad. The last of these was named for Maulana Abul Azad, the most prominent Muslim in the Indian National Congress. It was no coincidence that the parade was held on the Mahatma’s 73rd birthday.

General Claude Auchinleck, commander of British forces in the Middle East, warned Winston Churchill that the fall of India would be devastating to the British war effort. “We could still hold India without the Middle East,” he told the prime minister, “but we cannot hold the Middle East without India.”

As the Japanese were advancing into Burma, the Premier of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, visited India in the hope of shoring up Indian support for the Allied cause. He was going to need it, once the Japanese took control of the Burma Road. Chiang left India deeply pessimistic. He told Churchill and Roosevelt that “if the Japanese should know the real situation and attack India, they would be virtually unopposed.”

In Washington, the Roosevelt Administration was determined that the United States would be fighting the war only to defeat the Axis, and not to assist European colonial powers in their struggle to maintain their holds over their colonial possessions. The US was not in the war to help the Dutch reclaim the East Indies, nor the French Indochina, and if the independence of India was what it took to defeat Japan, then India should be granted independence.

Franklin Roosevelt sent his own proposal to Winston Churchill. Since the stumbling block appeared to be that no one could come up with a formula for a new Indian government after independence, Roosevelt drew on US history and rather naïvely proposed for India something akin to the US Articles of Confederation. Indian provinces would be largely self-governing and each would have one vote in a national Congress that would deal with matters that transcended provincial borders. The system could be changed later, if and when a consensus emerged for a more unified system, as it had in the United States.

Roosevelt’s proposal was dead on arrival in London, but within the British coalition government, the Labour Party had also been pressing for action on Indian independence. At first, Churchill proposed to travel to India personally to negotiate an agreement with Indian nationalists on the shape of a future government. But was the 67-year-old prime minister, who had recently suffered a mild heart attack in Washington, up to the task physically? His doctor said no, and after Singapore fell, that was the end of that idea.

But if not Churchill, perhaps someone else? The someone else the Cabinet chose was the 51-year-old Stafford Cripps. You may recall we met him before, in episode 328, when Churchill appointed him the British Ambassador to the USSR in 1940. Cripps’ father had been a barrister and Conservative MP; Cripps became a barrister and a Member of Parliament himself, though you couldn’t exactly call him a Conservative. He was a leftist and sympathetic to Marxism, though he was also an Evangelical Christian. He’d been expelled from the Labour Party for advocating that the Party enter a Popular Front with the Communists.

Churchill had sent him to Moscow precisely because Cripps was famous for his willingness to work with Communists, and as Ambassador he helped forge the alliance between the UK and the

USSR. He returned to Britain in triumph in 1942 and was appointed to the Cabinet. Now he would attempt to use the credibility that effort had earned him to find peace in India.

Cripps arrived in India just as the Japanese Army completed their conquest of Burma and the Japanese Navy attacked the Royal Navy in Ceylon, sinking the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes* and the cruisers *Cornwall* and *Dorsetshire*. Refugees from Burma, Ceylon, and Madras were pouring into central India. The Japanese occupied the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal.

The urgency of settling the conflict over India's future had never been greater. Cripps met with the most important Indian nationalist leaders and discussed with them a plan for Indian independence he himself had devised: seats in the Viceroy's Executive Council would immediately be filled by Indians and that body would effectively become the Indian Cabinet for the duration of the war. The only British members of the Council would be the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the commander of the Indian armed forces, General Archibald Wavell. India's government would thus be all but autonomous.

Afterward, as soon as the war was over, India would receive full independence as a dominion within the British Empire, though India would be free to leave the Commonwealth if it wished. It would be up to the Executive Council to draft a constitution. Drafting a constitution that satisfied everyone had always been the sticking point, so Cripps proposed that any of India's provinces or princely states that objected to the new constitution should be free to secede.

It was the most generous offer yet, but Cripps was surprised and disappointed that it went nowhere. In London, the prime minister and Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, objected to it. That was to be expected. Lord Linlithgow was angry that Cripps was bypassing him and his office and negotiating with the nationalists directly. The Congress was angry because they saw the proposal as all but conceding to the Muslim League the power to create Pakistan.

Even so, Cripps and Louis Johnson, the American representative at the talks, and representatives of the Congress worked out a tentative agreement that would at least assemble the all-Indian Executive Council immediately, with the post-war terms to be hammered out later. Cripps even promised India would get a new and more accommodating Viceroy in place of Lord Linlithgow, if the nationalists wanted.

But after the Congress negotiators telephoned Mohandas Gandhi and described the agreement to him, they returned to tell Cripps regretfully that the deal was off. Cripps returned to London disappointed and angry, especially at Gandhi, whom he felt had sabotaged his mission. Gandhi famously dismissed Cripps's offer by describing it as a "post-dated check drawn on a failing bank."

Indians had always been told that, whatever else one might say about the British, they could at least be confident that Britain would protect and secure their nation from foreign threats. Now

even that was in doubt, hence Gandhi's comparing the British Empire to a "failing bank." What to do next?

The answer came to Gandhi on a meditation day. It was very Gandhi: simple, and bold. The British could not defend India from the Japanese, therefore there was no reason for the British to remain. They should leave India. Today. Full stop. Until they did, Indians would boycott everything British, from British goods to British courts to British postage stamps. Employees of the Raj and soldiers in the military would walk away. In short, Indians would live their lives as if the British had already left.

Wouldn't a British exodus leave India wide open to a Japanese invasion? No, Gandhi believed that the departure of the British would leave Japan with no incentive to invade India. To the contrary, an independent and neutral India would be free to enter into a mutual non-aggression treaty with Japan, which would benefit both nations. If the Japanese did try to invade, they would learn that newly independent India would fiercely defend its newly gained freedom, by satyagraha, or, if that failed, by force of arms.

The reaction of the other leaders of Congress to Gandhi's latest idea ranged from astonishment to horror. The British would regard Gandhi's demand that they leave at once as treason. They would all be imprisoned. And if the British did suddenly withdraw from India, the result would surely be chaos, anarchy, and widespread violence.

As to the first objection, Gandhi offered to moderate his proposal a little. India could remain one of the Allies, and the British and American militaries could stay. Only British rule had to end. As for the second objection, Gandhi acknowledged the risk of violence, but argued that Indian leaders should be guided by the dream of a free India, not by the fear of violence. Independence would serve to unify India. If violence did break out, it would be temporary and a better India would afterward emerge. Unfortunate as that might be, it was still preferable to slavery.

Gandhi answered every objection and Congress soon fell in line. No one had any better ideas. On August 7, 1942, Congress met in Bombay and passed a resolution calling on the British to leave India at once, and calling all India to a campaign of nonviolent resistance until they did. Thus began what history calls the Quit India Movement.

The following day, Gandhi addressed the Congress in what was perhaps the greatest speech of his career. "The bond of the slave is snapped the moment he considers himself a free being," he declared. That day was today. He invited all political organizations to join the Quit India campaign, calling out the Muslim League by name. There would be no negotiation and no compromise. If the Viceroy asked what he wanted, Gandhi told the crowd, he would tell the Viceroy: "Nothing less than freedom."

"Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you," he continued. "You may imprint it in your hearts...The mantra is: 'Do or Die.' We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

In fact, Gandhi had hoped to negotiate something with the Viceroy within a few weeks. But this was war, Churchill was prime minister, and the Japanese were on the border. That very night, Gandhi, Nehru, and the rest of the Congress leadership were taken by the police and imprisoned.

All India exploded into violent protests. In one instance, a mob killed two Canadian RAF officers, but otherwise there was virtually no violence against foreigners. Instead came weeks of vandalism and sabotage directed against government buildings, railway stations, and post offices. Protestors tore up railway lines and ripped down telegraph wires, isolating some regions from the rest of the country.

The government responded by mobilizing thousands of Indian and British soldiers to put down the riots. Thousands of protesters were killed or wounded; more than a hundred thousand imprisoned. Many protesters were subjected to public floggings. Congress was banned. Six weeks later, the Quit India Movement was crushed, and the British Raj was back in control, although the Viceroy and its other leaders still had to contend with the fact that some Indian soldiers had refused orders to combat the rioters, the first mutinies in the Indian Army since 1857.

Gandhi had misread the Indian public and underestimated his opposition, not surprising for a 73-year-old who spent most of his time spinning thread and meditating in his ashram. Other political groups in India, far from joining Gandhi's movement, criticized and rejected it. Hindu Mahasabha, the Hindu nationalist party, called on its members to disregard Gandhi and support the war effort. The Muslim League, which still led the parliaments of the three Muslim-majority provinces, told its members they already had self rule. The Communist Party in India supported the war effort for the defense of the Soviet Union.

Middle-class Indians were profiting from the war. Increasing numbers of British and American service personnel were getting assigned to India to operate supply flights over the Hump to China, and they had money in their pay packets and things they needed to buy. Most of the supplies being flown over the Hump to China were Indian products. India supplied nearly £300 million worth of goods to China, money that went into Indian pockets in the form of British sterling and American dollars. Virtually all of India's production of cloth and leather was bought up for military use.

By 1942, the staff of the Indian Civil Service was majority Indian. As for the Indian Army, Indian soldiers were now eligible to become officers, equal in rank and status to their British counterparts. Few Indians in either service saw any reason to quit their jobs.

The British minister of war who had first introduced native Indian officers into the Indian Army back in 1920 had been Winston Churchill, and no one was more pleased than he to see the Quit India Movement collapse. US President Franklin Roosevelt had been pressing Churchill to make some kind of public pledge of Indian independence after the war. Now Churchill could argue that

independence had been offered and it had been rejected. The real lesson of the Quit India Movement was how little popular support the hotheads of the Congress actually wielded.

A defiant Churchill declared, "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."

Gandhi was imprisoned, but not in an ordinary jail cell. The British put him up in the majestic palace of Aga Khan, built in 1892 in the city of Pune. He stayed in spacious, airy rooms and walked the extensive and carefully manicured gardens. His wife, Kasturbai, chose to move in with him, and the British permitted this.

The Mahatma had been humiliated. He'd expected at least to have one negotiating session with the Viceroy, in which he could explain his demands more carefully. The news of the rioting across India saddened him. In a letter to the Viceroy, he blamed the violence on his untimely arrest. Had the government waited, the "deplorable destruction would have most certainly been avoided." The Viceroy wrote back to Gandhi that the violence was his own fault, a charge that disturbed the apostle of non-violence greatly.

On December 31, 1942, Gandhi threatened a hunger strike unless the Viceroy would talk to him. The Viceroy made a counteroffer: Gandhi must first renounce Congress's Quit India resolution. Gandhi would not do this, and announced he would fast for 21 days. The Viceroy accused him of blackmail.

Previously, when Gandhi had gone on a hunger strike, the British released him. This time, the Viceroy would only agree to release him for the duration of the fast; afterward it was back to the Palace. Gandhi refused the offer.

Gandhi was an old man, with high blood pressure and a failing heart. Most people believed this fast would kill him. Still the British would not relent. Winston Churchill himself insisted his government make no concessions. Churchill had always regarded Gandhi as a phony: half lunatic and half fraud; the saintly figure revered by Indians was to Churchill merely a shrewd performer.

On February 10, Gandhi began his fast. On the 12th, Churchill wrote to Linlithgow to suggest that Gandhi was faking it and sneaking sustenance on the sly. He wanted the Indian government to investigate. The Viceroy wrote back to assure Churchill that Gandhi was sincere.

A week into the fast, Gandhi's health began to fail. The Indian members of the Viceroy's Executive Council walked out in protest. Two weeks into the fast, Gandhi appeared to be on his deathbed. The Viceroy implored Churchill not to allow Gandhi to die in prison; so did President Roosevelt.

Churchill would not budge. Ironically, Churchill was also flat on his back at this time, with a case of pneumonia, a very serious matter in a man of 68. Despite his condition, he kept asking

whether Gandhi was dead yet. The answer was always negative, prompting Churchill again to speculate that Gandhi was cheating on his fast somehow.

But Gandhi rallied a bit, and agreed to take some fruit juice. Hours later, in England, Churchill's fever broke.

Gandhi survived his fast and began to take food again after 21 days. Churchill cynically suggested Gandhi's health took a turn for the better as soon as he realized Churchill would not give in. The prime minister believed he and Britain had won a great victory.

In June, Churchill replaced Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy. His choice was Archibald Wavell, now a field marshal and commander-in-chief of the Indian armed forces. Churchill believed Wavell would support his hard line on India.

In this he was mistaken. Wavell had been handed a mess and he fully understood this. He believed a political solution for India could not wait until the end of the war.

Lord Linlithgow's parting advice to the new Viceroy was that there could be no progress in India until Gandhi was dead. Wavell did not accept this. He asked the British Cabinet to authorize him to appoint political leaders of all Indian parties to a national coalition government that would administer India for the duration of the war. Secretary of State for India Leo Amery endorsed the plan, but the Cabinet wouldn't have it.

Churchill was furious and summoned Wavell to a private meeting, in which he laid down the law. "[O]nly over my dead body," the PM declared, would any further discussions with Gandhi take place. He told Wavell in no uncertain terms that his role as Viceroy would be to focus on the war. To that end, he should keep the peace in India, but make no concrete promises concerning India's future afterward.

But circumstances would not allow the new viceroy to follow the prime minister's instructions. In India, a disaster as bad as the war and closer to home was unfolding.

[music: Street musicians.]

By late 1942, the tide was turning in the war, and as soon as the Quit India protests burned themselves out, and the railroads were repaired, and the telegraph wires restrung, Churchill was pushing for an offensive against the Japanese in Burma. This offensive began in December 1942, but it failed badly and had to be called off in March 1943. It seemed British and Indian soldiers lacked the necessary training for jungle warfare, while the Japanese had had months to prepare their defenses. The road network in East Bengal proved inadequate to move soldiers and supplies toward Burma in the numbers required.

That was not the only problem in Bengal. The fall of Burma had sent hundreds of thousands of refugees west into Bengal. That meant hundreds of thousands of mouths to feed at the very same time rice imports from Burma were cut off. The price of rice began to climb.

The government in New Delhi feared a possible Japanese invasion of the east coast of India and took preemptive steps in a sort of scorched-earth plan to make a successful invasion less likely. One of these steps was to confiscate tens of thousands of civilian-owned boats up and down the coast. The loss of the boats disrupted fishing in the Bay of Bengal and some of these boats were used to transport rice from rural farms to urban markets. Another step the British took was to order the removal or destruction of rice and other foodstuffs deemed surplus, to deny them to the invader.

The government took no action to compensate people in the affected region for their losses of income, food, and trade.

Hundreds of thousands of British, American, Indian, and Chinese soldiers were stationed in Bengal. Some were on the front line; others were involved in the airlift to China. They had to eat, too. The military took farmland for camps and airfields. The families living and working on these lands, more than a hundred thousand people, were compensated for what was taken, but now they had no livelihood. Some got work helping to build these camps and airfields. Others went to Calcutta, where the arms industry was booming, but not everyone found work, and it all meant less food production.

By mid-1942, the rising cost of food, especially rice, was becoming alarming, particularly in Bengal and the east coast, the part of the country where rice is a traditional staple and per capita rice consumption is highest. Under the war-related emergency laws, individual provincial governments and the princely states had the power to ban the export of grain. Nervous government officials, fearful of famine, began to exercise that power. As 1942 progressed, every individual province in eastern India became, in the words of one official, “a food republic unto itself.” In July, the government of Bengal approved a plan to guarantee supplies of rice to essential workers in war-related industries. This guaranteed supply for workers deemed essential meant everyone else—mostly rural people, farmers and unskilled laborers, had to compete for what was left; the high demand increased prices.

On October 16, 1942, a powerful tropical cyclone struck Bengal, in what in our time is Bangladesh. Floods killed 14,000 people and some 200,000 head of livestock, as well as destroying homes and devastating rice fields. In the aftermath of the floods came an outbreak of brown spot disease, a fungus that attacks rice plants.

There are three rice crops per year in Bengal, but the most important one is the one sown in June and harvested in November, which accounts for 70% of the region’s annual rice production. The cyclone had struck at the worst possible time.

By the beginning of 1943, leading government and military figures in India, including the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, Leo Amery, the British Secretary of State for India, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, and Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Southeast Asia, were all sending requests to their superiors for food shipments to alleviate the developing famine. These requests were made repeatedly throughout 1943, with increasing urgency, but the British War Cabinet continually refused to provide the requested aid.

As food became harder to find and prices soared, farmers sold their farms and families sold off their possessions to feed themselves. Often men left their families to search for work or join the Army, leaving behind increasingly desperate women and children, some of whom turned to prostitution or child-selling to survive. Calcutta was inundated with hundreds of thousands of desperate, starving people, often naked because of the high price of cloth, living in the streets, drinking from gutters, their bare flesh pounded by the monsoon rains. In these conditions, diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and smallpox spread rapidly through a population with weakened immune systems.

In 1943, as I already told you, Churchill replaced Lord Linlithgow with Archibald Wavell as Viceroy. In that position, Wavell continued to ask for food aid, which the Cabinet still refused to provide, citing the need for shipping for the upcoming invasion of Sicily in 1943, and Operation Overlord in 1944. Wavell declared the famine “one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people under British rule, and damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in India is incalculable.”

With regard to that last point, Wavell was alluding to those large numbers of British, American, and other foreign military personnel stationed in Bengal who were by now regularly confronted by the sight of weeping, starving, naked women and children whenever they walked the streets of Calcutta, not to mention the corpses, or the vultures and crows picking at them.

The Great Bengal Famine is one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the twentieth century. The death toll is difficult to calculate; both deaths by starvation and by disease have to be considered, and data from the time is sparse, particularly for rural regions. Estimates range from one to four million.

Longtime listeners will recall how I recounted the multiple famines in British India in the 19th century in episode 219, each of which caused deaths in the millions, but by the 1940s, most informed people would have told you that such disasters were a thing of the past and could not happen in the modern, advanced twentieth century. They would have pointed out that communication and transportation in India were much more efficient now. The government of India was more enlightened, and now many government decisions were being taken by native Indians, as opposed to foreigners.

So why did it happen? This is a difficult question, still much debated in our time. There is no one simple answer. The government of Bengal has to take a share of the blame. It was slow to recognize the problem and ineffective in its response, and remember that this was an elected provincial government, fully operational, and controlled by the Muslim League.

The cyclone of October 1942 wasn't anyone's fault, but it contributed to the famine. So did the war; we've seen over and over again how world wars produce world food shortages. Even so, some historians argue that the drop in food production in India from 1940-43 was not serious; the problem had more to do with mismanagement and unequal distribution. Panic buying, hoarding, and profiteering played their roles, as they had in the Victorian-era famines.

The most controversial question is what degree of blame can be laid at the feet of Winston Churchill and his War Cabinet. The Churchill government repeatedly refused aid, and used wartime censorship to prevent the news of the famine from going international. The Cabinet clearly prioritized the war effort over famine relief. Whether that was the proper decision is certainly open to debate. Some historians argue that Japanese raiders were sinking merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean at the time, and any attempt to send food aid to India risked the loss of valuable cargo ships. Others point out that Japanese raiding had largely ended by 1943, and that the British were regularly shipping grain from Australia to South Africa, the Middle East, and Ceylon throughout the crisis—everywhere but India, it seemed. Indeed, India was exporting rice and wheat during the famine, and somehow shipping was available for those exports.

I should note that Churchill did request assistance from the United States in transporting food to India, but Franklin Roosevelt turned him down, also on the argument that US shipping was needed elsewhere.

Then there is the question of Churchill and his personal antipathy to the Indian nationalist movement. Did that play a role? Was Churchill punishing India for disloyalty to the Empire? Leo Amery later recounted an argument with Churchill, in which Churchill blamed the famine on Indians “breeding like rabbits” and their “bestly religion,” and demanded to know why, if the famine was so serious, Gandhi was still alive.

In Amery's words; “Naturally, I lost patience and couldn't help telling him that I didn't see much difference between his outlook and Hitler's, which angered him no little.”

We'll have to stop there for today. I thank you for listening, and I'd especially like to thank Joseph and Frank for their kind donations, and thank you to Zrinka for becoming a patron of the podcast. Donors and patrons like Joseph and Frank and Zrinka help cover the costs of making this show, which in turn keeps the podcast available free for everyone always, so my thanks to them and to all of you who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd like to become a patron or make a donation, you are most welcome; just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

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And I hope you'll join me next week, here on the *History of the Twentieth Century*, as we turn from war and famine to glitz and glamour as we take a look at the American motion picture industry of this period. Hooray for Hollywood, next week, here, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. When Churchill blamed the Great Bengal Famine on Indians "breeding like rabbits," he was far from unique in his attitude. The writings of the early 19th-century economist Thomas Robert Malthus were well known in the mid-twentieth century; as you likely know, Malthus laid out an argument that population growth inevitably leads to a situation in which the population outgrows the supply of food, leading to famine, disease, war, and other such miseries.

Malthus, who was also a member of the Anglican clergy, argued that the only alternative to misery as a check on human population was law and morality. In his view, a society could only avoid the misery of overpopulation through a moral order of abstinence outside of marriage plus a practice of late marriage or no marriage at all, coupled with a legal system that strictly respected property rights. He figured the accumulation of property created a financial incentive to avoid having too many children.

So when Churchill blamed population increase and "bestly religion," he was only echoing the conventional Malthusian wisdom.

Thinking about famine has changed twice since then. The second view, popular in the postwar years, blamed famine on supply shocks: unexpected events such as floods or droughts or war that reduced food supply.

In our time, the prevailing view is that the underlying cause of famine is an inadequate or unjust system of distribution. Such a system may operate acceptably in normal times, but when a supply shock comes, like a cyclone, the system degenerates into a crisis.

In the case of the Bengal famine, the fact that it was the poorest and least powerful people in Bengal who starved tends to support the systemic explanation. Modern studies suggest that rice production in the province declined by no more than 10% in 1943, which is bad, but could have been managed without widespread starvation.

British rule certainly has something to answer for here. There was the racist assumption that Indian lives did not matter as much as European lives. I feel confident in saying that had there been a widespread shortage of grain in Suffolk, the necessary cargo ships would have been found. There was a British-imposed distribution system that insured those whom the British deemed useful to the war effort were fed, while everyone else had to fend for themselves.

One survey of popular biographies of Churchill, conducted in 2009, noted that none of them included the 1943 famine, though most of them discuss the death and destruction British bombers caused in Germany that same year. The historian who conducted the survey, J. Hickman, described the omission as “Orwellian.”

But it was not solely a British failure. As I said, the government of Bengal was slow to address the famine and its response was inadequate. Private interests in the province responded to the rice shortage by hoarding supplies and profiteering. The province of Punjab had a grain surplus that year; its government chose to use the surplus to drive down local food prices and win the approval of the lower classes in Punjab rather than alleviate the famine in Bengal.

In our time, as one study notes, the same region of India and Bangladesh suffered destructive cyclones in 2019, 2020, and 2021. Although there was death and destruction from the storms, and despite much larger populations, there was no widespread famine as was seen in 1943.

[music: Closing War Theme]