

The History of the Twentieth Century

Episode 364

“The Man with the Iron Heart”

Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

*The world is just a barrel-organ
which the Lord God turns Himself.
We all have to dance to the tune
which is already on the drum.*

Reinhard Heydrich on his deathbed, quoting the libretto of an opera composed by his father, Richard Heydrich.

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 364. The Man with the Iron Heart.

Spring of 1942 was an interesting time in Europe. The past winter had seen two dramatic events that had cast the Second World War in an entirely new light. The first was the Axis declarations of war that brought the United States into the conflict. The second was the stubborn refusal of the Soviet Union’s Red Army to collapse under the German blitzkrieg the way it was supposed to. Not only had the Soviet Union withstood Operation Barbarossa, becoming the first European country not to collapse upon being invaded by the Wehrmacht, but the Russian winter offensive had actually pushed the German Army back, something that hasn’t been seen since 1918.

What did these events portend for the future of the war? First and foremost is the nature of the anti-Axis alliance, now dubbed the United Nations. There were 26 declared members of the alliance, including the Big Four, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, but have you noticed that one of these things is not like the others?

On this list of nations, the Soviet Union stands out like, well, like a Bolshevik at a Royal garden party. The Soviet Union had been the ideological enemy of all the other nations on the list until, like, six months ago. It was also the ideological enemy of Nazi Germany, but that didn’t stop the USSR and Germany from becoming the best of friends, right up until the day they weren’t.

Another way in which the Soviet Union stands out is in the degree of its war effort. British and Commonwealth forces based in Egypt were engaging three German Army divisions. The Soviet Red Army was engaging more than 120.

In early 1942, there was concern expressed among British and American diplomats that Stalin and his government might strike a deal for a separate peace with Germany. Winston Churchill was sufficiently concerned to ask US President Franklin Roosevelt to agree to Stalin's request that the Western Allies recognize the Soviet Union's 1941 borders after the war. This would mean acceding to the Soviet annexations of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and parts of Finland. The Americans would not agree to this; in fact, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom ever recognized the annexation of the Baltic States and regarded them as under Soviet occupation until they achieved independence in 1991.

Even more than recognition of that border, Stalin wanted to see the British and Americans open a second front against Germany and take some of the pressure off the Red Army. When British diplomats pointed to the fighting in North Africa, Stalin scoffed so loud it echoed through the Kremlin. You call *that* a war? Franklin Roosevelt, sensing the importance of a second front to Stalin, had rashly promised to open one before the end of 1942, and to Winston Churchill would fall the unpleasant duty of meeting with Stalin personally in Moscow to explain to him a second front in Europe was militarily impossible for the foreseeable future.

Was Churchill telling the truth? Stalin had reason to wonder. The capitalists have been rooting for the fall of the Soviet Union ever since the October Revolution 22 years ago. Was he supposed to believe they were now committed to its defense?

In lieu of the second front, the Americans and the British were making generous offers of supplies and equipment to aid the Red Army in its struggle with the Wehrmacht, but the more generous the offers became, the more suspicious Stalin got concerning the motives of his allies. That's because Stalin's great fear was that the capitalists would give the Soviet Union just enough aid to put it on an equal footing with Germany, then sit back and watch as the fascists and the Communists battled each other to exhaustion.

Why did that worry him so? Possibly because it was exactly his own war strategy from 1939 to 1941: sit back and wait while the capitalist imperialists and the capitalist fascists destroy each other, after which Communism would rule the ruins.

The only way the Western Allies would be able to convince him they were truly committed to the defeat of Germany was by opening that second front. Not until British and American soldiers were fighting the Germans, not until their own blood was being shed, could Stalin believe his allies meant what they said.

Given this mistrust, how willing was Stalin to open negotiations with the Germans and conclude a separate peace? Some sources claim that the Soviets sent out peace feelers, probably in neutral

Stockholm, where both countries had well-staffed embassies. It is said that the Soviet side floated the idea of the USSR withdrawing back to its 1939 borders and conceding the Baltic States and the other territories the Soviets had seized between 1939 and 1941 to Germany, perhaps even ceding parts of western Belarus and Ukraine, but the German side is said to have rejected that as inadequate.

If true, that dismissal of the Soviet proposals likely came from Hitler himself. Hitler wouldn't even accept proposals from his own military that the Wehrmacht spend 1942 hunkered down and concentrate on holding what they had already taken. He'd tell anyone who listened stories about the crises he had faced in the decade before he came to power. He had stared into the abyss more than once, he would say, and confronted the choice between victory and death. With those formative experiences behind him, it would take more than a few setbacks in Russia to shake his confidence.

The past winter had unquestionably shaken the confidence of a lot of Germans, military and civilian alike, but when Hitler gave a speech in Berlin on March 12, 1942, he exuded optimism. The past winter had been the coldest Eastern Europe had seen in 140 years, he said, and yet the Wehrmacht had not broken as had Napoleon's army in 1812. He predicted that "the Bolshevist hordes who were unable to defeat German and allied soldiers last winter will be vanquished, indeed destroyed, by us this summer."

Hitler's attitude was not irrational. He was all too aware of the potential threat posed by the Anglo-American alliance. With the Wehrmacht locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Bolsheviks, only second-string Army units, numerous, but of poor quality, were available to garrison Western Europe. An Allied invasion, if and when it came, would presumably be carried out by the very best units available, units that might slice right through the German garrisons and be knocking on Westwall in a matter of weeks.

But if the Soviet Union were vanquished and the German armies fighting on that front were freed to defend in the West, the Wehrmacht could turn the entire continent into Fortress Europa, guarded by unbreachable defenses. Hitler was already preparing for that day; he'd ordered the construction of a chain of defensive positions all along the Atlantic and Channel coasts of France. Still, Hitler understood that time was not on Germany's side. The Americans would put their superior industrial capacity to work, and the longer the war in the East raged on, the more likely became that invasion in the West.

The German Army chief of staff, Fritz Halder agreed. It was imperative that the Army remain on the offensive in the East, as daunting a challenge as that might be, otherwise Germany "would cede the initiative to our enemies and never regain it."

Why did Halder and other leading figures in the German Army regard a renewed offensive against the Red Army as so daunting? On the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet military, army, navy, and air force, numbered about five million, of which about 2.9 million were

Red Army soldiers garrisoning the western frontier. By the end of 1941, the Soviets had suffered 3.7 million killed, wounded, missing, or captured. This was in line with what the German military anticipated, only they expected that degree of losses would mean the utter collapse of the Red Army. In fact, at the end of 1941, the Soviets had more soldiers facing the Axis than they had six months earlier and they were waging a successful offensive. Clearly the Germans had seriously underestimated the Soviet Union.

In contrast, Germany had lost about one million killed, wounded, missing, or captured in 1941 and was struggling to replace those. Halder believed that the Army needed at minimum 600,000 new soldiers, and Germany's Axis partners would have to contribute more soldiers as well.

Because of these uncomfortable facts, Hitler concluded that a general offensive along the entire front was no longer feasible. At the end of March 1942, Hitler and the military leadership met at the Wolf's Lair and proceeded to make exactly the same mistake they had made last year; that is, underestimating the Soviet Union. The *Führer* and his military commanders were in agreement in their assessment of the enemy: the Red Army had used up its last remaining reserves in the winter offensive and there was nothing left. One could already see signs that it was disintegrating. This year's German offensive would precipitate the final collapse.

On April 5, *Führer* Directive 41 was issued, outlining the 1942 offensive. It began by declaring that the Red Army was failing. Now it was time for the German Army to take back the initiative in one final offensive, designated Plan Blue, would destroy the Soviet ability to fight. Army Group Center would remain in position, while tying down as many Soviet soldiers as possible. Army Group North would complete the capture of Leningrad and link up with the Finns.

The most important and highest priority actions would be conducted by Army Group South, which would advance across the Don River and on to the Volga, where it would take Stalingrad and then secure the west bank of the Volga from there down to Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea. Once Army Group South took Astrakhan, the Soviet Union would be cut off from its supplies of oil from the Caucasus, and the oil fields' defenders would be cut off from supply and reinforcement. Units of Army Group South would then advance south and capture the crucial cities of Maikop, Grozny, and Baku, seizing the oil fields and the refineries that converted raw petroleum into fuel. After nearly a year of fierce combat on a scale the world had never before seen, the Wehrmacht badly needed that fuel.

The months of April and May were spent in preparation for Plan Blue, but before the offensive proper could begin, a few loose ends needed to be tied up. First was the problem of the Crimea. The German Army had captured the Crimean Peninsula in the autumn of 1941, with the exception of the city of Sevastopol, home of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which lay under siege throughout the winter. A planned assault on the city had had to be put off after the Soviets executed an amphibious landing of two armies on the Kerch Peninsula, the eastern end of the Crimea.

This Soviet force outnumbered the Germans on the Crimea and it was in better supply, because the Soviets could ship supplies over the sea to Kerch, but the soldiers in these two armies were mostly Azeris from the Caucasus, quickly recruited and poorly trained and equipped. There is some evidence that they lacked enthusiasm for the struggle to preserve the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in early spring of 1942, these two armies were ordered to advance, clear the Germans from the peninsula, and break the siege of Sevastopol. Facing them was the German Eleventh Army, commanded by Erich von Manstein. Despite inferior numbers, Manstein was able to maneuver his panzers to surround the advancing Soviet armies, capturing 160,000 prisoners and destroying hundreds of tanks and aircraft. The loss of so many young men was devastating to the small nation of Azerbaijan.

Once that threat was eliminated, the Eleventh Army could devote its full attention to the Siege of Sevastopol. The city would be taken on July 4, 1942. The Soviet side suffered 18,000 killed and 90,000 taken prisoner. The Germans lost 4,000 soldiers killed; their Romanian allies 1,500.

There was yet another loose end that needed to be dealt with before the main offensive could begin. During last winter's offensive, the Red Army had succeeded in creating a salient by pushing through German lines in Ukraine, near the city of Izyum. This salient needed to be eliminated.

Remember I told you that Stalin expected the main German offensive of 1942 would be against Moscow, when in fact the Germans were planning an offensive in the south? Ironically, and as you'll recall, in 1941 Stalin had predicted the main German attack would be in the south and reinforced that area, but the Germans went for Moscow.

Stalin had placed Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, an ethnic Ukrainian, in command of Soviet forces in Ukraine last autumn. Timoshenko and his political commissar, Nikita Khrushchev, also an ethnic Ukrainian, proposed to Stalin an offensive that would make use of the salient at Izyum as one of two pincers that would surround and capture the key city of Kharkov. Stalin approved the plan. The Soviet leadership believed the German Army was still battered from last winter and would be vulnerable to such a move; what they did not know was that the Germans had been building up their forces in exactly this region, in preparation for Plan Blue.

The German offensive was to be lead by the Sixth Army, commanded by General Friedrich Paulus. He was new to the position and inexperienced. He succeeded Marshal Walter von Reichenau after the latter had been promoted to the command of the entire Army Group South. Reichenau, by the way, only held that post for two months. He died after suffering a stroke while out for a run in the winter weather in January 1942. You may remember Friedrich Paulus from episode 357, when the OKH sent him to North Africa to have a chat with his old friend Erwin Rommel.

Paulus' Sixth Army was ordered to attack and eliminate the Soviet salient at Izyum, beginning May 18. The Germans were aware of a buildup of Soviet forces in the region, but were surprised

when Timoshenko began his offensive on May 12. The Soviet offensive advanced quickly, albeit with heavy casualties, but they were advancing into a trap. Paulus wanted to withdraw his Sixth Army, but Hitler ordered him to stand his ground as German panzers began circling behind the enemy.

At Timoshenko's urging, Khrushchev telephoned Stalin on the night of May 20 to request permission to abandon the offensive. Stalin refused to take the call himself and instructed Georgy Malenkov, secretary of the Central Committee, to find out what he wanted. Malenkov relayed Khrushchev's request to Stalin; Stalin told Malenkov to hang up on him.

The Germans surrounded and destroyed two Soviet armies, killing or capturing nearly 300,000 Red Army soldiers and destroying 1200 Soviet tanks and 500 aircraft. Red Army commissars, having learned from the tragic fates of their colleagues in 1941, knew enough by this time to strip off their commissar uniforms and dress in the uniform of a dead common soldier before surrendering.

Timoshenko and Khrushchev were convinced they would be executed after this disastrous defeat, but they were more fortunate than that. When Khrushchev next met with Stalin, Stalin emptied the ashes from his pipe on the top of Khrushchev's bald head and explained to him that it was a Roman tradition for a commander who had lost a battle to put ashes on his head in penance.

General Paulus, on the other hand, was amazed at Hitler's brilliant insight that the Sixth Army needed to stand its ground when Paulus believed it was time to retreat. The lesson he learned was to trust in the *Führer's* judgment. He would take this lesson with him to Stalingrad.

These defeats hurt Soviet morale, while raising the spirits of German soldiers and civilians alike. The Wehrmacht was surrounding and destroying Red Army formations of hundreds of thousands, just as it had in 1941. Surely the Red Army could not continue to take these kinds of losses. Certainly Hitler didn't think it could. The stage was now set for Plan Blue, to begin on June 28.

[music: Janáček, *Violin Sonata*]

Reinhard Heydrich was one of the most vicious of the Nazi elite, and that is up against some pretty stiff competition. In allocating responsibility for the cruelty and butchery of Nazism, only Adolf Hitler himself and SS chief Heinrich Himmler would rank higher than Heydrich. Hitler had once called Heydrich "the man with the iron heart." I believe he meant that as a compliment.

He had worked his way up through the SS literally from private to general. He was head of the Reich Security Main Office, which put him in command of the Gestapo, the criminal police, and the SD, the SS intelligence branch. He was president of the International Criminal Police Commission, or INTERPOL, control over which fell into Nazi hands after the *Anschluss*. He

helped organize Kristallnacht and the faked Polish attack on Germany that the Nazis used to justify invading Poland. He led the Nazi operation to murder 100,000 members of the Polish intelligentsia following the Fall of Poland and organized and commanded the *Einsatzgruppen* operating in the Soviet Union. No doubt you remember the last time we came across Heydrich; that was when he chaired the Wannsee Conference, the meeting that developed the architecture of Nazi mass murder.

You may recall too that in 1938, Adolf Hitler removed his foreign minister, Konstantin von Neurath, a holdover from the Papen government who was not himself a Nazi, although he was perfectly happy to serve in Hitler's government. Hitler replaced him with a real Nazi, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In 1939, following the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, Hitler appointed Neurath to the newly created post of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, as his consolation prize.

In that position, Neurath oversaw press censorship and the banning of political parties, trade unions, and public demonstrations in Czech lands. He applied the Nuremberg Laws to Jewish Czechs. When students protested the occupation of their homeland, Neurath ordered summary execution of their leaders and sent more than a thousand of their followers to concentration camps.

Hitler was dissatisfied with Neurath's supervision of Bohemia and Moravia, because by Nazi standards, that all counts as too gentle. In September 1941, he appointed Heydrich Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia and sent Neurath on leave, effectively ceding control over the "protectorate" to Heydrich. Upon receiving his appointment, Heydrich remarked, "We will Germanize the Czech vermin."

Partisan groups in Czech lands committed acts of sabotage or vandalism against the German occupation. There was labor unrest in Czech arms factories, which were crucial to the Reich's war effort. And worst of all, from a Nazi point of view, the Czechs were refusing to kneel to their betters.

Heydrich set out to teach the Czechs a lesson, and he didn't waste time. On his first day in his new office, he ordered the Czech prime minister arrested. By the end of his first week, over a hundred Czech prisoners had been executed. Lists of their names were posted throughout the land, to ensure the Czechs got the point. These policies earned Heydrich the nickname "The Butcher of Prague."

By February 1942, some 500 Czechs had been executed and ten times that number imprisoned. Heydrich's regime targeted dissidents, intellectuals, educated people, and former officers of the Czechoslovak Army, in an effort to snuff out the Czech language and culture. The work day was increased from eight to twelve hours, and Czech workers employed in jobs deemed non-essential were liable to be conscripted and sent to any corner of the Reich where the Germans felt their labor would be of more use. It was while he also held this position in Prague that Heydrich

oversaw the Wannsee Conference. One outcome of the conference was the establishment of the Theresienstadt Ghetto in the Czech town of Terezín as a holding site for Jewish Czechs. Theresienstadt would become the preferred place to send older and more prominent Jewish prisoners and was sometimes used as a showcase for Red Cross inspections, a kind of Potemkin concentration camp.

Heydrich's reign of terror produced the desired results; production in Czech arms factories was up and resistance to the German occupation had been all but eradicated. And by the end of his first bloody week ruling over Czechia, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in England had decided it wanted him dead.

Two Czechoslovak soldiers in exile, Jozef Gabčík, an ethnic Slovak, and Jan Kubiš, an ethnic Czech, were selected from a pool of 24 Czechoslovak soldiers in Britain trained by the British Special Operations Executive, or SOE, as the lead assassins of what the British codenamed Operation Anthropoid. Anthropoid is a zoological term for an animal that resembles a human being. You can draw your own conclusions over what inspired that particular name.

The two assassins, along with seven other Czechoslovak soldiers and supplies were dropped by parachute into Czechia on December 28. They went first to Pilsen, where they made contact with the Czech resistance, who helped them get to Prague, where they stayed in safe houses and spent the next five months plotting the murder of Reinhard Heydrich.

They chose to strike while Heydrich was en route by car from his home in a suburban village outside Prague, to Prague Castle, the headquarters of the German occupation. They chose a place along the road where a tight turn would force Heydrich's driver to slow down. Heydrich simplified matters by choosing to ride in a Mercedes convertible with the top down and no security escort. He meant this as a demonstration of confidence in his control over the Czechs.

On May 27, 1942, the assassins struck. As Heydrich's car reached the curve and slowed, Gabčík raised the British Sten submachine gun he had been hiding under his raincoat and attempted to fire it, but the gun jammed. Stens did that a lot.

The proper thing would have been for Heydrich's driver to hit the gas and get as far away from the site of the attempted assassination as quickly as possible, but Heydrich instead ordered the driver to stop, stood, and drew his Luger.

Neither Heydrich nor his driver noticed Kubiš, who was carrying an anti-tank grenade inside a briefcase. Kubiš tried to throw the briefcase into the open car, but his aim was poor and the briefcase landed on the road, against the car's right rear wheel. The explosion shattered windows and threw shrapnel that wounded Kubiš and several passersby.

The blast also tore through the fender of the car and shot shrapnel into Heydrich, including bits of upholstery from his seat. Undeterred, Heydrich jumped out of his car, pistol in hand, as did his

driver. Heydrich pursued Gabčík, while the driver went after Kubiš. Kubiš escaped, as did Gabčík, after exchanging gunfire with Heydrich.

Heydrich collapsed. Passersby flagged down a delivery van, which was commandeered to drive Heydrich to Bulovka Hospital, where surgeons attended to his wounds and picked the shrapnel from his body as best they could. Heydrich's spleen had to be removed.

SS chief Heinrich Himmler sent his personal physician to Prague to see to Heydrich's care. Hitler's personal physician suggested the use of one of those newfangled sulfa drugs developed by Bayer, the German pharmaceutical firm, but these drugs sometimes triggered severe adverse effects and Himmler's physician decided against it. Heydrich seemed to be recovering nicely, although he was in pain and running a fever.

He continued to improve, apparently, until June 3, a week after the attack, when he fell into a coma and died early the following morning, apparently of sepsis, although some think it may have been a pulmonary embolism triggered by his shrapnel injuries.

Adolf Hitler was in Finland that day, June 4, for a surprise 75th birthday celebration for the Finnish military's commander-in-chief, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. This visit is notable for a couple of reasons. First, it adds Finland to the short list of nations Hitler visited in his lifetime, along with Germany, Austria, and Italy, as well as places under German occupation during either of the world wars.

Second, a Finnish engineer surreptitiously recorded Hitler's private conversation with Mannerheim. The recording still exists today as the only known recording of Hitler speaking in private, as opposed to a public address.

Hitler got along fine with the Finns, but was outraged by the news of Heydrich's death dealt by the hand of an assassin. In Nazi logic, Heydrich, the SS, the Party, and the entire Reich were the victims of a heinous war crime committed by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, aided and abetted by the British.

Hitler immediately ordered that 10,000 Czechs be killed in retribution, but he backed down from that demand when Himmler pointed out that so many deaths in a small country could not help but affect the workers in those crucial arms factories, diminishing their morale and leading to low productivity.

SS investigators quickly concluded—wrongly—that the assassins had been hiding in the village of Lidice, about 12 kilometers outside of Prague. Early in the morning of June 10, six days after Heydrich's death, police and SS officers closed off the village. All men and boys 16 years of age and over—173 in all—were taken to a farm on the edge of town and shot to death, their bodies left to rot where they fell. Eleven other men who were out of town at the time were tracked down, arrested, and also murdered. Eight men and seven women who were already in German

custody because they had relatives in the Czechoslovak army in exile in the UK were also put to death.

The 203 women of the village were rounded up. The four of them who were pregnant were taken to Bulovka Hospital, the same hospital where Heydrich had died; there doctors performed forced abortions on them. They and the other women were then sent to a labor camp where they spent the rest of the war doing war-related manufacturing for the German military.

The 105 children of the village were separated from their parents and taken into custody. The SS examined them and determined that seven of them were capable of Germanization—which likely meant that they were blond and blue-eyed. These children were adopted into the families of seven SS members and raised as Germans. The other 98 children were taken to the death camp at Chełmno and murdered.

The pets and other animals living in Lidice were also killed, then the town was set ablaze. After the fire burned out, whatever structures that had survived were destroyed with dynamite. The corpses in the village cemetery were exhumed and looted of their jewelry and gold fillings. Work crews cleared away all that remained of Lidice and covered the site with topsoil, erasing every last trace of the town.

The assassins, meanwhile, were still at large. They hid in two safe houses in Prague and then in the Orthodox Cathedral of Saints Cyril and Methodius. The Germans publicized the destruction of Lidice and threatened worse massacres unless the killers were handed over within a week; that is, by June 18. They also offered a reward of one million Reichsmarks for information leading to the capture of the assassins.

A Czech soldier in exile named Karel Čurda, whom the British had also airdropped into Czechia for a different operation, turned himself in and claimed the reward money after identifying several safe houses in Prague. The families living in those houses were arrested, tortured, and interrogated.

The SS learned that the killers were hiding in the cathedral. They surrounded the building and assaulted it. A two-hour firefight left everyone inside the church dead, including Kubiš and Gabčík.

Everyone and anyone connected to the assassins or the occupants of the safe houses were arrested and killed, along with as many of their family, friends, and associates as could be identified, as were the bishop and priests of the cathedral. No one can say for certain how many people in total were killed; estimates range from 2,000-5,000.

The Nazis normally had the good sense to keep their atrocities under wraps, but in this instance, they boasted of it over the radio in broadcasts monitored around the world, and the world responded with revulsion.

The British government and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile were both taken aback by the savagery of the Nazi retribution. Winston Churchill proposed that the RAF firebomb three German villages in retaliation for the destruction of Lidice, but was dissuaded when it was pointed out that this likely would trigger further atrocities against the Czechs or against British villages.

The SOE later considered a plan to assassinate Hitler, but it was never attempted, and there never were any further Allied efforts to assassinate high-ranking Nazis.

In July 1942, the Germans began executing their plan to murder all Jewish people in the General Government. In the four months that followed, nearly 1.5 million Jewish people were murdered in one of the death camps set up in Poland for this purpose. I will have more to say about this in a future episode; for now I simply want to point out that the Germans called it Operation Reinhard, and it was the deadliest four months of the Holocaust. The historical evidence is ambiguous, but it is widely believed the operation was named after Reinhard Heydrich, the man with the iron heart.

We'll have to stop there for today. I thank you for listening, and I'd especially like to thank Joe for his kind donation, and thank you to Jonas for becoming a patron of the podcast. Donors and patrons like Joe and Jonas help cover the costs of making this show, which in turn keeps the podcast available free for everyone, so my thanks to them and to all of you who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd like to become a patron or make a donation, you are most welcome; just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

The podcast website also contains notes about the music used on the podcast. Sometimes it's my own work, sometimes it's licensed, but many times, the music you hear here is free and downloadable. If you hear a piece of music on the podcast and you would like to know more about it, including the composer, the performers, and a link to where you can download it, that would be the place to go. While you're there, you can leave a comment and let me know what you thought about today's show.

Next week is a bye week for the podcast, but I hope you'll join me in two weeks' time, here on the *History of the Twentieth Century*, as consider the naval situation in the Atlantic and the effect of US entry into the war. The Second Happy Time, in two weeks' time, here, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. News of the eradication of Lidice shocked the world. In Britain, an organization called Lidice Shall Live was formed to raise money for the reconstruction of the village after the war.

In a number of Allied nations, local towns and neighborhoods renamed themselves Lidice in defiance of the Nazi effort to erase the village, including neighborhoods in Medeiros Neto, Brazil and Caracas, Venezuela. A town in Illinois in the USA renamed itself Lidice, as did a town in

Panama. A village outside Mexico City renamed itself San Jerónimo Lidice. Streets and squares in Coventry, England, Santiago, Chile, and Sofia, Bulgaria were named after the town, and there are Lidice monuments in Illinois and Wisconsin in the US and in Bremen, Germany.

After the war, a new village of Lidice was built on a site overlooking the location of the old village, where today there is a park with a fountain, memorials to the victims, and a museum.

[music: Closing War Theme]