“I am not a counterrevolutionary…I despise the old regime, which badly mistreated my family. There is no return to the past and there cannot be any. But we need an authority that could truly save Russia, which would make it possible honorably to end the war and lead her to the Constituent Assembly…Our current government has solid individuals but also those who ruin things, who ruin Russia. The main thing is that Russia has no authority and that such authority must be created. Perhaps I shall have to exert such pressure on the government. It is possible that if disorders break out in Petrograd, after they have been suppressed I will have to enter the government and participate in the formation of a new, strong authority.”

Russian Army General Lavr Kornilov.

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Two weeks ago, I set up the pieces for the next round of the Russian Revolution, but I didn’t have time in that episode to get to the punch line, as it were, the climax of the story. I felt bad about that, making you sit through the back story and not get the payoff for two whole weeks, but this is a complicated story and not all stories fit neatly in one podcast episode. But there’s also a silver lining here. Having set up the story two weeks ago, I can begin this week’s episode by stepping back, taking a look at the big picture, and summarizing where we stand before everything goes to hell. Oops. Spoiler.

I’m going to go through the political spectrum in Russia, as it stands, from left to right, and examine the key people and factions at different places along that axis. Before I do that, though, I fell obligated to register my objection to this whole left-right framework. It’s not that I think it’s wrong or not useful to analyze political opinions with this particular yardstick; it’s a useful tool,
but all tools have their limitations, and if you use this one too aggressively, you may find it muddles rather than clarifies the politics of an historical moment.

The terms “left” and “right” in their political sense, originate with the French Revolution. They refer to the seating plan in the National Assembly. The people who supported the monarchy sat on the right, from the president’s point of view, and those who supported radical change sat on the left. So this terminology was born in a revolutionary context. The difficulty comes from the fact that “left” and “right” political ideas can be very different, depending on time and place.

So I’m not saying you shouldn’t use them. They are useful terms in a given context, but I’m saying that you need to be leery of making connections across different historical contexts. The political “right” of France in 1789 believed in very different things from the political “right” of Russia in 1917, who in turn believe very different things from, oh let’s say, the political “right” of contemporary America.

These political terms were born in a revolutionary age, and so they are most useful when you talk about revolutions, and when you talk about the Russian Revolution, they are inescapable. Every historian of the Russian Revolution embraces this left-right framework, wherever their own sympathies might lie, because in this context, it’s very useful. So, with that long-winded caveat out of the way, let’s get going.

The farthest left group in Russian politics in 1917 is of course the Bolsheviks. For the Bolsheviks, the war doesn’t matter. Russia itself doesn’t matter. All that matters is the socialist revolution, which is already beginning in Russia and will shortly sweep the world. The Bolsheviks simply want to end the war and begin domestic reforms aimed at implementing a socialist economy, confident in the knowledge that Germany is about to undergo the very same socialist revolution, followed soon after by the other nations of Europe and before you know it, we’ll all be singing the “Internationale” and holding hands. Hence the Bolshevik slogan, “Peace, Land, and Bread,” which pretty much sums up the party position. By the autumn of 1917, the old slogan, “All Power to the Soviets,” begins to disappear and is replaced by the newer “Peace, Land, and Bread.”

The Bolsheviks are pushing for an immediate end to the war and to the Provisional Government. Bolshevik agitators are at work in the Russian Army, encouraging the common soldiers not to fight, to see the German soldiers as allies, not enemies, and to see their own officers as enemies, not allies. The Bolsheviks are also on the run at the moment. The revelation that the German government is funding these Bolshevik efforts toward treason and mutiny has tarnished their image, and their leadership is under arrest, like Trotsky, or in hiding, like Lenin and Zinoviev. In their absence, Joseph Stalin, the editor of Pravda, is the de facto leader of the Bolsheviks.

As a result of the embarrassing revelations, the arrests and the pending prosecutions, and the failure of the Bolshevik coup attempt known as the “July Days,” the Bolsheviks aren’t particularly strong at the moment, although the members they do have are thoroughly committed.
Based on local election data, you can conclude that the Bolsheviks have the support of a third to a half of the populations of Petrograd and Moscow, but only a small following in the rest of the country.

A little farther to the right, you’ll find various less extreme socialist groups, the most notable being the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. These socialist parties and the Bolsheviks comprise most of the membership of the Petrograd Soviet, which is taking in more and more delegations from the rest of the country and increasingly becoming a national Soviet. You’ll recall that at first, the socialists resisted joining the Provisional Government. They preferred to stand apart as a separate restraining mechanism on the government, a sort of “supreme court of the revolutionary conscience,” in Richard Pipes’s memorable phrase. The only socialist who participated in the Provisional Government from the beginning was Alexander Kerensky.

Over time, as the more right-leaning elements of the Provisional Government began to walk out, socialists took their places until most of the seats are now held by socialists of various stripes, with the notable exception of the Bolsheviks, the only socialist faction that still refuses to have anything to do with the Provisional Government. This means that the Bolsheviks are now the main opposition party.

This is not to say there isn’t any opposition on the right. The Provisional Government has been moving to the left since it was organized in the wake of the February Revolution. Originally it was run by a coalition of liberal democratic and monarchist parties that had held seats in the Duma, the Russian legislature, but remember that the Duma never selected the Provisional Government. These folks were self-appointed. As liberal democrats they are what the socialists dismiss as “bourgeois.” They moved quickly to bring freedom of speech and the press and religion and universal suffrage to Russia, which led then-justice minister Alexander Kerensky to declare Russia “the freest country in the world,” but balked at reforms such as soldiers’ committees to monitor their own officers for counterrevolutionary attitudes and limits on when soldiers can be made to salute and an end to capital and corporal punishments in the military.

Those reforms came from the Petrograd Soviet, and though the conservatives don’t like these reforms very much, they led then-war minister Alexander Kerensky to declare the Russian Army “the most democratic army in the world.” And then there was the Provisional Government’s unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to rein in the regional assemblies like the Finnish parliament or the Ukrainian Rada, that were demanding regional autonomy, if not outright independence.

So to the right of the socialists, we have these liberal democratic and monarchist parties, the most prominent one being the Constitutional Democratic, or Kadet, Party. These parties lost much of their early public support and credibility to socialist groups because of their commitment to keeping Russia in the Great War, even though they hemmed and hawed and got awfully evasive when pressed on the question of why it was important to keep Russia in the Great War and their
seeming inability to address land reform or democratization or even to put bread back on the store shelves.

Now that they are out of government, they are the marginalized parties of the political right, which is strange, because being an advocate for free elections and freedom of speech and constitutional monarchy was considered radical extremism in Russia just a couple of years ago. Many of the leaders of these parties did time in the Emperor’s prisons or in exile right alongside the socialists. Now they are suddenly regarded with suspicion as potential counterrevolutionary elements. That’s a telling bit of evidence of just how fast things are changing in revolutionary Russia.

This wasn’t just idle paranoia. As the liberal democratic political leaders found themselves brushed aside by the socialists, they reacted by reaching out to elements farther to the right. There were no organized political parties advocating rolling back the revolution or restoring unlimited power to the deposed emperor, but there were aristocrats and powerful land owners who viewed this whole “land reform” thing as skimpy cover for a plot to confiscate their wealth. There were factory owners who wanted control of their factories back from the soviets. There were army officers who were sick and tired of having to listen to representatives of soldiers’ committees prattle on about the quality of their food or about the high-handed attitude of certain officers toward their illiterate peasant recruits. I mean, don’t these muzhiks understand that there’s a war on?

Now, in a democratic system, it’s only natural for a minority political party or faction that’s out of power to seek alliances with like-minded parties or factions in order to build a stronger base. But from the socialist point of view, this looks, as they would put it, “counterrevolutionary.”

Okay, maybe they are being a little paranoid, but you have to remember that socialists in Russia are used to being monitored by the secret police, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or being deported to Siberia. Now they are running the country, but they can’t shake the feeling that their old enemies are...well, still their enemies, and that the rightward tilt of liberal democratic types like the Kadets is simply evidence that bourgeois liberals, when given the choice between free and fair universal elections on the one hand and capitalist hegemony on the other will side with the capitalists every single time.

Similarly, though the Bolsheviks are discredited and look unpatriotic, if not downright traitorous, remember that the other socialist parties resisted a full crackdown on the Bolsheviks, because they saw that as potentially the first step toward a full crackdown on socialists generally. So what we have in Petrograd can loosely be summarized as a moderate socialist government with enemies on both the right and the left, though right now, they are much more focused on their enemies on the right.

And at this point I remind you that the prime minister and war minister Alexander Kerensky has appointed Lavr Kornilov the new commander-in-chief of the Russian Army. Kornilov says he is
pro-revolution and supports the Provisional Government. He and Kerensky have agreed on the need to have loyal soldiers ready to move into Petrograd if needed in the event of another Bolshevik attempt to take control. Kornilov has done what he and Kerensky agreed to, positioning the Third Cavalry Corps where it can move to either Petrograd or Moscow, the two Bolshevik strongholds, as needs be, in the event of violence.

But Kornilov has also been talking, at least privately, of the need to break up the Petrograd Soviet, which he sees as restraining the Provisional Government’s authority, which, let’s face it, is true. But this kind of talk makes Kerensky nervous. Remember, too, that Kornilov is seen as a Cossack. In truth, he kind of is and kind of isn’t, his ethnic background is mixed and not well documented and I don’t want to try to get into it in detail because it’s not really that important. What is important is that Kornilov looks like a Cossack to a regular old urban Russian, like, say, Alexander Kerensky. Cossacks are associated with unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor, and calling a soldier or a military unit “loyal” makes many Russians wonder if that is maybe just another way of saying “loyal to the old regime,” and when you take into account Kornilov’s popularity with the old guard and the right wing parties like the Kadets, and his talk about busting up the Soviet, well, now he’s not looking so much like an “anti-Bolshevist” as a “counterrevolutionary threat.”

So even though Kornilov has only had the job of commander-in-chief for a month, relations between him and Kerensky are rapidly deteriorating, because that’s what Russian politics is now in 1917. Kerensky doesn’t trust Kornilov, even though it was Kerensky who put him in charge. Kerensky is nervous about those “loyal” troops, even though Kerensky was the one who asked for them. In a situation this tense, you can already guess that there are any number of circumstances that might make it blow up completely, although I imagine you would put “rogue Russian politician steps into the middle of all this and freelances a confrontation” pretty far down on your list of potential threats. But that is exactly what is going to happen next.

[music: Borodin, In the Steppes of Central Asia]

Enter Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvolv, no relation to the Georgi Lvov who preceded Kerensky as prime minister. In his younger days, this Lvov had studied philosophy at St. Petersburg University. Then he went on to Moscow Theological Seminary. He considered becoming a monk before opting instead for a career in politics. He’d held a seat in the Duma as a member of the Octobrist Party, the party which supported a constitutional monarchy under the terms set by Emperor Nikolai. During his tenure in the Duma, Lvov’s primary interest seems to have been relations between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church, although he was one of the first in the Duma to join the Progressive Bloc, that caucus in the Duma that began pressing the Emperor to reform conduct of the war all the way back in the bygone days of last year.

Lvov was rewarded for his support of the Progressive Bloc with a seat in the Provisional Government. He held the post of Procurator of the Holy Synod, a job left over from Imperial
times that was really about the Emperor exerting his authority over the Russian Orthodox Church. Some past procurators held considerable power, but the job had become less important under Nikolai II, who was not as interested in meddling in Church administration as were his father and grandfather.

Anyway, as you know, the Provisional Government had a shakeup after the July Days, and although Lvov was a Kerensky supporter, or claimed to be, Kerensky did not return the favor and handed Lvov’s seat in the government to someone else. You can guess as well as I can how Lvov felt about that. One source claims that Lvov was angry and declared that Kerensky was now his “mortal enemy,” which is not hard to believe. Other sources suggest Lvov may have been mentally ill, which is also not hard to believe. It could have been either or both, of course. Or he may just have had spectacularly poor judgment.

Or it might have been some sense of misguided patriotism that led him to travel to Mogilev and seek out a meeting with General Kornilov while claiming to have been sent by Alexander Kerensky. Kerensky would later deny sending him, but it’s possible that in his own mind, Lvov was serving Russia or serving Kerensky, or maybe he was just claiming his revenge. Whatever he thought he was doing, his actions would have enormous repercussions for all of Russia.

Lvov met with Kornilov on September 7. Kornilov appears to have taken Lvov’s claim, that he was an emissary from the prime minister, at face value. Kornilov made no effort to contact anyone in the government in Petrograd to confirm Lvov’s credentials, for instance. Instead, Lvov and Kornilov spent some time getting acquainted and bonded together over talk of their shared contempt for the Bolsheviks. Kornilov got fired up and complained to Lvov that the Bolsheviks were traitors, intent of overthrowing the Provisional Government, seizing power for themselves, and negotiating a humiliating peace with Germany.

Lvov agreed wholeheartedly, and told Kornilov that Kerensky had sent him to discuss ways of dealing with the Bolshevik threat. Lvov laid out three possible courses of action: first, Kerensky could take personal control and rule as a dictator until elections could be held; second, Kerensky could rule through a smaller “war cabinet” of three or four ministers, similar to what Lloyd George was doing in Britain, in which case Kerensky wanted Kornilov to be one of those ministers; or third, that Kornilov himself could assume control of the government, with Kerensky and other loyal ministers staying on under his direction.

Kornilov chose option three, and went on to suggest that Petrograd was too dangerous and that Kerensky should come to Mogilev, where the military could protect him and together Kornilov and Kerensky could discuss the future of Russian government. The meeting ended, and Lvov returned to Petrograd. In Mogilev, Kornilov told his chief of staff, General Lukomsky, about the meeting. Lukomsky raised the question that Kornilov never raised, asking Kornilov whether he had confirmed Lvov’s credentials. Kornilov dismissed the question. He knew Lvov to be an honorable man, he said. But Lukomsky pressed the point. Why then, Lukomsky asked, had
Kerensky’s man at the war ministry, Boris Savinkov, not mentioned any of this dictator stuff during his own meeting with Kornilov, which took place just two days ago. (You’ll recall I described that meeting in episode 146.) Kornilov also dismissed that question as unimportant.

The next day, Lvov met with Kerensky at the Winter Palace in Petrograd and claimed now to be coming as Kornilov’s representative. He told Kerensky that Kornilov was demanding to be made dictator. Specifically, that Petrograd was to be put under martial law, that all ministers, including Kerensky, should resign from the Provisional Government, and that all ministerial authority be handed over to him, to Kornilov. Lvov did not give the details about his meeting with Kornilov, especially not the part about the three options he had presented to the general, or that he had presented those options as coming from Kerensky. All he told Kerensky was that Kornilov sent him, Lvov, to inform Kerensky that Kornilov wanted him to resign and hand over control of the government.

The good news is that unlike Kornilov, Kerensky had enough sense to contact Kornilov directly that evening and ask him to confirm Lvov’s message. The bad news is…well, let me explain. We’ve already talked at length about telegraphs on this podcast, so you know that at this time, telegraph machines had keyboards. You press a key here in Petrograd, and a letter prints on a paper tape in Mogilev, or vice versa. These machines were usually used by professional operators to transmit written messages for other people, but in a pinch, two people who want to have a long-distance conversation in real time can sit down at telegraph keyboards and type messages to each other. This method of communication was expensive and cumbersome, but it was available if you urgently needed to talk to somebody about something. You can think of it as a primitive form of text messaging.

But here’s the thing. You and I have a lot more experience with text messaging than Kornilov or Kerensky had. You and I know that it’s easy to misunderstand a text message. You have to word them carefully and make clear what it is you’re talking about. Kerensky…did the other thing. In short, he messaged Kornilov and asked him to confirm that the message Lvov was delivering actually came from him. Kornilov said yes, it did. Unfortunately, Kerensky never spelled out exactly what message he was referring to, and Kornilov confirmed it without ever spelling out exactly what it was he was confirming. This situation would be hilarious if the consequences weren’t so grave.

At Kornilov’s end, when the conversation was over, the general leaned back in the chair and heaved a great sigh of relief. He thought all was well, that Kerensky and the leading government ministers were going to come to Mogilev to lead the nation from Stavka headquarters, where they would be safe from the wild fanatics of the Petrograd Soviet.

While Kornilov was in Mogilev, relaxing and congratulating himself on a job well done, Alexander Kerensky was in Petrograd, having an anxiety attack. Kerensky was so quick to believe the worst about Kornilov and also so quick to believe Kornilov had just confirmed his
worst fears without stopping to inquire whether Kornilov actually knew what it was Kerensky was talking about, that you’d have to take all this as a sign that Kerensky was already convinced Kornilov was a threat and regarded Lvov’s message and the text conversation with Kornilov as merely confirming what he already knew.

Kerensky called an emergency meeting of the Provisional Government for midnight that same night. He informed the ministers that a military coup had begun and asked them all to hand over control of their ministries to him, essentially making him a dictator, in the old Roman Republican sense of an individual taking personal control of the government in order to deal with a crisis. Incidentally, in 1917, the word “dictator” did not carry all the negative connotations it has in our time. It’s going to acquire all those negative connotations later in the twentieth century, but we’ll get into that sometime around episode 300.

By 4:00 AM, when the meeting broke up, the Provisional Government was effectively dead, and Alexander Kerensky and a couple of his closest allies were the government of the world’s largest nation. The nominal Provisional Government would only meet once more, but we’ll also get to that later.

Unaware of this emergency meeting in Petrograd, General Kornilov in Mogilev sent a cable at 2:40 AM, earlier that same morning, informing the government that the Third Cavalry Corps was on its way to Petrograd and requesting that the city be placed under martial law. At 7:00 AM he received a telegram from Petrograd, signed by Alexander Kerensky, relieving him of his command. The telegram put all of Stavka into an uproar. First of all, Kerensky did not have the power to relieve Kornilov on his own; that would require a vote of the entire Provisional Government. (No one at Stavka knew that the government had voted to hand over all its authority to Kerensky.) Second, Kornilov and Kerensky had communicated by telegraph just a few hours ago and, as far as Kornilov knew, they had reached a meeting of the minds. Why this sudden about face? The more Kornilov and his staff thought about it, the more obvious the conclusion became: that the Bolsheviks and/or the Petrograd Soviet had begun some sort of coup, and the cable from Kerensky was either a forgery or had been sent under duress. Kornilov contacted General Krymov, commander of the Third Cavalry Corps, and ordered him to move his unit into Petrograd as quickly as possible.

That afternoon, Kerensky’s man at the war ministry, Boris Savinkov, sent a telegram to Kornilov asking him where this demand for dictatorial powers had come from. Savinkov pointed out that he and Kornilov had held a face-to-face meeting just a few days ago and Kornilov had said nothing about any such thing. Kornilov wired him back and told him the idea had been suggested by Lvov—finally, someone in the civilian government knew the full story.

Savinkov rushed to Kerensky to explain to him that the whole thing was a miscommunication, that it had been Lvov, not Kornilov, who had proposed a military dictatorship. But Kerensky’s staff told him it was too late. A statement had already been released to the newspapers,
announcing that Kornilov had demanded that control of the government be surrendered to him and that the Provisional Government had refused the demand and dismissed General Kornilov.

When Kornilov got this news, he flew into a rage. He issued his own statement, proclaiming his loyalty to Russia and his opposition to what he called “the enemy of the Constituent Assembly.” The cavalry continued their advance on Petrograd.

It was at this moment, if not sooner, that General Kornilov went into open rebellion against the Russian government. Some historians believe Kerensky wanted this moment, so that he could not only relieve Kornilov, but discredit him. A few judge that Kornilov is the villain of this story, and that certainly will be the Bolshevik version, but it’s entirely possible that this whole thing began as a misunderstanding, a misunderstanding caused by, or perhaps even engineered by, Vladimir Lvov. But however we got here, here we are, and neither Kerensky nor Kornilov is willing to back down.

Kerensky approached the Petrograd Soviet that evening and asked for its support in defending the capital against the approaching cavalry corps. The Soviet agreed and formed what it called “The Committee to Fight the Counterrevolution.” The war ministry released 40,000 small arms to workers’ groups to help defend the city.

Only, here’s the thing. The only workers who had been organized into paramilitary groups were the Bolsheviks. So they got most of the weapons. The Bolsheviks were known to control certain army and navy units in Petrograd, and Kerensky made a direct appeal to the Bolsheviks to take up arms in defense of the Provisional Government. And boy, did they ever. Most notably, the crew of the Russian Navy cruiser Aurora was known to be riddled with Bolsheviks. The ship was brought up the river into the city and stationed by the Winter Palace, which was now the seat of government.

The next day, September 10, Kerensky issued a public statement accusing Kornilov of rebelling against the Provisional Government and of pulling combat units off the front lines and thus undermining the war against the Germans in order to seize control of Petrograd. Kerensky may have believed the first part of that accusation, but he surely knew the second part was false. Remember that it was Kerensky himself who had instructed Kornilov to ready a unit to move into Petrograd just a week ago.

That unit, the Third Cavalry Corps, commanded by Alexander Krymov, was still advancing on Petrograd at Kornilov’s order. Kornilov sent messages to other army commanders asking for support, but the only support he got from them was the moral kind. They send him messages of encouragement and some of them sent telegrams to Kerensky, protesting that Kornilov was no traitor. No civilian politicians in Petrograd of any political persuasion spoke out in favor of Kornilov.
On September 11, as the Third Cavalry Corps was approaching the outskirts of the city, General Krymov received a telegram from Alexander Kerensky. The telegram said that the situation in Petrograd was stable, that there was no need for the cavalry, and that the Provisional Government was ordering him to halt his advance. Within the unit, the consensus of Krymov’s officers was just the same. Petrograd was perfectly calm, and there appeared to be no reason for a military occupation.

In the Bolshevik telling of this story, the Bolshevik resistance in Petrograd takes a much more prominent role. Bolshevik railway workers are said to have sabotaged the rail lines, thus preventing a move into the city, and taken up defensive positions to block the cavalry’s way. No doubt the Bolshevik version exaggerates, but it does seem to be true that the cavalry units met up with Petrograd defenders, but the meetings were friendly and indeed they were part of what persuaded the cavalry that they weren’t needed.

With no army units left to support whatever it was Kornilov was trying to do, he had no choice but to accept Kerensky’s order relieving him of command of the army. This led to a few days of confusion that sound like something out of Gilbert and Sullivan as Kerensky went around trying to find an officer to replace Kornilov as commander in chief and couldn’t find anyone willing to take the job. Think about it. Would you want the job after getting a close-up look at what happened to Kornilov?

Kerensky offered the post to Vladimir Klembovsky, who is currently commanding the Northern Front, but Klembovsky turned him down. Then he offered it to Kornilov’s chief of staff, Alexander Lukomsky, who also turned him down. It took several days to sort out who was in command of the Russian military, and let me take a moment to remind you here that there’s a war on. It took so long that Kerensky was forced to issue a directive to the Army clarifying that, until a new c-in-c was appointed, Kornilov was still in command. Kornilov himself described this as “an episode unique in world history…the Commander in Chief, accused of treason…has been ordered to continue commanding his armies because there is no one else to appoint.”

Eventually, Mikhail Alexeyev agreed to take the position, which is ironic if you can remember all the way back to the February Revolution. This is the guy who was chief of staff when the Emperor commanded the armies, and then took over as commander-in-chief after Nikolai abdicated, then was dismissed by Kerensky to make room for Brusilov after Kerensky decided Alexeyev was too much of a defeatist. Brusilov commanded the ill-fated offensive in July, which led to him being replaced by, yes, Lavr Kornilov. Alexeyev proceeded to Stavka headquarters at Mogilev, where he assumed command, placed Kornilov under arrest, and had him sent back to Petrograd.

And thus ends what history knows as the “Kornilov Affair.” If Kerensky had intended any of this to strengthen his position or the position of the Provisional Government, then it backfired spectacularly. Kornilov is no longer a threat, but the government looks weak and it has lost the
support of the generals, who were appalled at how Kornilov and Krymov were treated. Worse still, Kerensky’s call for aid from the Bolsheviks has rehabilitated them as a political force in Petrograd and allowed them to position themselves as the saviors of the Provisional Government and the Revolution against right-wing counterrevolutionary elements. And worst of all, remember those 40,000 rifles the war ministry handed out? Most of them are now in Bolshevik hands and, spoiler alert, they aren’t planning to give them back.

We’ll have to stop there for today. As always, I thank you for listening. I’d also like to thank Frank for making a donation, and thank you, Hugh, for becoming a patron of the podcast. It actually does cost a certain amount of money to create a podcast and keep it going. Donors and patrons help pay those bills and ensure that everyone can enjoy The History of the Twentieth Century, so if you’ve got a few extra hamiltons or galahs or toonies or winstons or whatever they call them in your country, come on over to the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and become a donor or patron. You can also help out by tweeting and liking and doing all that cool social media stuff, and if you haven’t already, don’t forget to leave a rating and review at the iTunes store. This helps new listeners find the podcast, listeners who hopefully will enjoy it as much as you do.

And I hope you’ll join me next week on The History of the Twentieth Century as we conclude with the final days of the Kerensky government and the October Revolution. Peace, Land, and Bread, next week, on The History of the Twentieth Century.

Oh, and one more thing. I alluded to the army officers’ reaction to how Kornilov and Krymov had been treated by the government, but I didn’t actually tell you General Krymov’s story. He was the commander of that Third Cavalry Corps that was advancing on Petrograd. After the advance halted, Kerensky asked Krymov to come to his office for a meeting. Krymov came, and went into the meeting offering his apologies. He explained to Kerensky he had only been following orders, that he had believed the Provisional Government was in jeopardy, and that he had halted his units as soon as he realized that was not the case.

Kerensky had little to say in return. He refused to shake Krymov’s hand and ordered him to report to the military court in Petrograd to be investigated. Krymov did not obey that order. He proceeded to the apartment of a friend of his in Petrograd, reportedly declared, “Life is no longer worth living,” drew his service revolver, and killed himself.

Krymov did leave a suicide note. It was addressed to his commander, Lavr Kornilov. Kornilov read the note and destroyed it. No one else knows what it said.

[music: Closing Theme]