

The History of the Twentieth Century

Episode 359

“Order 9066”

Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

After the attack at Pearl Harbor, there was an irrational fear among many Americans that a Japanese invasion of the US West Coast was imminent, which resulted in needless cruelty and suffering among some of America’s own people.

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 359. Order 9066.

The subject of immigration to the United States from East Asian nations has come up repeatedly on this podcast. The earliest such immigrants were Chinese. Most of them were men and most of them came to California during the period of roughly 1850-1880, drawn by work opportunities related to the California Gold Rush and the expansion of the railroads.

Chinese immigrants faced a great deal of racial prejudice, especially in the Pacific coastal states of California, Oregon, and Washington. Chinese immigrants were widely perceived as unfairly taking jobs from white workers.

Opposition to immigration from China became so intense that in 1882, the US Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which entirely prohibited Chinese people from immigrating to the United States at all, with a few narrow exceptions. The Act applied not only to immigrants from China itself but to all ethnic Chinese, regardless of their national origin. It barred Chinese already resident in America from acquiring US citizenship. It provided that ethnic Chinese residents who left the United States could not re-enter the country. It even prohibited family reunification, which was a big deal because many of these immigrant workers were men who left wives and children behind, intending to send for them later, after they established themselves in America. The Act made that impossible; it even made it impossible for these men to visit their families, unless they were willing to give up their US residency.

Moreover, some states enacted laws that banned marriage between ethnic Chinese and white people. Some had laws barring ethnic Chinese from owning real property or holding public office. Ethnic Chinese children were sometimes taught in segregated schools. Outbursts of racial violence against Chinese-Americans were a regular occurrence in the Pacific States.

The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of these laws, although in the 1898 case of *Wong Kim Ark v. United States*, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution means what it says, that any person born in the United States held irrevocable citizenship from the moment of their birth, irrespective of the legal status of their parents. Even so, the Chinese-American population began to decline after 1882, from 100,000 in 1880 to 60,000 in 1920.

Later, when the US took possession of Hawaii and the Philippines, the ban on Chinese immigration was extended to those lands.

None of this went down very well in China, which previously had had friendly relations with the United States. Most people in China saw these laws as insulting, but there wasn't much the Chinese could do about it, other than occasionally organize boycotts of American imports, such as the one that ran from 1904 to 1906.

As Chinese immigration dwindled to a trickle, the niche they left open was quickly filled by Japanese émigrés. Between 1882 and 1924, roughly 200,000 Japanese emigrated to the mainland United States and another 200,000 to Hawaii, numbers far exceeding the Chinese-American population. By the way, these numbers include ethnic Koreans. Remember that Korea was for some of this time part of the Japanese Empire.

As you might expect, the people who opposed Chinese immigration and worked to end it weren't any happier with Japanese immigration. You'll recall that in 1907, the San Francisco School Board sparked an international incident when it decided to move Japanese-American (and Korean-American) students from its white schools to its Chinese schools. Afterward, the US and Japanese governments entered into the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement," under which Japan would voluntarily and informally limit emigration to the United States. I talked about that in episode 43.

US President Woodrow Wilson didn't help Japanese-American relations any when he blocked Japan's anti-racism clause from inclusion in the charter of the League of Nations in 1919, episode 199. Nor did the US Congress, when it passed the Immigration Act of 1924, which closed off all immigration from Asian nations, including Japan.

Can you guess what happened next? The immigration opportunities no longer available to the Chinese or the Japanese were next taken up by Filipinos. The Philippines were exempt from the Immigration Act of 1924, and in the ten-year period from 1920 to 1930, the Filipino-American population increased eightfold, from 5,600 to 45,000, mostly agricultural laborers in California.

Here's a fun fact: I have an uncle who in 1930 was working on a farm in the San Joaquin Valley in California; he supervised a couple dozen Filipino laborers.

I'll have more to say about Filipinos and the Philippines later. For now, let's focus on Japanese-Americans. In 1905, a political organization called the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League was formed in San Francisco. Two years later, it changed its name to the Asiatic Exclusion League, broadening its agenda to include ethnic Indians and Chinese. This was the group that lobbied for the 1907 segregation action by the San Francisco School Board. That same year, an Asiatic Exclusion League was organized in British Columbia. One of its first actions was to incite a mob of white people to riot in Vancouver's Japantown.

The Asiatic Exclusion League and its successor, the California Joint Immigration Committee, coordinated anti-immigration efforts of a number of other organizations, including labor unions, farmers' groups, and the American Legion. In 1927, it broadened its agenda again to include Filipinos and Mexicans.

Within the Japanese-American community, the end of Japanese immigration in 1924 created a clear cut line between first-generation Japanese immigrants, known as *issei*, a Japanese word that literally means "first generation," and their US-born children, the *nissei*, the second generation and their children, the *sansei*, the third generation. The 1924 law banned Japanese non-citizen residents from becoming US citizens, often making the older *issei* dependents of their *nissei* children who, unlike them, could rent or purchase property.

In 1936, the US Office of Naval Intelligence began monitoring the Japanese-American community in Hawaii. ONI and the FBI later began compiling lists of Japanese-Americans seen as possible security threats, so that they could be imprisoned in the event of a national emergency.

In 1941, President Roosevelt ordered a study to assess the loyalty of Japanese-Americans living in Hawaii and the West Coast. The study produced a report which concluded "There is no Japanese problem on the West Coast...[there is] a remarkable, even extraordinary, degree of loyalty among this generally suspect ethnic group."

Then came the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Americans showed little sign of hostility toward ethnic Japanese in their own country, but that began to change with the beginning of the new year. Japanese land and naval forces were expanding their reach throughout the Western Pacific at a breathtaking pace, while the US and its allies reeled from one defeat to another. Many Americans began to think that a Japanese invasion of the West Coast of the United States was in the offing.

Generally speaking, in circumstances like this, when a nation's enemies win a string of unexpected victories, you often find citizens of that country in search of an explanation turning to suspicions of sabotage and subversion. They think: it can't be possible that the enemy fights that much better than we do, they must be engaged in some kind of devious infiltration of our nation and our military.

And so it was in America of 1942, with Japanese-Americans the target of these kinds of suspicions. The vast majority of mainland Japanese-Americans lived in California at that time, where there was already a long-simmering racial animosity toward Japanese-Americans, as we've seen, and California seemed the most likely landing site of the feared Japanese invasion. The combination of these three facts would lead to dark deeds.

On December 18, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed a commission to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack. It was known as the Roberts Commission, after Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, who chaired it. On January 24, 1942, the Commission released its report. Its most important finding was that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the Navy and Army commanders on the scene at Pearl Harbor, were guilty of dereliction of duty.

The report also asserted that the attack was assisted by Japanese spies on the island of Oahu, and suggested there were 200 such agents. The Commission offered no evidence to support this claim, and did not explicitly say that any of these agents were Japanese-American citizens or residents, but who else could they be?

The report set off a firestorm, with elected officials and journalists, especially in California, embracing calls for the removal of Japanese-Americans from the Pacific coast. In December, the *Los Angeles Times* asserted in an editorial that Japanese-Americans in California were "good Americans." Six weeks later, the *Times* called for their relocation. Elected officials in California joined in. California's entire congressional delegation endorsed relocation, as did the state's Democratic governor, Culbert Olsen, and its Republican attorney general, Earl Warren.

US Army Lieutenant General John De Witt, commander of the Army's Western Defense Command, which was responsible for the defense of the US Pacific coastal region, was outspoken in his fears both of a Japanese attack on the West Coast and of sabotage conducted by Japanese-Americans. He claimed Japanese reconnaissance planes were flying over San Francisco. His warnings of possible Japanese attacks led to the 1942 Rose Bowl college football game being moved to North Carolina.

Walter Lippmann, the most prominent liberal columnist in America spoke with De Witt and was sufficiently convinced to publish in his newspaper column on February 12 a call for the removal of Japanese-Americans, under the headline FIFTH COLUMN ON THE WEST COAST. Most other columnists and editorial writers followed suit.

A Congressional subcommittee on aliens and espionage recommended to President Roosevelt the removal of “all persons of Japanese lineage...aliens and citizens alike” from California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska.

A few days later, De Witt formally asked the War Department for the authority to remove all ethnic Japanese from the West Coast. Many within the Roosevelt Administration objected to the request, including Attorney General Francis Biddle, who called it “ill-advised, unnecessary, and unnecessarily cruel.” FBI director J. Edgar Hoover called the proposal “entirely unwarranted.” In testimony before Congress, Army deputy chief of staff General Mark Clark said the odds of a Japanese invasion of the US West Coast were zero. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark told Congress that a Japanese attack on the West Coast “would be impossible.”

On the other hand, within the War Department, Assistant Secretary John McCloy said, “If it is a question of safety of the country or the Constitution of the United States, why the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.” De Witt was asked, if there were Japanese saboteurs on the West Coast, why it was that ten weeks into the war, not a single act of sabotage had taken place? In a remarkable display of pretzel logic, De Witt replied that the absence of sabotage attempts was ominous, as it suggested that the saboteurs were being centrally directed, and when the sabotage did come, it would be in the form of mass attacks all at once.

War Secretary Stimson was uncertain, so he consulted with the President. Roosevelt took no position and left the decision with Stimson, who gave McCloy free rein. Ultimately, it was McCloy’s decision to proceed, but Roosevelt and Stimson have to share the blame, since either of them could have eighth-sixed the proposal, but neither of them chose to do so.

On February 19, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, drafted by the War Department, which authorized the US military to designate at their discretion areas “from which any or all persons may be excluded.” The order made no explicit mention of Japanese-Americans, but everyone knew what it meant.

The removal effort began in March. Over 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry were forced out of their homes and imprisoned in what were delicately called “relocation centers” but were in fact concentration camps. Two-thirds of them were US citizens. They were allowed only a small baggage allowance; everything else they owned, including homes, businesses, and farms, had to be sold to white Americans. The US government did not offer storage facilities, nor did it take any action to insure fair prices, meaning that the relocated people had to sell their property quickly for whatever price they could get, often pennies on the dollar. It is estimated that the Japanese-American community collectively lost about \$400 million this way, equivalent to about \$5 billion dollars in our time.

Japanese-Americans had a significant presence in agriculture in California, much to the resentment of white farmers. The head of one farmers’ group told the *Saturday Evening Post* “We’re charged with wanting to get rid of the [Japanese] for selfish reasons. We do. It’s a

question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over... If all the [Japanese] were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks because the White farmers can take over and produce everything the [Japanese grow]. And we do not want them back when the war ends, either."

The absence of Japanese-American farm labor in California, at a time when millions of young white men had been drafted into the armed forces, created a serious agricultural labor shortage. In some instance, Japanese-Americans were released from the camps temporarily to do farm labor. The shortage led the US government to work out an arrangement with Mexico to allow Mexican farm workers temporary permission to work on American farms. This became known as the Bracero Program, *bracero* being a Spanish word that roughly means "someone who works using their arms." The program would continue until 1964. Mexican workers admitted under the program were promised a guaranteed wage and healthy living conditions, though these promises went mostly unenforced.

Most of the concentration camps were located on Indian reservations; the tribes were paid for the use of the land. The prisoners were held behind barbed wire and guarded by US Army soldiers, with orders to shoot anyone who tried to escape. The prisoners lived in communal barracks, constructed of wood with tar-paper roofs, heated by coal stoves. Bathrooms were also communal. The quality of the food was poor; food poisoning was a chronic problem.

In Canada, the government of Prime Minister William Mackenzie King followed suit with an internment order that barred people of Japanese ancestry from lands within 100 miles of the Pacific Ocean. About 22,000 Canadians were relocated, mostly to camps in the prairie provinces, where some were employed as farm laborers. Living standards were poor, as in the United States. Japanese-Canadian property was confiscated by the government and sold at auction, ostensibly with the proceeds to be paid to the owners, though the property usually sold for below-market prices.

In Hawaii, where one-third of the territory's entire population was of Japanese ancestry, the larger Hawaiian public opposed their imprisonment as both impractical and likely to result in severe economic dislocation in the islands. As a result, only a small fraction of them were imprisoned. No one in the US government or military offered any explanation for why it was a military necessity to remove people of Japanese ancestry from the mainland Pacific coast, but not Hawaii.

Within the Japanese-American community, most held it was best to comply with the relocation, rather than resist, as resistance would likely be seen as confirmation of disloyalty. But there were lawsuits, which culminated in the Supreme Court's December 1944 decision, *Korematsu v. United States*, in which the Court by a 6-3 margin upheld the exclusion of Japanese-Americans. The decision has been called "a stain on American jurisprudence." Nonetheless, in *Ex parte Endo*, another decision handed down the same day, the Court held unanimously that the US

government could not detain a US citizen absent any evidence of disloyalty. In other words, relocation was one thing, detention a whole other thing.

In response to the Supreme Court, the Roosevelt Administration rescinded the removal order and began allowing Japanese-Americans to return to the Pacific Coast.

[music: Purcell, *The Old Bachelor*]

It's been a long time since we talked about the Philippines on this podcast, and since the islands are currently part of a war zone, it might be a good idea to get caught up.

The United States seized possession of the Philippines during the Spanish-American War and then fought an ugly war against the Filipinos to maintain its rule over that country. American rule began during a Republican administration, that of William McKinley, and in the 1900 Presidential election, Democratic nominee William Jennings Bryan made independence for the Philippines one of his campaign issues.

Bryan lost that election, but the Democratic Party continued to include Philippine independence in its party platform thereafter, while Republicans maintained that the Philippines were better off under US control and the country was not ready for independence.

The election of 1912 put Woodrow Wilson into the White House, making him the first Democratic President since the Philippines became an American possession. Many Filipinos believed, or hoped, that the accession of Wilson to the Presidency meant that independence was at hand.

In Congress, one of the Philippines' two resident commissioners was Manuel Quezon, an astute politician who lobbied hard for the islands. He helped draft a bill for Philippine independence in 1911. Woodrow Wilson, however, did not rank Philippine independence as a major policy issue. He did appoint as Governor General the person Quezon recommended to him, New York Democratic Congressman Francis Burton Harrison. In that post, Harrison replaced American officials with Filipinos in the Philippine government, a policy he called "Filipinization," which was very popular among Filipinos. Among Republicans in the United States, less so.

Meanwhile, Quezon, leery of the rising power of Japan, shifted his priorities away from independence and toward an autonomous Philippine government, elected by and consisting of native Filipinos.

In 1916, Congress passed and Wilson signed the Jones Act, which replaced the Presidentially-appointed Philippine Commission, the upper house of the Philippine legislature, with a Filipino-elected Senate, and pledged US support for independence, although no fixed date was set. This marked the first time a Western colonial power granted this degree of autonomy to one of its colonial possessions or promised eventual independence.

In 1920, Republican Warren G. Harding was elected President on a platform of restoring “normalcy,” which in the case of the Philippines, meant US rule for the foreseeable future. In 1921, Harding sent University of Pennsylvania provost and former Presidential candidate General Leonard Wood to the Philippines, on a mission to report on the state of that country. Wood and his colleague W. Cameron Forbes, reported back to Harding that Filipinization had led to corruption and a deterioration in government services.

This report didn’t exactly endear him to leading Filipinos, who were further dismayed when Harding appointed Wood the new Governor General. His relationship with the Philippine government was tense. Wood vetoed 16 bills passed by the Philippine legislature in his first year as governor general; compare that to Harrison, who had vetoed only five bills over seven years.

This tension broke into open conflict in July 1923. The mayor of Manila suspended an American detective named Ray Conley, who worked in the Manila Police vice squad. Conley was accused of taking bribes, dealing in opium, and “immorality,” the exact nature of which went unspecified. Secretary of the Interior José Laurel approved the suspension, but Wood intervened and ultimately arranged for Conley to retire with full benefits.

This interference in a routine administrative matter infuriated the Filipinos. Seven Filipino members of Wood’s cabinet, including Quezon and Laurel, resigned in protest. The Filipinos sent a delegation to Washington to explain their side of the story to President Harding, but Harding died unexpectedly before they had the chance to talk to him. The new President, Calvin Coolidge, told them that Wood was a fine administrator and that their opposition to his administration was evidence of “unpreparedness for the full obligations of citizenship.”

Wood remained Governor General until his death from a brain tumor in 1927. Quezon met with Coolidge and recommended Henry Stimson, Taft’s former secretary of war and Herbert Hoover’s future secretary of state. Coolidge agreed to appoint him.

Quezon got along with Stimson well enough, though Stimson was yet another American who doubted that Filipinos were ready to manage their own country. By this time, Quezon was close to abandoning the quest for independence; he and Stimson discussed a sort of dominion status for the Philippines, similar to Canada’s relationship to the United Kingdom.

The political landscape changed drastically from 1929 to 1931. First came the Great Depression. With tough times upon them, the American sugar and dairy lobbies, among others, called for tariffs on imports from the Philippines, while the large number of Filipino immigrants who came to the US since 1924 led to calls for restrictions. Why not kill two birds with one stone by granting the Philippines their independence, which would immediately make them subject to American immigration and tariff laws.

On the other hand, when the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, a stronger American military presence in the Philippines seemed advisable, to deter Japanese aggression. The British and the

Dutch thought so, and pressed the Americans either to beef up defense of the archipelago, or else let them do it. Arthur MacArthur's son Douglas MacArthur, former military commander of the Philippines and now US Army chief of staff, agreed. But with the Depression on and government revenues shrinking, Herbert Hoover was hesitant about spending more money on the defense of the distant Philippines. Many anti-war Americans agreed, and called for Philippine independence as a means to keeping the United States out of any future war.

From the Philippine point of view, the Great Depression and Japanese militarism were two good arguments for maintaining the status quo with the United States, at least for a while. Manuel Quezon began to float the idea of independence after a 10-20 year transition period.

In 1932, after the Democrats took control of Congress, a bill that provided for Philippine independence after a five-year transition period easily passed the House of Representatives, with representatives from farm states fully in support. Most of the opposition came from industrial states, which were reluctant to give up the captive Philippine market.

The Senate was less enthusiastic, but by January 1933, the two houses compromised on independence after a ten-year transition, during which the Philippines would be an autonomous commonwealth. Herbert Hoover, who was in his stubborn "I'm the smartest man in the room so just shut up and do as I say" phase at the time, promptly vetoed the bill. Congress promptly overrode his veto.

But the bill required the assent of the Philippine legislature, and Manuel Quezon arranged for the Philippine Senate to reject it, on the argument that he could get a better deal from the Americans. Quezon's idea of a better deal was one that had his name on it.

After negotiations with the Roosevelt Administration, Congress passed a new bill with only minor changes from the earlier law the Philippine Senate rejected. Quezon returned home in triumph, declared the bill a great victory for the Philippines, and got the Philippine legislature to ratify it. Manuel Quezon would then win election as the first President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, set to govern over a ten-year transition to independence, scheduled for 1946.

Quezon was inaugurated on November 15, 1935. Among the American dignitaries at the inauguration ceremony was General Douglas MacArthur, who had a long and complicated relationship with the Philippines, beginning with his father, Arthur MacArthur who, as you know, served as military governor of the Philippines during the Philippine-American War. Douglas graduated from West Point, served in the Veracruz occupation in 1914 and in the First World War. He became known for his reckless heroism and his flamboyant style, which included some eccentric deviations from the regulation US Army uniform. Some soldiers derided him by referring to him as "Beau Brummel." MacArthur explained it this way: "It's the orders you disobey that make you famous."

After the war, he became Superintendent of West Point, then one of the youngest generals in the Army, and eventually rose to the command of the US Army in the Philippines. In that role, he developed a good relationship with leading Filipinos, including Quezon. He was far more willing to mingle with Filipinos socially than were most American expatriates in Manila, who were offended by his affection for brown people. Ironically, one of his tasks in the Philippines was to survey the Bataan Peninsula as part of Plan Orange, the Army war plan for defending the islands.

In 1930, MacArthur became Army chief of staff. It was in that position that MacArthur sicced the troops on the Bonus Army in Washington in 1932, episode 280. By this time, MacArthur had been married, divorced, and was now carrying on an affair with a Filipina woman.

MacArthur got along not at all well with the new President Roosevelt, and the feeling was mutual. Recall that Roosevelt had once called MacArthur “a Mussolini in waiting.” When Manuel Quezon was elected President of the Philippines, he invited his old friend to become military adviser to the new Philippine government. MacArthur agreed and Roosevelt, eager to get rid of him, approved the arrangement.

Aboard the ship *SS President Hoover* on the way over to the Philippines, the 55-year-old MacArthur met a woman of 37 named Jean Marie Faircloth. They married about two years later, and in 1938 Jean gave birth to a son, whom they named Arthur MacArthur, in honor of Douglas’s father. Manuel Quezon and his wife Aurora would be the boy’s godparents.

MacArthur demanded from the Philippine government salary and benefits comparable to what the governor general got; that is, \$33,000 per year and an air-conditioned penthouse suite on the top floor of the Manila Hotel. In 1936, President Quezon made MacArthur a field marshal in the Philippine Army, at MacArthur’s request, making him the only US Army officer to hold that rank, albeit in a different army. Eisenhower described it as “pompous and rather ridiculous to be the field marshal of a virtually nonexistent army.”

MacArthur brought with him his aide, Major Eisenhower. The two soldiers detested each other, but MacArthur recognized Eisenhower’s organizational abilities.

Later in their careers, after Eisenhower rose to prominence, MacArthur would refer to him as “the best clerk I ever had.” Eisenhower, for his part, would describe his relationship with MacArthur this way: “I studied dramatics under him for seven years.”

Quezon chose MacArthur because he was the only American military leader who was willing to say that the Philippines would be able to raise an army capable of defending the islands against an invader. He envisioned a Swiss-style army, with a core group of regular soldiers who would train a citizen reserve which could be mobilized in wartime.

MacArthur envisioned his Swiss-style army primarily as a deterrent, predicting that an enemy would need half a million soldiers, ten billion dollars, and three years to conquer the islands, a

price no reasonable enemy would be willing to pay. With foresight bordering on the prophetic, Theodore Roosevelt's former Secretary of State, Elihu Root, now 92 years old, countered with a prediction of his own: that Japan could take the Philippines in a week, and it would cost the United States twenty-five billion dollars and five years to oust them. Huh.

Quezon ruled the country as an autocrat who funded his lavish lifestyle with payments from Philippine and American businesses, in exchange for government contracts. He particularly enjoyed visiting China and Japan, where he was treated as a head of state, unlike in the US or other Western nations. He attempted, unsuccessfully, to extract from the Japanese government a promise to respect Philippine neutrality in the event of a war.

Back home in the islands, the combination of the Great Depression and a rapidly increasing birth rate led to widespread poverty, unrest, and sometimes violence. MacArthur focused on creating an army that could repel an invader, when perhaps the islands needed an army capable of controlling outbreaks of violence at home.

Eisenhower got stuck with the job of organizing this new army, and from the beginning he doubted the prospects for success. Local draft boards were lax; young men dodged military service simply by leaving town for a while. Weapons and provisions were inadequate, and the pay was, in Eisenhower's words, "cigarette money."

Recruits were uneducated and undisciplined, while their officers overlooked their chronic disobedience of orders. MacArthur gave Washington optimistic reports, while privately Eisenhower argued with him over the state of the new army. In 1939, Eisenhower left the Philippines in frustration, saying "I can't afford to go on teaching schoolboys..." Quezon said of him, "Whenever I asked Ike for an opinion, I got an answer. It may not have been what I wanted to hear...but it was always a straightforward and honest answer."

Quezon by then had accepted the unpleasant reality. Switzerland was a landlocked country in the Alps. The Philippines were an archipelago with 36,000 kilometers of coastline, comparable to the East Coast of the United States from Maine to Texas. So much coastline could never be defended against a determined invader. Quezon cut the military budget, closed training camps, and began to snub his old friend, forcing MacArthur to deal with Jorge Vargas, his personal secretary. MacArthur once told Vargas, "Someday your boss is going to want to see me more than I want to see him."

Quezon's dilemma was this: America didn't want to spend the money required to defend the islands and the Philippines were not in a condition to defend themselves. His only other option was to try to maintain cordial relations with Japan and hope the Japanese would be satisfied with that. Of course, they weren't.

In July 1941, as tensions with Japan were rising, President Roosevelt federalized the Philippine Army and reactivated MacArthur in the US Army, appointing him commander of US Army

Forces in the Far East, a joint Philippine-American force. Between July and December, as part of the US military buildup in the Pacific, thousands of US soldiers and large amounts of equipment were shipped to the islands from the US, though the buildup was still underway when the Japanese attacked. For example, only 35 of a projected 100 B-17 bombers had been delivered when the war began.

The Japanese attacked the Philippines on December 8, 1941, and I already told you how that turned out. On December 22, MacArthur was promoted to a full four-star general. In March 1942, President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines for Australia.

Army Chief of Staff George Marshall afterward decided to award MacArthur the Medal of Honor. Eisenhower, now Marshall's deputy, pointed out that the award is designated for conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty, which made this award questionable, but Marshall felt it was necessary to dispel any criticism against MacArthur for leaving his command in the Philippines. MacArthur got the award. This made him and his father Arthur the first father-son pair to both receive America's highest military decoration.

And as I'm sure you know, when MacArthur arrived in Australia, he famously declared, "I came through and I shall return." He frequently repeated the vow. The War Department asked him to alter it to "We shall return," but he never did.

We'll have to stop there for today. I thank you for listening, and I'd especially like to thank Drew and Suzanne for their kind donations, and thank you to Ken for becoming a patron of the podcast. Donors and patrons like Drew and Suzanne and Ken help cover the costs of making this show, which in turn keeps the podcast available free for everyone, so my thanks to them and to all of you who have pitched in and helped out. If you'd like to become a patron or make a donation, you are most welcome; just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

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And I hope you'll join me next week, here on the *History of the Twentieth Century*, as we take a look at how the war is going in the Middle East and, especially, India. That's next week, here, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. In 1943, with the United States and China wartime allies, Congress passed the Magnuson Act, named after its sponsor, Washington Democratic Representative

Warren Magnuson. The Act allowed more Chinese immigration to the United States, a little more, anyway, and also loosened the restrictions on ethnic Chinese becoming US citizens.

In 1948, Congress passed the Japanese-American Claims Act, which allowed Japanese-Americans to apply for compensation for property losses incurred during their removal and detention. The US government paid out about \$37 million in claims, less than 10% of the community's estimated losses.

In 1976, US President Gerald Ford formally revoked Executive Order 9066, calling it a “national mistake” and deploring its use against loyal US citizens. In 1980, in response to advocacy from the Japanese American Citizens League, the US Congress created a commission to study the matter. The commission returned a report in 1983 that was sharply critical of the treatment of Japanese-Americans, condemning it as motivated by racism and xenophobia. The commission recommended \$20,000 reparation payments to each surviving detainee.

In 1988 Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act, authorizing such payments and apologizing for the wartime treatment of Japanese-Americans. More than 82,000 people received payments.

A month later, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made an apology to Japanese-Canadians who were detained, and Parliament approved payments of C\$21,000 to each surviving detainee.

In 1998, President Bill Clinton awarded Fred Korematsu, the lead appellant in the 1944 Supreme Court case, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

[music: Closing War Theme]