So far, from the British point of view, the naval war against Germany hasn’t been going at all according to expectations. The Admiralty, and the British public, had expected a grand confrontation in the North Sea in pretty short order after the war began, a confrontation the British could reasonably expect to win, crippling the German High Seas Fleet, eliminating even the remote possibility of the Germans landing soldiers on British soil, and locking in British naval supremacy for the rest of the war.

It didn’t happen. And as the weeks dragged on, the British public began to wonder: What are the Germans up to? And why isn’t our Navy doing anything to stop them?

Welcome to *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

As a reminder, we closed out episode 91 with the dramatic events of September 22, 1914, when the German submarine *U-9* sank three British cruisers in one engagement in the Broad Fourteens. These three cruisers were older ships, so the loss of the cruisers themselves was not a heavy blow to the Royal Navy; much more tragic was the loss of more than 1400 officers and sailors.

It seemed the Germans were whittling away at the Royal Navy, and the Navy was just sitting there and letting them do it. Where was that big naval battle?

The expectation that the naval confrontation with Germany would lead to one decisive battle was not an idle fancy; it was based on historical precedent. The last time the Royal Navy faced a comparable enemy was in 1805, when it was blockading France during the War of the Third
Coalition. Then, the French Army was supreme on land, and Napoleon dreamed of breaking the British blockade and establishing control of the English Channel, at least for long enough to ferry his unstoppable army onto British soil. The French attempted to assemble their scattered naval squadrons into a force capable of breaking the British blockade, and the result was the Battle of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy’s most storied victory in a long history of storied victories. So it was reasonable for the British in 1914 to expect that the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet were heading for a Trafalgar-like confrontation.

But the Germans weren’t giving them one. The 57-year old commander of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Gustav von Ingenohl, was cautious, and the German Admiralty was backing up his caution. The Germans settled on this strategy of chipping away at the Royal Navy, taking out a ship here and a ship there with mines and torpedo boats and submarines, modes of naval combat where the Germans had the advantage. Perhaps if they kept it up long enough, a frustrated British commander could be provoked into making a rash move, and he and his ships could be drawn into some isolated confrontation where the Germans would have the superior numbers.

The British Admiralty fully understood this danger, and so their strategy was very careful and very conservative. Maintain the distant blockade and do not be drawn into exchanges with the Germans. This goes against the grain. British naval commanders have been court-martialed for refusing battle, even against superior enemies, as we saw as recently as episode 95. But this is a new day. If German ships fire at you and then run, especially in the southern waters of the North Sea, you have to stop and ask yourself, are they trying to draw you into waters that are full of freshly-laid mines or waiting U-boats? Or quite possibly both? What looked like cowardice in the 19th century is simple prudence in the twentieth.

But the British public was growing impatient. They had been taught all their lives that the Royal Navy was the glory of Britain, the force that made her supreme around the world. And now the Navy is just hanging back and doing nothing, even as the Germans are picking away at their ships? What’s up with that? It’s only human nature that when your adversaries remain quiet and their behavior mysterious, to leap to the conclusion that they are plotting some kind of masterstroke they are about to spring on you. Maybe that’s what the Germans were doing. So why isn’t the Navy doing anything to stop it?

There was a lot of anti-German propaganda going around in Britain at the time. What’s awkward about this is that a lot of English aristocrats have German ancestry, German family connections, and even German titles, including [clears throat] the House of Saxe-Coburg und Gotha, the British royal family. There were royals with titles like Duchess of Saxony and Princess of Schleswig-Holstein, and during a bitter war against Germany, this can get a little awkward. Some Britons whispered that perhaps the royals weren’t fully committed to the war.
The man for whom all this quickly got the most awkward was the First Sea Lord, the admiral in overall command of the Royal Navy. In 1914, this post was held by King George’s cousin, the sixty-year old Prince Louis of Battenberg.

Louis of Battenberg was not merely a British aristocrat with a German ancestry and title. His grandfather had been a German Grand Duke, and his father had served in the Austrian Army, fighting in the Italian wars. Louis enlisted in the Royal Navy at the age of fourteen, presumably after demonstrating his ability to strip naked and jump over a chair. But he was no aristocratic dandy. He was serious about his naval career and he sought real posting aboard real warships, not the sort of honorary positions as royal escort or first officer aboard the royal yacht that most aristocrats who wanted a naval commission preferred. He got some of those kinds of postings anyway, and he was dogged by rumors that he’d advanced through the ranks based on his bloodline.

But as the Royal Navy sat idly while the Germans prepared their big surprise, whatever that might be, suspicions grew, in private, that Louis of Battenberg was a German sympathizer.

[music: Prelude from Das Rheingold]

On October 20, 1914, the German submarine U-17 sank a British cargo ship, SS Glitra, the first British merchant ship to be sunk by a submarine. And it didn’t happen at all the way you are probably picturing it in your mind. So let me explain that.

You may recall from episode 30 that working out the rules for submarines engaging merchant ships was part of the debate that went on at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907. When a surface ship intercepts an unarmed enemy civilian ship, she is supposed to allow the civilian ship the opportunity to stop and be boarded. To surrender, basically. The warship sends a boarding party and can take possession of or scuttle the civilian ship if it is carrying contraband. If the ship is scuttled, her crew must be taken prisoner aboard the warship, or released into lifeboats. Obviously, it would be shocking to have a battleship, say, fire on a civilian ship without first allowing her to surrender, or to sink a civilian ship without giving her crew at least the opportunity to get into the lifeboats. That would in fact be a war crime, on a par with soldiers shooting civilians on sight.

But the introduction of the submarine complicates this picture. On the face of it, you might argue—as many did—that submarines were bound by the same laws as everybody else, and why couldn’t a submarine hail a civilian ship and allow it to surrender and allow the crew to evacuate before sinking it?

Well, it could. And that’s exactly what happened with Glitra and U-17. Glitra was stopped, boarded, searched, and then scuttled off the coast of Norway. All very proper. All very legal. A Norwegian torpedo boat observed these proceedings, but did not interfere, Norway being a neutral nation. After U-17 left, the Norwegians then rescued the British sailors.
But perhaps you can see the problem here. Submarines are stealth weapons. Their great advantage is their ability to sneak up on another ship underwater, undetected. Submarines sacrifice, well, just about everything else that makes a warship strong for the sake of being able to travel underwater. They are small, they are slow, they do not have armor, and they have little or no armaments, other than torpedoes. Asking a submarine to surface and identify itself is like asking a dreadnought battleship to take off its armor, unload its guns, and shut down its engines.

Forcing a submarine to surface could cause it all kinds of problems. The merchant ship might radio nearby friendly warships and alert them to the submarine’s presence. The merchant ship might be able to get away, since submarines aren’t especially fast. The merchant ship might try ramming the submarine. And the merchant ship might be lightly armed herself, say, with a small caliber gun, a gun that wouldn’t be worth much against a warship but could do a lot of damage to a submarine.

So how long do you think it’s going to take before the German Admiralty and their U-boat commanders decide they just can’t operate within these narrow restrictions and take to firing torpedoes at enemy merchant ships on sight?

The answer is, six days. On October 26, a British ship was struck by a German torpedo without warning. It was a naval first, and it was a shocker. Equally shocking was the location of the attack—in the Dover Strait, Britain’s moat, a waterway that is supposed to be thoroughly safe for British ships. The target of this attack was damaged by the torpedo, but not sunk, and was towed away for repairs.

The next day, October 27, at 8:45 AM, a sudden explosion blew a hole in the hull of the dreadnought battleship HMS *Audacious* while it was participating in gunnery practice off the north coast of Ireland. It was thought at first the explosion was caused by a torpedo, and the other dreadnoughts participating in the exercise fled the scene. In fact, *Audacious* had struck a mine, a mine laid by a German minelayer that had managed to slip out of the North Sea. A collection of smaller ships in the area attempted to stabilize *Audacious* and tow her into port, but the efforts failed, and *Audacious* sank that night.

This was quite a shock. *Audacious* was no elderly ship; she had only been commissioned a year ago and was one of the Royal Navy’s largest and most powerful battleships. The Admiralty and the British Cabinet decided at once to keep the sinking a secret. This proved very difficult to do and later became something of a joke, because, you see, one of the ships that came to the aid of *Audacious* when she struck that mine was *Olympic*.

You remember the passenger liner *Olympic* from episode 64, right? She belonged to the White Star Line and was the older sister of *Titanic*. *Olympic* had continued in the transatlantic passenger business. Once the war broke out, transatlantic travel became mostly one way—westbound Americans in Europe wanting to go home. By this time though, late October, the demand for transatlantic passenger travel was down to a trickle. *Olympic* was on her way from
New York to Glasgow on what would be her final voyage until after the war ends. She was only carrying 135 passengers, about six percent of her capacity, which is obviously not the way to turn a profit, and White Star Line planned to lay her up in Belfast until business picked up again. But you see, some of those 135 passengers who watched Audacious sink from the decks of Olympic were Americans. The British government impounded the ship and her passengers for a few days, but couldn’t keep that up forever, and had no legal mechanism for quarantining American citizens or preventing them from telling the American press what they had seen, and within a couple weeks, the Germans were pretty sure that the stories were true and Audacious had in fact sunk. Still, the news was embargoed in Britain until the end of the war, and in an almost Monty Python-level of official absurdity, the Admiralty refused to acknowledge the loss of the ship and continued to report on the doings of Audacious and her crew as if she were still active.

That same day, October 27, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, asked Louis of Battenberg to resign. The story is told that Louis had been suffering from a painful episode of gout and expressed relief that he was able to give up his post, but that might be a bit of face saving. Battenberg’s replacement was none other than Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher, now Lord Fisher, brought out of retirement just shy of his 74th birthday.

Winston Churchill was a hands-on kind of leader, and modern telegraphy and radio made it possible for the first time in naval history for a civilian official like Churchill to sit in a room at Whitehall and issue real-time operational orders to Royal Navy commanders in distant locations. This didn’t always work out for the best. The technology wasn’t good enough to have conversations, just send short one-way text messages. And text messages are easily misinterpreted. Just ask Admiral Troubridge (episode 83) or Admiral Craddock (episode 95). The former got court-martialed, and the latter killed, owing to misunderstandings of Churchill’s orders.

But Churchill and Fisher were both eager to see the Royal Navy get more involved in the war. After all, the RN is supposed to be Britain’s premier military service, right? As it would turn out, they would come to disagree on exactly how the Navy was supposed to get more involved in the war, but that’s a story for another episode.

With the sinking of Audacious and the reassignment of Invincible and Inflexible to the South Atlantic to hunt for von Spee’s squadron and ships in dock for maintenance, by November, the British edge in dreadnoughts at the standoff in the North Sea had been whittled down to just one. This would have been an excellent time for the Germans to attempt their Trafalgar, but unfortunately for them, no one in the German Admiralty knew this at the time.

In fact, the British had a substantial intelligence advantage over the Germans, aided considerably by the fact that the British had all three German naval codes. The Australians had captured one aboard a merchant ship, the Russians had captured one from a disabled German cruiser in the
Baltic, and the British themselves snagged the third one—literally—after a German destroyer sank, and its code book turned up in the net of a British fishing boat. These codes would be put to work for British Naval Intelligence in the famous Room 40 of the Old Admiralty Building. The British also had a series of radio receiving stations along the east coast. These stations could intercept German radio transmissions in the North Sea and forward them to Room 40, where they could be decoded in real time. Even better, the multiple stations made it possible to triangulate on the position of the German ship making the broadcast.

German naval vessels were in the habit of transmitting at high power and chatting with one another about mundane matters. All this gave Room 40 plenty of opportunity to track the German ships and hone their decoding skills. For their part, the Germans valued radio, and believed a fleet of ships coordinating their actions using radio would have a significant advantage in battle. But they were slow to see the dangers of the enemy monitoring their transmissions. So as a result of all this, Room 40 had a pretty good idea of German naval activity in the North Sea all throughout the war.

The Royal Navy, by contrast, was suspicious of radio. British ships used radio at minimal power and only for urgent communications. The British preferred to rely on old-time signal flags to communicate, in spite of their limitations in bad weather or poor lighting. This caused the British some problems of their own, as we shall see.

In November, the German Naval Chief of Staff, Hugo von Pohl, wrote a critical memorandum to the German Chancellor, which contained a suggestion for a wholly new strategy for dealing with the British. It was becoming apparent that U-boats were far more effective in sneak attacks against unarmed merchant ships than they were against warships.

That’s not really a surprise, but von Pohl’s key insight was this: Germany lacked the means to break the British blockade. But her U-boats presented a novel opportunity: Germany could set up its own underwater blockade of the British Isles using her U-boats.

Germany was, officially, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. That’s what the Imperial government said. The truth is a little more ambiguous. German agriculture relied on imports of nitrates and phosphates for fertilizer—including guano. And German cattle survived on imported fodder in the winter. Still, compare that to Britain. Two-thirds of the food consumed in Britain is imported. The British blockade was hurting Germany, but a German blockade had the potential to starve Britain.

The High Seas Fleet, meanwhile, were still hoping to lure the British into doing something reckless. The German Admiral Franz von Hipper was in command of the I Scouting Group, a squadron of five battlecruisers, those fast ships with big guns. On November 2, Hipper’s Squadron shelled the port of Great Yarmouth, with the idea of provoking a British pursuit, which the Germans would then lead into a minefield. On that occasion, all they got for their trouble was the sinking of one British submarine.
Hipper tried again in December, setting out on the 15th to strike the British coast once again. A few hours behind his squadron, the entire High Seas Fleet followed. The idea here was to bombard the coastal towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool on the morning of the 16th, and tempt the British to send their own battlecruiser force in response. Hipper’s squadron would withdraw, leading the British force right into minefields, torpedo boats, and the waiting High Seas Fleet.

The bombardment went off as planned, doing major damage to the towns and killing over a hundred British civilians. To the British public, these civilian deaths were just one more example of German brutality, like the Rape of Belgium. But the British public also couldn’t help wondering where their Navy was. Wasn’t the Navy supposed to be protecting them from this very sort of thing? Unfortunately for the British, the distant blockade strategy preserves the Navy’s warships at the cost of ceding control of the North Sea to the Germans. So no, they actually can’t stop bombardments like this. The east coast of Britain is vulnerable to an enemy attack, at least until the Admiralty gets a lot more comfortable with risk.

The irony of the bombardments of December 16, though, is that the Germans got what they wanted, but it didn’t do them any good. The British response to Hipper; was to send a fleet of ten battleships. That’s ten battleships to the Germans’ 24, waiting to spring the trap. But von Ingenohl missed what would prove to be his best opportunity to strike a blow on the Royal Navy. The approaching British ships put out so much radio traffic that he became convinced the entire Grand Fleet was bearing down on him and ordered a withdrawal. This left Hipper’s force with no backup, and now it’s the British turn to miss an opportunity. A signaling error aboard one of the British ships led to an order getting misread as an instruction to withdraw and that ship passed it on to other ships. So you see, visual signaling does have its own disadvantages.

On New Year’s Day, 1915, the British pre-dreadnought battleship Formidable was sunk by a U-boat in the English Channel.

On January 23, Hipper’s squadron set sail for another sortie into the North Sea. Once again, Room 40 picked up on the movement, and the Admiralty sent the British First Battlecruiser Squadron, commanded by Admiral David Beatty, to intercept with a superior force of five battlecruisers to the Germans’ four. The British also had greater numbers of cruisers and destroyers.

The British were expecting the Germans to attack a coastal town once again. But Hipper had another mission in mind. He had noticed that the British seemed to be able to anticipate his moves. But he guessed wrong about the explanation. He thought civilian fishing boats, maybe British, maybe neutral, in the waters of the Dogger Bank were spying on German movements. So his goal was to capture and search fishing ships in the Dogger Bank and see if he could figure out what was going on there.

This encounter became known as the Battle of Dogger Bank. The Germans withdrew, the British pursued, firing on and damaging the older German armored cruiser Blücher. But the British took
some serious hits, too. The Germans escaped, except for Blücher, after yet another signaling error, which caused the British ships to think they had been ordered to stick around and finish off Blücher, which they did, rather than pursue the rest of the German squadron.

This battle revealed serious shortcomings in the whole battlecruiser concept, but Jackie Fisher wasn’t ready to give up on his brainchild just yet. The Germans, on the other hand, drew from the battle the lesson that survivability of the ships was a key factor in winning a naval battle. Armor was improved, and steps were taken to shield on-board ammunition from being detonated by enemy gunfire. Ingenohl was removed from command of the High Seas Fleet, and replaced by von Pohl. The Germans would take a year to make these improvements, and the new and improved High Seas Fleet would not appear until 1916. But by then, the gap in numbers between British and German dreadnoughts will have widened further.

In February 1915, now that German surface battleships were being refitted and were unavailable, the German Admiralty put into effect Pohl’s underwater blockade plan. On February 4, the Admiralty announced a war zone around the British Isles, and advised that any enemy-flagged ship in that zone would be destroyed, and that it would not always be possible to avoid endangering crews and passengers. In other words, forget that stuff about submarines identifying themselves and giving the ship’s crew time to get into the lifeboats. It’s going to be shoot on sight.

The Germans also warned that there would be a risk to neutral vessels, owing to the British practice of flying neutral flags as a deception.

Flying a false flag is a no-no, of course, but everybody did it. The Germans did it, as we’ve already seen. The British did it. Ships of other countries did it, too. The Germans were already aware of what were obviously British ships flying American flags as a protective deception.

The German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, was especially concerned about the diplomatic fallout of attacks on neutral shipping, including especially the Great Neutral, the United States. But he was overruled, and the German U-boats commenced what we now call “unrestricted submarine warfare.” The best Bethman-Hollweg could get out of the Navy was a promise that U-boat commanders would at least try to determine whether ships seen flying neutral flags were actually neutral. This promise was not always kept.

It’s worth noting here that six months’ worth of naval conflict has led to a complete re-thinking of the role of submarines. Before the war, submarines were viewed as underwater torpedo boats: a weapon intended for fast, short-range attacks on enemy ships in coordination with surface ships. A blockade buster. The concept of U-boats as long-range blockade vessels themselves was something very new.

And at the beginning of the war, Germany didn’t have many U-boats, and the ones they did have were short range vessels. But submarines are small and relatively cheap, and the Germans
upgraded their designs to build U-boats capable of operating alone for longer times over greater distances.

Unrestricted submarine warfare was initially a great success. British losses soared. The British instructed their ships to paint over their names, and, if they spotted a submarine, or were challenged, to fire on it or ram it if possible, or otherwise attempt to flee. The British tightened the blockade around Germany, and now added foodstuffs to the list of contraband. If you’re going to try to starve us, we’re going to try to starve you.

[music: Prelude from Das Rheingold]

Unrestricted submarine warfare would give Germany yet another public relations problem. On March 28, a British steamship, Falaba, was sunk by U-28. One of the passengers killed was an American, Leon Chester Thrasher, prompting a US government protest to Germany.

As it would turn out, the commander of U-28 gave the appropriate warnings to Falaba. Falaba refused to cooperate and called on a British warship for help. It was only when U-28 saw the approaching warship that she fired on Falaba and withdrew. The German torpedo detonated explosives in Falaba’s cargo—explosives that weren’t supposed to be there. So there was plenty of bad behavior on the British side, but the Germans got the blame.

At that brings us at last to Lusitania. We first met Lusitania all the way back in episode 41. Eight years ago, she had been the pride of the Cunard Line and taken back the title of fastest transatlantic run from the Germans, although she had later been superseded by her sister ships Mauretania and Aquitania, which were a little bigger and a little faster, and by the White Star Lines’ Olympic-class ships, which were neither, but were more luxurious.

But Lusitania remained in service. After the war broke out, the transatlantic passenger traffic dwindled, but the number of ships in service also dwindled. Obviously, the German liners were no longer in business. Some ships were laid up because they had become unprofitable, like Olympic, others had been requisitioned by the Royal Navy, like Britannic, Olympic’s sister ship, and Aquitania and Mauretania, Lusitania’s big sisters.

With the competition gone, there was enough business to keep a few ships, like Lusitania, still plying the Atlantic. Cunard had experimented with flying an American flag on her and painting her in camouflage colors, but she was so big and so famous that all of that seemed futile. There was no mistaking Lusitania. Cunard settled on her not flying any flag at all while she was in the German exclusion zone.

Lusitania left Liverpool for New York City on April 17, 1915, which would be her 201st transatlantic run. It would also be her last. As I’m sure you already know, during her return trip, on May 7, 1915, at 2:10 in the afternoon, the German submarine U-20 fired a single torpedo at her. There was a huge explosion, and Lusitania began to list starboard almost at once. She lost
electric power three minutes after the explosion, and just after that, her captain gave the order to abandon ship.

It took until 2:20, ten minutes after the attack, before Lusitania had slowed sufficiently to make it safe to lower the lifeboats. By this time, she was listing so far starboard that it was difficult and dangerous to attempt to climb into the boats. On the port side, boats could not be lowered into the water without dragging them against Lusitania’s riveted hull, which caused the boats to tip and in some cases dumped passengers into the ocean. And Lusitania sank only eight minutes after that.

Lusitania carried enough lifeboats to save everyone, but because of the list and the very short time available and the panic among the passengers, only a few of the boats were lowered successfully. Of the 1,959 passengers and crew aboard, 1,195 were killed. 128 of them were Americans.

The sinking of Lusitania shocked the world. It provoked criticism even in Germany, in Austria, in the Ottoman Empire. Yes, people die in wars, and yes, sometimes they are civilians and sometimes mistakes are made and civilian lives are lost. But the sinking of Lusitania was like nothing the world had seen before. It was a harsh reminder of Titanic, which had sunk just two years earlier, except where the sinking of Titanic had been a natural disaster, or at worst the consequence of insufficient respect for the forces of nature, this was a deliberate act. You might regard it as comparable in our time to a government deliberately shooting down a commercial airliner. Except that Lusitania carried many times the number of civilians who might ride in a single aircraft.

And maybe it’s not fair, but after the burning of the library at Louvain, the shelling of Rheims cathedral and Scarborough, after the sinking of Falaba and now Lusitania, most citizens of the Allied countries were now convinced that the German military simply didn’t respect human life, that it was determined to win the war at any cost, and following any German victory, Europe would be a continent in the grip of a harsh and callous overlord.

And in the Allied countries and the Central Powers alike, everyone waited to find out what the United States, the Great Neutral, would have to say about this.

We’ll have to stop there for today. As always, I thank you all for listening, and I would especially like to thank Alex for making a donation to the podcast, and thank you, Brent, for becoming a patron of the podcast. I am always grateful to all of you for your support. If you have a few extra quid or pesos or marks or dollars or euros to spare and would like to help out, visit the website at historyofthetwentiethcentury.com and click on the PayPal button for a one-time contribution, or on the Patreon button to become a patron.

That’s three episodes in a row, so I’m going to take a week off in my continuing effort to catch up. That means there will be no new episode next week, but I hope you’ll join me in two weeks’
time on *The History of the Twentieth Century*, when we pick up where we left off today and turn to the United States to see how the Great Neutral reacts to the sinking of *Lusitania*. Is America too proud to fight? Find out in two weeks’ time, in *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing. In 1917, King George V would finally get around to abandoning those German royal titles, for himself and all his relations, and would shed the name Saxe-Coburg und Gotha and rename his royal house the House of Windsor, a name apparently derived from Windsor Castle, which was originally constructed by William the Conqueror and used as a royal residence for over 800 years now. The fact that the name “Windsor” sounds pleasingly English and not at all German was likely a factor.

Louis of Battenberg followed suit by anglicizing his own name into “Mountbatten.” He jokingly referred to this name change as going from “Prince Hyde” to “Lord Jekyll.”

Louis Mountbatten’s grandson, Prince Philip, born in 1921, would in 1947 marry his second cousin, Princess Elizabeth, daughter of King George VI. His German relatives were *not* invited to the wedding. On the same day he was married, he was made Duke of Edinburgh. Elizabeth, of course, would succeed her father as Queen Elizabeth II, and Prince Philip would become prince consort and so they are to this day. Their marriage is the longest of any British sovereign.

And I might as well add, while I’m talking about Prince Philip, that we have already come across his other grandfather in the course of this podcast. He was King George I of Greece, who was assassinated in 1913.

[music: Closing Theme]