

The History of the Twentieth Century

Episode 109

“I Am Ordering You to Die”

Transcript

[music: Fanfare]

“This is one of the great campaigns of history. Think what Constantinople is to the East. It is more than London, Paris, and Berlin all rolled into one are to the West. Think how it has dominated the East. Think what its fall will mean.

First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill.

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

[music: Opening War Theme]

Episode 109. I Am Ordering You to Die.

In this episode, I want to turn our attention to the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire, where we last visited in episode 99. In that episode, we looked at the Empire’s earliest military moves, principally against the Russians in the Caucasus. I also raised the prospect of an Ottoman offensive against the Suez Canal, but then noted the logistical issues and said it was going to take the Turks some time to work them all out. So let’s go back and pick up that thread.

The Suez Canal is the British Empire’s jugular vein, as it provides the best route to India, the jewel of the Empire. The Three Pashas, who are running things in Constantinople these days, are fully aware of this, and so is Berlin. If the Central Powers were able to deny the British the use of the canal, that would impact the British economy and hamper British military operations pretty much everywhere outside of Europe. I’m thinking of places like the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Mesopotamia, and Persia. In early 1915 there is actual or potential conflict in each of these locations, and loss of the canal would make British operations slower and more expensive.

Before the Ottoman Empire joined the war, Egypt was British-administered, but was formally part of the Empire. When the British declared war on the Empire, they dispensed with the formalities and took full responsibility for administering Egypt, including the Sinai Peninsula. So the front line runs along the border between Egypt and Ottoman-controlled Palestine.

Except that the British aren't trying to defend the Sinai. It's a harsh place: arid, mountainous, sparsely populated. The British defensive line is the canal, and that's good strategic thinking, since it puts any Turkish attacker in a very unpleasant position. First, the Turks would have to assemble an army in Palestine. That's a pretty stiff challenge right there, because in 1914, Palestine is an underdeveloped and neglected corner of the Empire with few railroads. The Turks set to work expanding and modernizing their rail network when the war began, but hey, that's a case of being a day late and a dinar short. It's going to take years before that makes any impact.

Second, any army assembled in Palestine has to march across some 120 miles of harsh terrain to reach the Suez Canal. I say "march" because, again, there is no railroad. The march will take more than a week, and the army will have to carry everything it needs for the march and for the battle waiting at the end of it. That includes water. And don't forget bridging equipment, which you're going to need if you expect to cross the Suez Canal. And heavy artillery. You can't win a battle in 1915 without heavy artillery.

It was a huge task to haul so much equipment over so much unforgiving terrain, but the Turks pulled it off. The Ottoman Fourth Army, under the command of Djemal Pasha, one of the Three Pashas, and assisted by German advisers, was able to cross the Sinai in January 1915 and attack the British. One key bit of ingenuity was bringing along well-drilling equipment so the Turks could dig their own wells and draw their own water along the line of advance.

While I'm on this subject, I should mention that this word "pasha" that I keep throwing at you is a title in the Ottoman Empire. You can think of it as roughly equivalent to calling a European a "count" or a "baron" or some such aristocratic title, except here in the Ottoman Empire, we put the title after the person's name, so it's Djemal Pasha, not Pasha Djemal, as a European might want to say it. Got that? Great. Then let's move on.

Most of the Turkish force crossed through the middle of the peninsula, avoiding the coast so as not to be detected. The Turks believed they had succeeded at this, although they were wrong. The British had aerial reconnaissance, the latest in military technology, and they spotted the Ottoman army long before it arrived.

The British forces defending Egypt at this time were primarily Indian soldiers, with some native Egyptians and British. There were also soldiers coming in from Australia and New Zealand. These soldiers were delayed in arriving out of concerns raised by the raids of the German cruiser *Emden*, as we saw in episode 95. These Australian and New Zealander units were originally intended to be trained in England and then assigned to the Western Front, just like the Canadians, but after the unhappy experience of the Indian troops assigned to the Western Front, these Australians and New Zealanders were assigned instead to Egypt for their training.

At this time, these units amounted to two divisions, one Australian division and one division of mixed Australian and New Zealander units. They were brought together under what was at first called the "Australasian Corps," until the New Zealanders objected to the Australians getting all

the billing, and so the name was changed to the rather unwieldy “Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.” That was a mouthful, so in typical military fashion, the name quickly got shortened to the acronym ANZAC, although it’s worth noting that at various times there were British and Indian units in the corps as well.

The Turks assaulted the canal on February 3. The British were less surprised than the Turks had hoped and they defended the canal tenaciously, assisted by the Royal Navy, which could send ships right into the canal to bombard enemy positions and, crucially, wreck the Turkish pontoon bridges as fast as the Turks could build them. Some Turkish soldiers actually did manage to cross the canal, but the Turkish commanders came to realize that the defenders were too strong for the forces they had available, and so the Ottoman forces withdrew to Palestine until they could build up a larger army. British casualties were minimal; the Turks lost about 1,500, including the 700 or so soldiers who had managed to cross the canal, but then were stranded when their comrades withdrew and were forced to surrender.

Given the importance of the Suez Canal to the British, this was something of a wake-up call, and the British Army began sending reinforcements to beef up the canal defenses.

You might think you see an opportunity here for the British to go on the offensive in the wake of the Ottoman withdrawal and strike back at the Ottomans in Palestine, and, yes, that’s eventually going to happen. But in the spring of 1915, British strategic thinking took a sharp left turn, toward opening a whole new front in a whole new location. A place called “Gallipoli.”

[music: Turkish music]

The end of the year 1914 saw the major powers in a deadlock on the Western Front, a deadlock that inevitably raised the question, “What next?” We looked at that question in earlier episodes, and examined some of the German strategic thinking engendered by that strategic dilemma. For Russia and France, the answer to the question “What next?” is pretty obvious. But for the British War Cabinet, the options are many, and the best course of action is not clear.

Except to Lord Kitchener, the war minister. He wanted to build the British Army up from six divisions to seventy, a force large enough to tip the scales decisively on the Western Front. If this took two more years, if the French and the Germans and the Russians bled themselves into exhaustion before the British Army swept in and won the war, well, that was not so much a bug in the plan as a feature. Shh! Don’t say it out loud.

Key to the Kitchener plan was patience. It would take time to build this force, and during those two years, there would be a terrible temptation to use it prematurely. In Kitchener’s mind, this temptation was to be resisted at all costs.

But then there was the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Churchill was still at this point just 40 years old, still energetic, and very much dissatisfied with how the Great War is playing out.

We've seen how the development of radio has allowed the naval ministry in Whitehall to keep in close communication with Royal Navy commanders around the world. Churchill took full advantage of this, and was managing naval affairs in more detail than had ever before been possible. Some would say micromanaging, and it wasn't always a happy experience for the naval commanders at sea.

So either these commanders need to calibrate their moves very carefully, or Churchill needs to lighten up and give them more discretion. But Churchill wasn't much for reflection. He was in charge of what was supposed to be the most formidable branch of the British military, and what were they doing? Blockading Germany. Okay, well, that's important, but it's boring. The Royal Navy has many more assets than just the Grand Fleet. What *else* could we be doing that might end the war? What blow can we strike to help break the deadlock?

The first inkling of an answer to this question came back when the Ottoman offensive in the Caucasus was putting a scare into the Russians. During those dark days of December 1914, Grand Duke Nikolai, the commander-in-chief of the Russian military, pleaded for Russia's allies to do something to take the pressure off. In the end, the Russians were able to turn that Ottoman offensive around on their own, but the British heard their plea and responded with naval units to bombard Turkish forts at the Dardanelles. The first bombardment began on February 17, 1915.

And there were other reasons, besides assisting the Russians, for why an assault here would begin to look attractive to the British War Cabinet. First, the Ottoman Empire was undoubtedly the weakest of the three Central Powers. The collapse of this Empire had been expected any day now for the past, oh, forty years. Ironically, British policy had once been to prop up the Ottomans and deny the Russians control of Constantinople and the straits. But now, Russia is an ally and Constantinople is an enemy.

Second, the Ottoman military has in recent years proved to be remarkably ineffective at defending Ottoman territory. Just in the past four years, the Ottomans have been forced to cede territory to Italy (episode 66) and the Balkan League (episode 69), so what chance do they have against the army of a Great Power, one that's far better trained and equipped?

Third, if the Allies took the straits and gained access to the Black Sea, that would open up trade with Russia. Russia has huge manpower reserves, but her economy is suffering as a result of the Central Powers' blockade, and she hasn't been able to produce nearly enough weapons and ammunition to properly arm all her soldiers. If Britain can open up this waterway, it could be used to ship arms to Russia. If Russia only had as many rifles as she had soldiers, well, that could tip the balance right there.

Fourth, the Allies and the Central Powers were by this time competing diplomatically to recruit the remaining neutral Balkan nations—Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania—to join their respective alliances. For the Allies to strike a blow in the Balkans would send a message to the neutrals that the Allies were winning the war and they'd better get aboard the train before it leaves the station. Furthermore, it might even present an opportunity, at long last, for Britain and France to send supplies and assistance to poor, beleaguered, struggling Serbia.

Fifth, it was felt among the allied command, and with good reason, that the political instability seen in the Ottoman Empire in recent years might erupt again if Constantinople fell, or even if it were seriously threatened. You already know that the Ottoman government was hesitant about entering the war. They'd had their hand forced by Enver Pasha and Admiral Souchon. If things went south, the faction in the government that hadn't wanted to join the war in the first place might reassert itself and sue for peace.

And for Churchill, there's another reason. This will give him the opportunity to take a break from court-martialing admirals and show off what the Royal Navy can do. The RN still has quite a few of those pre-dreadnought battleships that aren't worth much in a fight against the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet, but still have powerful guns and would make great mobile artillery platforms for destroying Turkish forts in the straits.

Could it be that the Royal Navy had assets just lying about that could be employed to force the straits, open the sea route to Russia, and lead to the capture of Constantinople, the New Rome, the imposing fortress capital that had fallen only once in its 1,584-year history?

[music: "March of the Mogul Emperors"]

The first Royal Navy bombardment of the Turkish forts on the Dardanelles had happened back on November 4, right after Britain declared war on the Empire. But after that first attack, the RN was quiet for a time. This bombardment served as something of a wake-up call to the Turks, alerting them of the danger the British posed and reminding them to beef up their strait defenses. Which they did.

The Grand Duke made his plea on January 2, 1915. On February 17, the British were flying planes from their Navy's first seaplane carrier, HMS *Ark Royal* to act as spotters for an Anglo-French naval force sent to bombard the forts. This effort met with some success, but the Turks had mobile artillery that could be shifted around before the ships could target it properly, and they had mined the straits. Minesweepers sent into the straits were bombarded by these mobile artillery.

I should mention here that the Dardanelles is a seaway virtually unique. It is over 35 miles long and quite narrow, varying from four miles wide to less than a mile, and including some sharp bends. The general flow of water is from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and so the currents can get quite strong, and are flowing in the wrong direction, from the British point of view. The

land rises sharply on either side of the strait, ideal for positioning those Turkish forts and mobile artillery guns, while hampering the effectiveness of the British naval guns, which were forced to fire hundreds of feet upward, something naval guns aren't usually called upon to do.

These early naval engagements demonstrated that a much larger force would be needed to have any hope of breaking Turkish control of the strait. And so a larger force was assembled, and dissention broke out in the Admiralty. Jackie Fisher, who had come out of retirement and been reappointed First Sea Lord, was lukewarm to this whole idea. He still favored that plan of landing British troops on the Baltic coast of Germany, and to him, this mucking about at the Dardanelles was just a wasteful distraction. To Winston Churchill, though, it was just what was needed: a way to leverage the huge Royal Navy to break the deadlock in Europe.

And so a larger Anglo-French naval force was gathered, built around a collection of 18 battleships and it struck at 10:30 in the morning on March 18, a sunny spring day. Unfortunately for the Allies, the Turks had managed just a few days earlier to secretly lay mines in just the area where this Allied fleet intended to operate. The Allies began their bombardment. Three and a half hours in, a French battleship, *Bouvet*, struck a Turkish mine and sank, carrying 639 French sailors to their deaths.

Two hours later it was the battlecruiser *Inflexible*'s turn to strike a mine. She was heavily damaged, but managed to escape and beach herself. For those of you keeping score at home, this is the third time *Inflexible* has made an appearance in this podcast. She was also involved in the Flight of the *Goeben*, episode 83, and the Battle of the Falkland Islands, episode 95.

Two other British battleships would also be sunk, *Ocean* and *Irresistible*, and two more French battleships damaged, *Gaulois* and *Suffren*. And thus by sunset, one-third of the allied battleship force had been put out of action and seven hundred or more sailors killed, as against about 100 Turkish casualties. But the Turkish position suffered as well. Turkish fire had dwindled to almost nothing by sunset, and some British commanders thought the Turks were on the verge of defeat. But the overall commander of the operation, Admiral John de Robeck judged the risks too great and ordered a withdrawal.

It seemed clear now that naval units alone weren't going to be able to take and hold the straits. Only two options remained: either abandon the ambition of opening the straits, or double down by committing substantial ground forces to assault the strait with naval support, a strategy enthusiastically endorsed by Churchill. And unfortunately, he convinced the War Cabinet.

With Kitchener's army still years away from his ambition of it becoming large enough to break the deadlock on the Western Front, siphoning off substantial numbers of British troops to fight the Turks may seem like a bad idea. It certainly did to Kitchener. But the advantages of opening the straits—and perhaps knocking the Turks out of the war altogether—still loomed large.

It's also important to understand that this approach felt more natural to a lot of British military planners than the Kitchener approach. For the past century, Britain's key military strategy has been to use her large and powerful navy to bombard her enemies from the safety of the sea. You can think of it as the 19th century equivalent of a drone strike. If more than a naval bombardment was required, the next step would be to use the Navy for rapid deployment of light ground forces to strike an enemy at an unexpected time and place and then slip away before the counterattack comes. I've already mentioned the British burning of Washington in 1814. That's one example. As recently as 1902, we saw the British using their navy to intimidate Venezuela. Sometimes these landings would include seizing the customs house of a small nation and diverting its tax revenues to pay debts which might lead to that small nation getting incorporated into the British Empire, a process the British liked to call "peaceful penetration."

It wasn't all-out campaigns of conquest that made the British Empire; it was this strategy of economic entanglement, defended by rapid deployment of ships and soldiers when needed to enforce British claims. This was the British way. And an assault on Gallipoli felt like one more round of the usual procedure.

But times have changed. Modern weapons have longer ranges and are far more lethal. The terrain we're looking at here is remarkably rugged and favors defense heavily, as the Royal Navy has already discovered. Now the British are about to attempt the first large-scale amphibious landing in the age of modern weapons, and in a particularly inauspicious location.

An expeditionary force of about 70,000 was put together to invade and seize the Gallipoli peninsula. This is a long and slender peninsula with a narrow neck that makes up the European side of the Dardanelles. The commander of the operation would be the 62-year old General Sir Ian Hamilton, a protégé of Lord Kitchener. The force was scraped together from available British units, some Indian units, one French division contributed with great reluctance by Marshal Joffre, and ANZAC, that army corps made up of Australians and New Zealanders currently training in Egypt and meant for the Western Front. Now they were going to Gallipoli instead.

It has to be said that the training the ANZACs were getting in Egypt was not the best, and they would be underprepared for what awaits them. These soldiers had already garnered a reputation for raucous indiscipline, although you have to balance that against their spirited enthusiasm.

The biggest problem facing Hamilton was that this sequence of escalating bombardments the British had conducted over the past couple of months was a bright red flag to the Turks that some kind of assault on the peninsula was on the way. Defense of the peninsula was assigned to the Ottoman Fifth Army, which had been formed for this purpose, and which was under the command of the German General Otto Liman von Sanders, the chief of the German military mission in Turkey. The Turks had been strengthening their defenses in Gallipoli, with German advice and oversight, in anticipation of just the sort of attack that was coming.

Hamilton knew that the Turks knew he was coming, so he had to grapple with the challenge of making the assault work anyway. His solution was to strike in four places at once, on the principle that the enemy can't be everywhere at once, so if you attack in multiple locations, you'll catch them off guard somewhere. And so the largest landing was by British forces at the southern tip of the peninsula, called Cape Helles, with a diversionary French attack across the strait on the Asian side of the entrance, as well as a second diversionary attack much farther north at the neck of the peninsula by Royal Navy forces. The fourth attack would be a flank attack by the ANZACs and it would be on the western coast of the peninsula, about ten miles north of Cape Helles. There was an inlet here that would come to be called ANZAC Cove.

The danger that comes from the strategy of dividing your forces in this way is that you run a risk that all of your attacks will fail everywhere. Then what do you do? And that's pretty much how it all went down. On the Turkish side, General Liman von Sanders adopted a defensive strategy of screening the coasts of the peninsula with light forces while keeping the bulk of the Fifth Army in reserve inland, which turned out, by luck or design, to be exactly the right response to Hamilton's attack plan.

The assault on the Gallipoli peninsula began on Sunday, April 25. The landings at Cape Helles went relatively smoothly, but Turkish resistance proved much stiffer than anticipated. The British had expected the Turkish soldiers to cut and run once they saw British troops on the peninsula in force, but instead the Turks resisted tenaciously. Reinforcements slowed the British advance to a crawl. They managed to work themselves just two miles inland in the first two days of fighting.

But they had a better time of it than the ANZACs, who landed ten miles farther north on the west coast of the peninsula. The ANZAC assault began before dawn, about 4:30 in the morning, and succeeded in landing 16,000 soldiers on the first day. They began moving inland up the many ridges in the area and into the rugged interior of the peninsula, but they were able to advance no more than a quarter-mile before being pinned down by a determined Turkish defense.

The ANZAC attack had the potential to move east across the width of the peninsula, flanking the Turkish defenders and cutting off the Turks facing the British farther south. But that would not happen, primarily because of the leadership of the commander of the Ottoman 19th Division, who was quick to spot the danger posed by the ANZACs and led a ferocious Turkish resistance determined not to allow an ANZAC advance, no matter the cost. This commander was the 33-year old career army officer Mustafa Kemal.

Mustafa Kemal has appeared in the podcast before. He was one of the Ottoman officers sent to organize the defense of Libya against the Italians, although I did not mention him by name in that episode. Then he returned to the Balkans to fight in the Balkan wars. I did mention him by name there. After the Balkan Wars, Kemal was promoted to lieutenant colonel and served as the Ottoman military attaché to the Balkans. In that capacity, he had been one of the voices in the

Ottoman government opposed to Turkish involvement in the Great War. But when the war began, Kemal was given command of the 19th division and assigned to the Fifth Army tasked with defense of Gallipoli.

On the morning of the 25th, Kemal was among the first of the Turkish officers to recognize the scale of the British landings and in particular, the danger posed by the ANZACs. His response was rapid and decisive. As Kemal advanced his division toward the invaders, he encountered Turkish troops retreating from the ANZAC advance. Kemal demanded an explanation. The soldiers told him that they were retreating because they had run out of ammunition. Kemal ordered them to take up sniper positions, to lie on their bellies, aim their rifles, and generally give the appearance of snipers setting up an ambush, even though they couldn't actually shoot anybody, and thus force the ANZAC troops to advance more slowly. This gave Kemal's unit more time to set up. His soldiers took full advantage of the time and the terrain to pour artillery and machine gun fire down into the valleys. They kept up the attack at any cost, even attacking with bayonets once the ammunition ran out.

Most famously, Mustafa Kemal told his subordinate commanders, "I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can take our places."

It was quite the opposite of the weak and desultory defense the British commanders were expecting. The ANZACs would suffer over 2,000 casualties on the first day of fighting, and by evening would be requesting an evacuation. Hamilton would consult with the Navy, which would tell him evacuation was impossible. This forced Hamilton to respond to the evacuation request with a famous line of his own: "[D]ig yourselves right in and stick it out...dig, dig, dig, until you are safe." The ANZACs would fight alone for two more days before any relief came, and in the seven months that followed until the end of the Gallipoli campaign, they would be stuck in endless fighting on that narrow strip of beach, less than a mile long and a quarter-mile wide. The Turks would not be able to push them off, but the ANZACs would not be able to advance.

The forces down at Cape Helles would manage to advance about four miles up the peninsula, but there, too, the fighting would bog down into stalemate. The Allied forces were reliant on naval artillery support, but the Turks learned they could reduce the effectiveness of Allied naval fire by attacking at night and by keeping themselves close to the enemy. Because the Navy was having trouble with accurate targeting, and there were strict rules about not aiming at locations too close to Allied ground forces.

German and Austrian submarines harried the Allied navies and supply ships in the Mediterranean. After the sinkings of the British pre-dreadnought battleships HMS *Triumph* on May 25 and HMS *Majestic* on May 27—both sunk by German U-boats—the Allies withdrew

their large ships from the region, depriving the ground forces of their heaviest artillery protection.

By summer, the situation had degenerated into trench warfare, and the Turkish doctrine of sticking close to the enemy meant very narrow no-man's lands, sometimes less than fifty feet apart—or fifteen meters, if you like. Close enough that soldiers could lob grenades into each other's trenches. The summer conditions on the peninsula were hot and wet and full of bugs, and that combined with soldiers packed tightly in unsanitary conditions, meant disease was rampant and caused many casualties, especially on the Allied side.

By the end of 1915, it was clear that Gallipoli, far from being a way to break the stalemate, was merely an extension of the stalemate. It was siphoning off soldiers and supplies from the Western Front for no good purpose. Any hope of capturing the straits was long gone, unless the Allies were willing to sacrifice their efforts on all other fronts and pour everything into Gallipoli. This they would not do. Also, the deteriorating Allied position in the Balkans, which we will get to in a future episode, was rendering Gallipoli irrelevant. Allied forces evacuated in an orderly fashion, with the last units leaving the peninsula on January 8, 1916.

Altogether, the Allies suffered 56,000 killed and 130,000 wounded or missing, 90,000 evacuated due to disease. Ottoman casualties were comparable.

[music: "Venus, the Bringer of Peace"]

The Gallipoli Campaign was the bloodiest and most pointless offensive in a war famous for its bloody and pointless offensives. Ian Hamilton's career never recovered. Winston Churchill's political career seemed over—although if history teaches us anything, it teaches us not to count Winston Churchill out too soon. The War Cabinet's reputation suffered, and you should expect to see a cabinet reshuffle in a future episode.

For the Turks, Gallipoli would be the only major victory of the war, and it would make Mustafa Kemal the most admired Turkish hero of the war. You can expect to be hearing that name again, too. But why did the Turkish Army, which performed so poorly elsewhere, show such grit at Gallipoli? The answer lies in the rural Turkish peasant farmer, the backbone of the Ottoman Army. These soldiers were tough, religiously devout, and patriotic. They may have had mixed feelings about suppressing the emerging nationalism of Muslim Arabs or Orthodox Serbs, but nothing fired up their own Turkish nationalist identity like the thought of British troops marching into Constantinople. Turkey was not about to become the next Egypt or India. Not if the Turks had anything to say about it.

It has been said that three nations were born in the Gallipoli campaign. Not only Turkey, but Australia and New Zealand as well. Australians and New Zealanders felt pride in the valiant efforts of their ANZAC soldiers, tempered by a sense that the British Empire was not infallible, and that the leaders of the Empire were perhaps a little bit more willing to sacrifice their lives

than the lives of British soldiers. The result was emerging national identities for these two lands, separate and distinct from the British Empire. To this day, April 25 is celebrated as ANZAC Day in those two countries.

Military planners and historians would study the Gallipoli experience for the next thirty years, and most of them would draw the conclusion that amphibious landings would be difficult and bloody, if not impossible, in the circumstances of modern warfare. The next thirty years will see a great reluctance to attempt landings on this scale. This resistance to amphibious operations would not be dispelled until the experience of the Normandy landings in 1944.

The Gallipoli Campaign demonstrated that the venerable British Empire tactic of surprise naval landings had become obsolete in the age of modern weapons and communications and we can also see in this story an early indication that the Empire itself cannot survive the modern era.

We'll have to stop there for today. Thank you for listening. I'd like to thank Oliver for making a donation to the podcast, and thank you Randall for becoming a patron of the podcast. If you'd like to become a patron, or make a one-time contribution, visit the website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com, and click on the PayPal button or the Patreon button. And why not drop a comment while you're there and let me know what you thought of today's episode. Share our posts on Facebook, like our tweets, and drop by the iTunes store and leave a rating and review. Those are more ways you can help out.

And I hope you'll join me next week, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*, as we turn to the United Kingdom and see how things are going on the home front. Spoiler alert: not very well. The war news has not been good for some time now, and the British public is beginning to take notice. "Tell me, Mr. Asquith, do you take an interest in the war?" That's next week, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. It has become customary for Australian and New Zealander officials and tourists to visit Anzac Cove at Gallipoli on ANZAC Day. The first such visit by Australian, New Zealander and British officials and veterans and families of the fallen soldiers took place in 1934. On that occasion, the visitors were addressed by none other than Mustafa Kemal, now the President of the Republic of Turkey, who spoke these words:

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments to us where they lie side by side, here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in our bosom, and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.

[music: Closing War Theme]

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