By 1917, and especially after the February Revolution in Russia, the Allies were framing the Great War as a conflict between democracy and autocracy, between freedom and oppression.

But by this time, the heavy social and economic costs of fighting this new kind of war were wearing down even the wealthiest of the belligerent nations. With new restrictions on dissent and economic centralization, the western Allies were becoming less democratic and less free, even as they took up the banner of freedom and democracy.

Welcome to The History of the Twentieth Century.

Liberalism is the great 19th century idea that respect for individual rights and a democratic form of government are beneficial not only for individual citizens but for the nation as a whole. By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were those everywhere in the world promoting liberalism, and in particular, most European nations seemed either liberal or liberalizing. It you were sufficiently optimistic, you could imagine that the march toward liberalism was moving inexorably forward, even in repressive nations like Russia and China, and look forward to the day when the entire planet was governed by peaceful democratic states bound together by economic and cultural ties.

Even if you were a socialist, you could still embrace this vision, only add to it the notation that in the glorious future of peace and prosperity, not only will political oppression disappear, but economic oppression as well.
Sadly, the Great War knocked this vision askew. The most advanced and civilized nations of the world—presumably—have now turned on each other with a bloody savagery that would have disgusted a Neanderthal.

Does that mean that liberalism has failed?

Well, as you well know, the advanced liberal nations of Britain and France have been maintaining all along that the problem here isn’t with liberalism or with European civilization. The problem is with those old-school Prussians and their autocratic militarism, throwbacks to the bad old pre-Enlightenment Europe. They and the atavistic Austrian and Turkish Empires they have aligned with represent the last remnants of what liberalism was meant to sweep away. Once the Central Powers are defeated, everything will go back to the way it used to be and we can all look toward the future with hope once again.

But as you’ve heard me say several times by now, the fact that the most liberal nations in Europe were allied with Russia, the most repressive nation in Europe, in this glorious war for freedom and democracy was a little hard to swallow. The February Revolution seemed to solve that problem, and now the battle lines between democracy and repression seem clearer.

However, as you also now know, the brief blossoming of what might have become a liberal, democratic Russia withered in less than a year. And not only did liberalism fail in Russia, it failed mostly because of the war. You can’t keep forcing your people to struggle and sacrifice to keep up an unpopular war with one hand while patting yourself on the back over your commitment to freedom and democracy with the other.

It was this contradiction, more than any other single factor, that brought down liberalism in Russia, and the problem of reconciling liberalism and the Great War was not unique to Russia. Every Great War combatant faced its own version of this contradiction. Ottoman Turkey was abusing and starving the Armenians. The Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had suspended its parliament, the Reichsrat, and was being ruled by decree. I’ll say more about that in a future episode. We’ve seen Germany sliding away from rule by Kaiser, Chancellor, and Reichstag and toward something like a military dictatorship overseen by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Among the Western Allies, there’s Italy. I talked in episode 150 about the political strains the war has put on that country, with socialist anti-war demonstrations and strikes becoming common, as well as large numbers of desertions and increasing poverty in the already impoverished south.

And the strains between liberalism and fighting the war are by 1917 also becoming apparent in Britain, France and the United States. We looked at the United States last time, and saw prosecutions of dissidents opposed to the war and the Post Office banning magazines deemed subversive, which, if it wasn’t quite censorship, it was pretty close to it. The fact that the 1917
Espionage Act didn’t have an explicit censorship provision was because of the reluctance of Congress to pass one, not of Woodrow Wilson, who wanted it and had pressed Congress to grant it.

The United Kingdom had the comparable Defence of the Realm Act, which gave the British government far-reaching powers, including censorship of both private letters and public journalism. The civilian population was subject to martial law. Remember the aftermath of the Easter Rising, episode 127? Even in Britain itself, ten civilians were executed for violations of the Act, though none were British nationals, and others were imprisoned, including the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell, whom we’ve encountered a few times before on this podcast. Strict controls on the sale of alcoholic beverages were imposed; I mentioned those in episode 116. It was made illegal for a woman with a venereal disease to have sex with a man in military service, with no exception even for married couples.

In France, President Raymond Poincaré had decreed France under martial law at the beginning of the war. We’ve already seen in this podcast how the French military customarily operated with a minimum of civilian oversight, a problem exacerbated by the traditional political instability of the Third Republic. The Presidential decree gave the military power to control the press and the French police and to apply military law to civilians across France. Control was particularly tight over the regions near the trenches, understandably, but even the Army Committee of the Chamber of Deputies was not permitted to visit the front in 1915.

These sweeping powers were scaled back in October 1915 after public protests. The French parliament lifted martial law in the interior of the country, though the military retained tight control over regions near the front. That month also saw the appointment of General Joseph Gallieni as war minister in the cabinet of the new prime minister, Aristide Briand, following the fall of the Viviani government. Gallieni had a lot of credibility following the role he had played in the defense of Paris and just possibly the salvation of the French nation itself during the dark days of 1914, episodes 86 and 88.

Gallieni, as a general officer himself, and now a war hero, took a more flexible position and opened the door to ministerial tours of the front, but even he saw himself as a soldier first and a government minister second. That didn’t mean that he was willing to let Joffre have his way, though. By the end of 1915, Gallieni began questioning Joffre about allegations that Joffre was stripping the defenses around Verdun. Joffre, as usual, haughtily refused to discuss military matters with the civilian leadership, even in a case like this, when the Minister of War was a soldier himself.

As you know, the Germans began a major offensive around Verdun just a few weeks later, in early 1916, which Gallieni read as evidence that Joffre had invited the attack by dismantling the defenses, which led to a breakdown in the relationship between the two men. Gallieni resigned as war minister in March 1916, possibly hoping this would force the ouster of Joffre as well, or
maybe because the stress of the job was getting to him. Gallieni was not a young man, and in fact he would pass away just two months later, at the age of 67.

Joffre would get no further trouble from the Briand government until the end of 1916 when, as you may recall from episode 140, he was promoted to field marshal and kicked upstairs. And as you know from that same episode, Briand himself was forced to resign as prime minister just three months later. His replacement was the 74-year old Alexandre Ribot, for whom this was the fourth premiership. Ribot was really more of a caretaker prime minister than anything else. His government endured the Nivelle Offensive and the French Army mutinies, lasting just a few months before he swapped jobs with his war minister, Paul Painlevé, who led the next government, which lasted only two months.

Those two months saw the failure of Field Marshal Haig’s Passchendaele offensive, the success of the joint German and Austrian offensive into Italy at Caporetto, and the October Revolution in Russia, not to mention a demoralized French Army that has merely been marking time since the Nivelle Offensive, awaiting that far-off day when supposedly there will be enough Americans in France to think about starting up the war again. In the meantime, though, the French front lines are looking suspiciously like the Russian front lines had in the months leading up to the October Revolution.

In mid-1917, it wasn’t hard to imagine that France might go the way of Russia, with its crumbling army and decaying civilian morale. How long would it be before the French equivalent of Lenin appeared, a socialist defeatist ready to open talks with the Germans on a French exit from the war?

Well…funny you should bring that up…there is a political figure in France you might be tempted to cast as the French Lenin. It’s Joseph Caillaux. Talk about a blast from the past. Do you recognize that name? Longtime listeners might remember Caillaux from such classics as “The Panther Leap,” episode 65, when he was prime minister during the Second Morocco Crisis. Or perhaps from episode 76, in which it was not so much M. Caillaux who was memorable as it was Henriette, the second Mme. Caillaux, who shot and killed Gaston Calmette, the editor of the newspaper Le Figaro and a harsh critic of M. Caillaux, because Calmette intended to publish love letters Joseph sent to Henriette back in the day when he was still married to the first Mme. Caillaux. After all, Miss, this is France.

Actually, I shouldn’t say that. All this is pretty outré, even for France in the Belle Époque. Joseph Caillaux was the son of a conservative politician who entered politics himself as a member of the Radical Party, which, despite the name, is a moderate left-leaning party. Hardly Bolsheviks or anything. Caillaux’s expertise was in finance and he was an early proponent of an income tax in France, not an especially popular idea. He was also pacifist in his inclinations and in particular advocated French détente with Germany. He held the position of finance minister four times, and as I already mentioned, served as prime minister briefly in 1911 and 1912, during
the Second Morocco Crisis, when he was involved in secret negotiations with the Germans, which forced his resignation when those were revealed.

Caillaux led the opposition to the Three Years’ Service bill in 1913, which passed anyway and which enlarged the standing French Army. By this time, Caillaux’s reputation for pacifism in general and Germanophilia in particular made him something of a political pariah as tensions with Germany grew, and especially after Raymond Poincaré, an ardent Germanophobe, became President.

And then there was that little incident where his wife Henriette walked into the editorial offices of *Le Figaro* in March 1914 and shot the editor dead. Henriette was placed on trial in July 1914, her trial coinciding with the July Crisis. She was acquitted of murder charges on the grounds that it was a crime of passion. Temporary insanity, I suppose we would call it in America.

Needless to say, however, none of this did her husband’s political career any favors. He was actually serving his fourth stint as finance minister at the time of the killing, until he resigned shortly afterward. When the war began, Caillaux’s Radical Party became part of the *union sacrée*, the coalition of all parties that governed France during the war, but Caillaux’s pacifism and his sympathy for Germany were well known enough to keep him out of government during the war. But Caillaux’s political associate and fellow Radical Party member, Louis-Jean Malvy served as interior minister from the beginning of the war until his resignation in August 1917.

Malvy had gone easy on the socialists, union leaders, and other pacifist types who opposed the war. But by 1917, with the army mutinying and the kind of anti-war unrest already seen in places like Russia and Italy beginning to appear in France as well, Malvy, like Caillaux, became seen as a pacifist at best, if not an outright German sympathizer, and was forced to resign.

Both Malvy and Caillaux were involved in some sketchy dealings with shadowy figures with German connections. Both of them were likely willing to negotiate with the Germans and perhaps were positioning themselves to lead a peace cabinet if and when France became ready to enter peace talks with Germany. Some in France accused them of doing more than that, of encouraging defeatism in France, perhaps even operating as German agents. One very specific rumor held that Caillaux had already worked out a tentative peace deal with the Germans, under which Germany would cede Alsace and Lorraine back to France in exchange for a separate peace. With access to German sources and the benefit of hindsight, this seems dubious. We know that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were at this moment discussing not what Germany might give up to end the war, but what she might claim following her victory, although it is possible, I suppose, that Caillaux was in touch with some civilians in Berlin who might have been willing to discuss this plan.

The fall of the Painlevé government in November 1917 left the French President, Raymond Poincaré, in a difficult position. These all-party coalition governments that have been muddling along since 1914, trying to keep everyone happy while allowing the military free rein, were
proving inadequate to the challenges facing the French. With discontent with the war growing, the next government would either have to accommodate the naysayers—or confront them. Poincaré himself was ardently anti-German and in favor of prosecuting the war to the hilt, so the prospect of a Caillaux ministry was repugnant to him. But the alternative was only slightly less repugnant. Nevertheless, Poincaré took it. He swallowed his pride, and asked Georges Clemenceau to form the next French government.

Wow. There’s another name from the early days of the podcast. We first met Clemenceau all the way back in episode 7, and he was regarded as a political has-been then. Since then, we’ve seen him take part in the Dreyfus affair, episode 8, and return to politics long enough to become interior minister and prime minister, episodes 40 and 46. Now he sits in the French Senate and is back to his other interest, journalism. In 1913, he opened a new newspaper in Paris, called *L’Homme libre*, The Free Man.

Recall that despite his youthful leftism, by the early twentieth century, Clemenceau had moved rightward, embracing an anti-German foreign policy and supporting crackdowns on socialists and radicals at home. When the war began, Clemenceau’s newspaper criticized the French government and supported the war while also calling for suppression of anti-war elements at home. You’ll recall that Clemenceau turned down a seat in the coalition cabinet in the early days of the war, episode 86.

Ironically, for his trouble Clemenceau found his own newspaper one of the early victims of wartime censorship. *L’Homme libre* was closed down, only to return in a matter of days as a new newspaper, *L’Homme enchaîné*, The Chained Man.

Ever since 1914, Clemenceau has been using his newspaper to press the government to fight the war more aggressively and to suppress dissent more harshly. If you are President of France and you want to demonstrate your resolve to silence the pacifists and push through to victory over the Germans whatever the cost, the person you want to appoint prime minister is surely Georges Clemenceau.

And that is exactly what Poincaré did. It had to have been a bitter pill for him to swallow. Poincaré and Clemenceau have been political enemies for decades. Clemenceau is noted for his quotable quips, and one of his most famous observations was that there were only two perfectly useless things in the world. One was the human appendix and the other was Raymond Poincaré.

Of course, appointing the hawkish Clemenceau despite the fact that his contempt for you is well known certainly adds credence to the view that you are willing to do anything to win the war, so props to Poincaré here for what must have been a painful decision.

And thus, at the advanced age of 76, Georges Clemenceau became prime minister a second time. This also makes him France’s fifth prime minister since the beginning of the war, just three years
ago, after René Viviani, Aristide Briand, Alexandre Ribot, and Paul Painlevé, for those of you keeping score at home.

The man who had been known in his youth as “The Tiger” for his pointed debating skills soon demonstrated that he still kept his claws even as a septuagenarian. He took not only the post of prime minister, but also of war minister and governed the nation mostly out of the war ministry offices, and within days of taking those offices, he told the Chamber of Deputies:

“Mistakes have been made; do not think of them except to rectify them. Alas, there have also been crimes, crimes against France which call for a prompt punishment. We promise you, we promise the country, that justice will be done according to the law…Weakness would be complicity. We will avoid weakness, as we will avoid violence. All the guilty before courts-martial. The soldier in the court-room, united with the soldier in battle. No more pacifist campaigns, no more German intrigues. Neither treason, nor semi-treason: the war. Nothing but the war. Our armies will not be caught between fire from two sides. Justice will be done. The country will know that it is defended.”

Winston Churchill was probably sitting off to one side somewhere, taking notes.

And those comments about treason were not mere hyperbole. Over the following weeks, the Clemenceau government moved to strip Joseph Caillaux and Louis Malvy of their parliamentary immunity and arrest them on suspicion of treason.

[music: Painter, “Valse de Paris”]

We already talked about how contentious the issue of conscription became in Canada in 1917; that was in episode 142. The conscription debate split the country along its sensitive language divide, with Francophone Canadians most likely to oppose conscription, leading to the bitter federal election of December 1917.

Similarly, Australia experienced a heated debate over conscription that split Prime Minister Billy Hughes’s Labor Party. The situation in Australia was a little different. Australian law already permitted conscription for military service within Australia, but the government lacked authority to conscript soldiers for service in Europe. As was the case in Britain and in Canada, the Australian military initially relied on voluntary enlistments, but by 1916, enlistment numbers fell short of the numbers the military said it needed, and conscription came up for debate.

Because the subject of conscription was so fraught and divisive, the Hughes government turned to a non-binding referendum, or plebiscite, on the conscription question, in the hope that a “yes” vote would provide political support for conscription in Parliament.

At first, it appeared the voters were likely to do exactly that, but it seems the government overplayed its hand. Australia had its own version of Britain’s Defence of the Realm Act and the US Espionage Act called the War Precautions Act, passed in 1914. The War Precautions Act was
used during the plebiscite campaign to suppress anti-conscription speeches and literature. So confident was the government of a win that it began calling up young men for physical exams and basic training ahead of the vote, under the existing conscription law, so that the conscripts could rapidly be redeployed overseas just as soon as Parliament approved it.

But when the vote was held in October 1916, these heavy-handed tactics apparently backfired as conscription was defeated at the polls by a margin of 52-48. The fallout from this defeat included a split in the Labor Party, with Hughes leaving to join the new Nationalist Party and a federal election held in May 1917. The election led to a decisive Nationalist victory over Labor, 53 seats to 22 in the House of Representatives, which encouraged Hughes, who had returned as prime minister, to attempt a second plebiscite on a more modest conscription proposal in December 1917. But despite the voters returning Hughes to office, they were still not ready even for this weaker conscription law and voted it down, this time by a margin of 54-46.

Australia never did enact an overseas conscription law during the Great War. Newfoundland eventually did, in May of 1918 when the Germans were on the offensive and the need for manpower was obvious. And that leaves just one other portion of the United Kingdom and its dominions, the place where conscription was a more politically fraught question than anywhere else: Ireland.

A quick reminder of the turbulent recent history of Ireland. We’ve been talking about the ups and downs of Irish Home Rule since the early days of this podcast. Most recently, you’ll recall, the Asquith government finally got a Home Rule bill passed, much to the displeasure of the Unionists, mostly Protestants in Ulster, who wanted to maintain the status quo in their relationship with Britain and who were leery of what they called “Rome Rule.” The government was working on an amending bill to placate the Unionists, one that would temporarily exclude Ulster from Home Rule. How long the exclusion would last and what the boundaries of the excluded territory would be were never decided, because the Great War began, and a Suspensory Act was passed, delaying the implementation of Home Rule until after the end of the war. The amending legislation was dropped, for the time being.

Then in April 1916 came the Easter Rising, episodes 126 and 127, and the harsh British Army response. In the aftermath, it seemed that, whatever laws were on the statute books, the future of Ireland and its relationship with the UK were now more unclear than ever. In June 1916, Asquith dispatched David Lloyd George to Ireland to confer with Irish leaders and offer an olive branch in the form of immediate implementation of Home Rule, with a temporary exclusion for Ulster. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, embraced the offer, but the Ulster Unionists pressed the government to embrace a permanent exclusion for Ulster as well as a reduction in the number of Irish seats in the British Parliament. This was unacceptable to the Nationalists and so the deal collapsed.
Christmas of 1916 saw an amnesty when the new Lloyd George government released a number of Irish internees captured after the Rising. There was a second amnesty in June of 1917. Many of those released drifted toward Sinn Féin, a political party that supported greater Irish autonomy but was not involved in the Rising. This influx of new members pushed the party in a more radical direction and it now became the voice of the most ardent Irish nationalists.

Political discussions continued into 1917. In the first half of that year, three parliamentary by-elections in Ireland all returned Sinn Féin candidates to seats that used to be held by the Irish Parliamentary Party, evidence of increasing radicalization of the Irish public. David Lloyd George, feeling pressure to ease the tensions in Ireland, not least because of the entry of the United States and its large Irish-American population into the war, offered John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the grand old man of Irish Home Rule, immediate home rule for Ireland, excluding Ulster, or alternatively, and all-Irish convention, at which the quarrelling Irish political factions would meet and hammer out an agreement among themselves. Redmond took the second choice.

The now 61-year old Redmond, who had dedicated his life to winning Home Rule for a united Ireland through legal and democratic means and who had just three years ago seemingly had the prize within his grasp now had to contend at the end of his life with it all slipping away. The Easter Rising in 1916 had caught Redmond entirely by surprise, and now the Irish people began turning away from him and his party and toward more extreme groups that sought outright independence. His health began to deteriorate. In June 1917, his brother Willie, also an MP and an officer in the British Army, was killed in the Battle of Messines, which took a toll on John. It must have been all the more painful when the by-election held to fill his brother’s seat in Parliament was won by the Sinn Féin candidate. And not just any Sinn Féin candidate but Éamon de Valera himself, one of the highest ranking commanders of the Irish Republican Brotherhood during the Easter Rising not to have been executed. De Valera had been sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life in prison. He was among those amnestied just a few weeks earlier.

The Irish Convention sat in Dublin from July 1917 to March 1918 and included representatives from most Irish political parties, but not Sinn Féin, which boycotted the proceedings on the grounds that the Convention was precluded from considering full Irish independence. Over months of agonizing debate, there were moments when a Home Rule formula acceptable to all parties seemed close to becoming a reality, but it never quite arrived. Tragically, John Redmond died on March 6, 1918, during the deliberations of the Convention. His final words in his last address to the Convention rang sadly prophetic: “Better for us never to have met than to have met and failed.”

For even as the Irish Convention was winding down to a muddled conclusion, the German 1918 spring offensive had begun on March 21. One of the consequences of the German attacks was to precipitate a political crisis in Westminster. Suddenly, there were more Germans than Allies on
The Western Front. Suddenly, the Germans were advancing again, in a manner that evoked dread memories of 1914. And suddenly, Lloyd George and his “Easterner” strategy of sending British troops to Italy and Salonika and Palestine to rob Haig of the numbers needed to begin another offensive was looking pretty dumb.

The British government scrambled to put more soldiers on the Western Front. Lloyd George himself committed the political faux pas of telling the House of Commons that Haig had more soldiers under his command now than he had a year ago…only that wasn’t quite true. The numbers were greater if you counted the Chinese and Colonial laborers behind the lines, but not if you only considered combat soldiers. Lloyd George stood accused of deliberately starving the BEF of troops and then covering it up by lying to Parliament, which led to a major political row.

The Lloyd George government scrambled to get more soldiers into France. Reservists in Britain were sent over. Conscription exemptions were tightened to put more British men in uniform, to the dismay of the labor unions. Abroad, the Dominions were pressed for more soldiers. Newfoundland enacted conscription in May. Conscription proved controversial and divisive in Canada and Australia, as we have seen. And…and…and…there was Ireland.

While it seemed everyone else was being pressed for conscripts, conscripts, and more conscripts, the fact that Ireland has always been and still remained exempt from conscription became impossible to ignore. The question was unavoidable: if we are being asked to do more and more, why are the Irish getting off scot-free? (You should pardon the expression.) The answer, of course, was that years, decades of patient argument, negotiation, politicking, and legislation went into building the delicate structure that was almost, but not quite, the answer to the Irish question and anyone who knew Ireland knew that introducing conscription into the debate right now would be a recipe for a catastrophe.

But political pressure overwhelmed caution. The Lloyd George government passed a new military service act that extended conscription to Ireland, linking it to Home Rule. The effect on that delicate structure was akin to taking a cricket bat to a house of cards. Overnight, the entire spectrum of opinion in Ireland turned against the government and against the bill. Unionists didn’t like Home Rule. Nationalists didn’t want conscription. Everyone from the radical Sinn Féin to the moderate Irish Parliamentary Party to the Catholic bishops rose up as one and vowed to resist conscription. Pledges were taken across the island, including at Catholic parishes on Sunday morning, to resist conscription “by the most effective means.” What that meant was left ominously undefined.

There was a general strike across Ireland on April 23, including at munitions factories. Thousands of Irish participated in anti-conscription demonstrations. The Lord Mayor of Dublin even appealed to Woodrow Wilson for support. Henry Duke, the Government’s Irish Secretary resigned. Lord Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, “retired.” The latter was replaced by our old friend, Field Marshal Sir John French, now Lord French, whom we first met during the
Boer War and who, you’ll recall was the first commander of the BEF back in 1914, until he was removed from that command and made commander of the Home Forces. In that capacity, he was ultimately in control of the British forces that responded to the Easter Rising, although he did not personally command them. Still, to make the overseer of the bloody British response to the Rising the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland sounded to many Irish as if the island was being put under martial law.

It did nothing to change that perception when the Government and Lord French blamed the anti-conscription backlash on a treasonous conspiracy between the German government and Sinn Féin and arrested most of the Sinn Féin leadership, including MP Eamon de Valera.

As it turned out, all this trouble was for nothing, because by June the German offensive was sputtering out and the large numbers of Americans now arriving in France had ended any worries about a shortage of soldiers on the Allied side. Conscription for Ireland was on the books, but in fact not a single Irish soldier would be conscripted before the end of the war. It would do nothing to help fight the Germans, but it would destroy the last hopes of resolving the Irish question.

And there you have it. In all three of the most liberal and democratic nations in the war: Britain, France, and the United States, we find arrests of dissidents and suppression of anti-government opinion in the war that was meant to “make the world safe for democracy.” Was this necessary to fight the kind of mass-mobilized twentieth-century warfare the Great War demanded? Or was it driven by wartime fears, understandable perhaps, but nonetheless irrational? One wonders what would have happened if the war had dragged on another year or two or five. How bad would the repression have gotten?

Fortunately for the future of liberal democracy, the war is closer to the end than most people yet imagine. Even so, it seems likely that the shadow cast by this wartime repression will linger in the postwar world. Its effects will be something to look for in future episodes, but we’ll have to stop here for today. Thanks for listening. I’d especially like to thank Dmitri for his donation, and thank you to Iurie for becoming a patron of the podcast. Patrons and donors help keep the show going strong for everyone, so if you have a few quid or bucks or pesos or loonies to spare, I invite you to help out. Just visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal or Patreon buttons.

And I hope you’ll join me next week, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*, as we consider the latest efforts to bring about an end to the Great War. Leon Trotsky challenged the Allies to state plainly their war aims; now Woodrow Wilson gives his reply. The Fourteen Points, next week, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. I told you that Joseph Caillaux and Louis Malvy had been arrested for treason. Their cases were not tried until after the war ended. Both men were acquitted of treason but convicted of lesser charges, which, even so, you might think would end their political
careers. You would be wrong. Within a few years, both of them would be back in ministerial positions. That’s France for you.

[music: Closing War Theme]