

The History of the Twentieth Century

Episode 36

“Lessons Learned I: The Russo-Japanese War”

Transcript

[music: fanfare]

The Russo-Japanese War is an event that in our day is almost forgotten. Which is unfortunate, since the repercussions of this war will echo down through the rest of the twentieth century. In Asia, Japan is now the unquestioned lead power, and for the next forty years her influence will expand until only the United States will stand between her and domination of nearly half the globe.

For Russia, the war marks the end of Russia as an expansionist power. Weakened and humiliated, Russia will refocus her energies on her most crucial interests. Europe, and especially the Balkans. Her leading rival, Austria, will pick up on the first of these facts, Russia’s newly weakened state, and move aggressively. Austria will fail to pick up on the second of these facts, that Russia is now concentrating her energies in the Balkans, much to her peril. And to the peril of all Europe.

Welcome to the History of the Twentieth Century.

[music: opening theme]

Episode 36. Lessons Learned I: The Russo-Japanese War.

I want to take a break from a narrative telling of history this week to ponder the Russo-Japanese War, and consider what it all means. And in keeping with the spirit of the times in which we live, I am going to present my conclusions as a listicle: “The Top Ten Lessons to Learn from the Russo-Japanese War.” I suppose if I really want to do this in the spirit of our times, I should bill it as “You Won’t Believe These Ten Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War That No One Learned. [Click here!](#)”

Okay, I guess there’s nothing to click on, so let’s just get started.

10. Existing battleships are poorly designed.

We will discuss this more in future episodes, but the Russo-Japanese war exposed flaws in the design of the world’s battleships. During this period, battleships had a mix of different size guns.

The largest guns were twelve inches—the size refers to the diameter of the gun barrel, so when I say 12 inches, I mean a gun that fires a shell twelve inches in diameter. These shells are enormous; they weigh about 800 pounds, and they can be fired over amazing distances, as far as 15 miles.

Now at this point, you might be wondering why any navy that had these guns would also want to equip their ships with smaller guns. Why not make every gun on the ship 12 inches? Well, the 12 inch guns have disadvantages, too. They can't fire as fast as a smaller gun, for one thing. Also, their range isn't as big an advantage as it sounds, because in 1905 even the best optical rangefinding devices have trouble spotting an enemy warship at a distance over ten miles or so, and hitting anything at that range requires a lot of luck. Medium caliber guns can fire more rapidly at a closer range, and, while they don't do as much damage, the higher rate of fire means the enemy ship and crew will have to spend more time and effort evading your shells, which will render their big guns all but useless anyway. There were also smaller caliber guns intended for use against small and fast ships, like the dreaded torpedo boats.

That was the principle, anyway. You had big guns that might score a lucky hit at long range. As the enemy closes, however, you switch to smaller guns with a higher rate of fire, which become more useful at the closer range.

The naval battles of the Russo-Japanese war were the first time that modern battleships squared off against each other, and these battles proved conclusively that the big guns were more effective than anyone had recognized. Yes, they missed a lot, but when they hit, they often put an enemy out of action before the smaller guns ever had a chance. Also, when you fire over a long distance, you fire in a parabola. The shell goes up and comes back down, often missing the armored hull of the enemy ship and striking the less well-protected deck. Smaller shells, fired at a closer range, travel in a path closer to a straight line, and more often strike the enemy's armored hull. Small shells hitting the armored hull, or large shells plunging down onto the decks, the superstructure, and the crew. Which do *you* think is more effective?

It will not be long before the great powers, led by Britain, will take advantage of this insight to create a whole new generation of battleships, as we will see in a future episode. Episode? Who am I kidding?

As an aside, it's also worth noting that the naval battles of this war seemed to confirm the "Fleet in Being" theory. This is the today much-mocked idea that your naval fleet poses a bigger threat to your enemy just by existing than it would or could by actually going out and engaging the enemy. But you'll note in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian squadron at Port Arthur was a much bigger headache for Admiral Togo when it stayed in port than when it sortied. So. Something to think about.

9. It Doesn't Pay to Underestimate Japan

In the early years of the twentieth century, it was easy to look down your nose at Japan. There was, of course, racism. But even setting aside racism, Western nations tended to underestimate the Japanese for other reasons. For instance, there was the historical fact that Japan was essentially a medieval society just fifty years ago. The generals and admirals of the Japanese military in 1905 were men who had begun their careers wielding swords. For a nation to make the leap from swords and armor to modern artillery and long-range rifles in two generations was unheard of.

Of course, by the beginning of the twentieth century, everyone knew that Japan had modern weapons. But so did China, and the Boxer Uprising and other conflicts between China and Western powers have demonstrated clearly that being armed with modern weapons isn't enough. The Chinese lacked the training and the discipline needed to employ them effectively. On the other hand, China and Japan had fought a war just a decade earlier, and the Japanese military had proven themselves far more effective than the Chinese. And hadn't one of the lessons of the Boxer Uprising been that the Japanese army had been as effective as any Western army?

And then there's the matter of the relative size and strength of the two countries. If you look at a map, Russia is very much bigger than Japan, especially if you're looking at a Mercator projection, which is what most maps were at that time. At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia is a sprawling Empire with many natural resources. It has the Trans-Siberian railroad, a substantial Pacific fleet, and triple the population of Japan. Japan, by contrast, is a much smaller country with little to boast of in terms of natural resources, and only one third the population of Russia. Yes, Japan has a fine Navy, but it also is an archipelago that's wholly dependent on sea trade to keep its people fed and its economy operating. With the Russian fleet so close by, surely it is the Japanese and not the Russians who have to worry about blockades.

But it's precisely because Japan is an archipelago with limited resources that the Japanese government is so tightly focused on maintaining a modern and efficient military, especially the Navy. The Japanese can no more afford to lose naval superiority in and around the Home Islands than the British can afford to lose naval superiority in and around the British Isles. In other words, not at all. We're going to see in future episodes how the Royal Navy went *tilt* when the Germans started building up their own fleet; is anyone surprised that the Japanese went *tilt* when the Russians started moving ships into Port Arthur? Well they were, but they shouldn't have been.

8. Don't Bite Off More Than You Can Chew.

From humble beginnings, the Russian Empire has grown to be a world power. It has a large population and area. It swallowed up most of Poland by the end of the eighteenth century, and

grabbed Finland away from Sweden in 1809. Since then, it has taken Bessarabia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Armenia, and Outer Manchuria, among other places. Russia's record in bringing peace and stability to these new acquisitions has been—oh, what's the word?—horrible. And as we have seen, the end of serfdom and the arrival of the Industrial Revolution in Russia have led to economic and social tensions even among ethnic Russians, who ought to be the Emperor's core constituency.

And Russia's reaction to this unrest and turmoil? A series of wars against the Ottoman Empire, aimed at gaining new lands. Encroachment into places like Iran and Afghanistan and Tibet. A pretty obvious attempt to pry Inner Manchuria away from China. Hell, why don't you just annex the whole damn Chinese Empire while you're at it? They only outnumber you four to one. Oh, yeah, and gobble up Japan for dessert.

All the way back in episode one, I talked about how the prevailing view at this time was that empires naturally expand, and that the world of the 21st century was seen as likely be one with larger, and fewer, empires. It sure is the prevailing view in Russia! But it should be obvious to anyone who stops to think about it for a couple seconds, even in 1904, that Russia looks much more likely to break apart than to grow bigger and stronger. Seriously. Sometimes you just want to grab Nikolai by his shoulders and shake him and say, "Dude! You can't even convince your brother Poles to be happy living in the Russian Empire. What are your chances that you're ever going to get Chinese or Iranians or Turks to be contented Russian subjects?"

Keeping your subjects happy may be less fun than sticking pins into a map, but Russian ambitions in the early twentieth century would have looked a lot more plausible if there was any sign of a plan for how Russia was going to hold onto its new territories after it conquered them. Or any sign that the Russian government recognized that they *needed* such a plan. By 1904, it should be pretty clear that nationalism is a thing. The Russians certainly understood it was a thing when they were whipping up anti-Turk and anti-Austrian sentiments in the Balkans. Why was it so hard for the Russian government to understand that their enemies could whip up anti-Russian sentiment among the Poles or the Finns or the peoples of the Caucasus? Take a good, hard look at the Ottoman Empire, and then tell me how long you think it will take before Russia starts to look like that.

Besides St. Petersburg, that's a thought that should have kept officials up late in Vienna, and in the colonial offices in London and Paris and a few other capitals I can name. And you know, in some of those cities, I think it did.

7. War May or May Not be Hell, But It Sure is Dear.

Remember how I underlined this during the Battle of Nanshan? The Japanese expended more ordnance and ammunition on one battle in the Russo-Japanese war than they had in the entire Sino-Japanese war, just ten years earlier.

The French astonished the world back in the days of the revolution and Napoleon with the introduction of mass conscription. Mass conscription enabled nations to field armies much larger than any general of an earlier age ever dreamed of. Over the course of the 19th century, several other of the great powers learned this lesson and incorporated mass conscription into their own war plans. The Franco-Prussian war in 1870 demonstrated that in addition to the benefits of mass conscription, a modern army employing a modern network of railroads and careful advance planning can deliver a huge force to a critical battlefield faster than the enemy, with devastating results—even if the enemy has a larger or better armed force on paper.

By the time of the Russo-Japanese war, military planners and all the great powers have assimilated these lessons. But they have also learned a false lesson from the Franco-Prussian war: that modern wars between great powers are bound to be brief. That's because they think that one side or the other will win the mobilization race, and deliver overwhelming force that will quickly defeat the enemy. That's a comforting thought, but no one—apart from Jan Bloch—seems to be willing to ask the question, But what if the war is *not* brief?

Modern artillery can fire shells much more rapidly than earlier artillery. During the Napoleonic wars, a Russian cannon might fire fifty times in a day. During the battle of Mukden, Russian artillery pieces were firing 500 shells a day. Modern rapid-fire weapons like Gatling guns and Maxim guns fire more bullets in one minute than an infantryman used to fire in an entire battle. That means modern war is going to consume ammunition at a horrifying rate. How long can your nation's economy continue to produce munitions as fast as your soldiers can expend them?

Now, this is a new problem. We might be able to forgive military planners for not fully understanding this *before* the Russo-Japanese war, but now there's no excuse. This war lasted a year and a half. It loaded both governments down with a pile of debt that would take many years to pay off. We've seen how the trans-Siberian railroad strained under the burden of delivering equipment and supplies to the theater of war. Granted, this is an extreme case, but it raises the question nonetheless: even if you can manufacture munitions fast enough for a modern war, can you get them to the army fast enough?

The military planners of this era seem to have no answers to these questions, even though just a few minutes with a pencil and a scrap of paper should be enough to work out how big these problems could potentially become. Instead, they continued to insist that any war will be brief. It begins to look an awful lot like denial. We don't have an answer to this question, so let's pretend it'll never come up.

And by the way, the British government deserve some praise here, because the British learned their lesson during the Boer War. Britain won that war, but only by pouring in tremendous

resources to defeat a relatively small power. We've already seen how this changed British policy. The British are now looking for ways to avoid colonial conflicts. They've discovered the virtues of international arbitration, and have settled their differences with the French on colonial matters, because if fighting a few thousand Boers cost that much, imagine what a colonial war against a rival like France or Russia would cost.

6. Divided Nations Launch Losing Wars.

During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian government needed as many soldiers in Poland to garrison it against Polish unrest as it needed in Manchuria to fight the Japanese. Think about that.

It's wonderful that you have three times the population of your adversary. That can't help but be an advantage, because of course it means potentially you can raise an army three times the size of your adversary. But if you need your army to maintain order in your own country, then you just aren't doing it right. And if you can only count on one third of your army, because you need the other two thirds either to garrison your own country or because you can't count on them to fight for you, well, then you've lost your amazing three to one advantage, haven't you?

The Russian Emperor, Nikolai II, seems to have believed, devoutly and sincerely, that he was called by God to rule the Russian Empire, and that to concede democratic reforms or respect civil liberties, was somehow flying in the face of God's Will. Okay, strange theology you've got there, but even if I'm willing to concede you are sincere and mean well, I'm having a hard time understanding how using violence against your own subjects fits into God's Plan. I suppose someone could argue that anyone who dissents against Nikolai's rule is dissenting against God and should be punished. But here's the thing. In the midst of all this unrest and political and revolutionary violence that Russia is experiencing, is it also God's Will that at the same time you go out and incorporate large new territories and unhappy new populations into the Empire? Seriously?

I'm sorry. I just don't buy it. I can't wrap my head around the idea that anyone could believe such a thing. Surely God wants you to put the household you already have into better order before you start inviting other people to come live there, too. Unless, of course, you're not actually thinking about God's Will. Unless you're actually thinking more about how cool it would be to have more subjects and more tax revenue. And if that's what you're thinking, well, with regard to the more subjects, refer back to what I already said about biting off more than you can chew. And with regard to the more tax revenue, see what I already said about how expensive modern wars are getting. And then think about how much happier you could have made the Poles and the Finns and the Empire's other restive minority groups, if you had spent that money making their lives better. Because somewhere in your crazy theology, there must be something about how God wants you to rule so that you can make life better for all His children, right, Nikolai? Nikolai?

The counterexample of Japan is really instructive here. Japan is one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world. Are there some Japanese subjects who feel they're getting a raw deal from their Emperor and their state? Well, of course there are. But there's also a consensus in Japan that Russia is a threat to the very survival of the Japanese nation. And if Japan were to be reduced by Russia to a vassal or protectorate or an outright colony, well, not even the most unhappy of Japanese thinks that is going to make their lives any better.

There is no corresponding consensus in Russia. No one believes Russia will not survive unless it can defeat Japan. No one in European Russia believes that their lives will be made harder if the Japanese get control of Port Arthur. To the contrary, few Russians believe this war in a faraway corner of the world will affect their own lives in the slightest. So why would they support it?

5. Mahan was right.

Hey, sea power is important, isn't it? That was Mahan's thesis, and there's nothing about this war that contradicts him. The Russo-Japanese war would have been impossible for Japan to prosecute without sea superiority. Because, of course, Russia can resupply and reinforce its forces in Asia by land, but the Japanese supply lines have to go across the sea. It's the importance of sea superiority to Japan that caused the war in the first place. Russia threatened Japan's naval power by taking Port Arthur and stationing a fleet there, and the Japanese government found that threat unacceptable.

Given the importance of sea superiority to an island nation, you might be tempted to conclude that stationing a fleet close to a rival island nation is an invitation to a preemptive attack. If you don't want to go to war, then either don't station your fleet there, or, if you must, station a fleet that is so big your enemy can't consider a pre-emptive attack. Are you paying attention to any of this, Kaiser Wilhelm? Because even as this war begins, Germany is building up its Navy in a way that's threatening to Britain, and some in British government are already talking about a pre-emptive attack against the Imperial German Navy.

But, sadly for Russia, geography has never been her friend, at least as far as projecting naval power goes. Russia is too far north. It lacks year-round port facilities, hence the much-discussed yearning of successive Russian governments for the elusive "warm water port." When they finally acquired one, at Port Arthur, it was too provocative to Japan.

And even putting aside the winter problem, most of Russia's ports have other geographical issues. Vladivostok is all but blockaded by the Japanese Home Islands. The Baltic Fleet is stuck in the Baltic. Egress from the Black Sea is controlled by the Ottoman Empire. None of these ports are well placed for projecting naval power onto the high seas. And then there's that other problem. Different ports in different parts of Russia can't communicate with each other. It's a huge undertaking just to move naval assets from one Russian fleet to another, as we have seen.

Russia, in short, just can't catch a break.

4. Maps disturb men's reasoning powers.

"I think that the constant study of maps is apt to disturb men's reasoning powers," said Lord Salisbury, and he was absolutely right. He was referring to Cecil Rhodes' dream of British control of a strip of territory right down Africa from Cairo to Cape Town. Lord Salisbury had a perfectly reasonable quarrel with that image. How are you going to do it? What is it going to cost to acquire it? What's it going to cost to hold onto it? And where is the benefit that makes it worth the cost?

It is so easy to look at the colored splotches on a map and dream about a different map where that splotch there is bigger at the expense of all the little splotches around it. And so easy while you're doing that to overlook the costs and the lack of benefit. Not to mention all the lives that would be affected. I've looked at maps and done this. Be honest, you have, too.

I'll bet the Russian Emperor, Nikolai II, had a huge map, with his Empire in sprawling brown, as was the custom at the time, spreading across Europe and Asia. Russia looks like a huge beast, a wolf or a bear, resting casually over the rest of Asia, the hundreds of millions of subjects of the Chinese Empire and British India. Europe, by contrast, looks like an appendage. A tail. Or perhaps a meal for the beast to gobble up.

It's only a matter of time. It won't require ships and navies, just railroads and marching soldiers, and Russia has more of both than anyone else. Perhaps she won't so mush swallow up the rest of Europe and Asia as absorb it by osmosis. That's how she got where she is today, isn't it?

Now look at the Far East. Look at Korea and Japan. Insignificant, right? Of course little Korea is going to be absorbed into our Empire. Of course Japan can't do anything about it. It's just a sprinkling of tiny islands.

You see what maps do to people? That Lord Salisbury, he knew at least a thing or two.

3. Racism is really stupid.

If you haven't gotten the hint yet, let me spell it out for you one more time. The early twentieth century was a period of phenomenally stupid racism.

Of course, in our time, we have come to a consensus as a society that racism is a bad thing. So there's no need to belabor that point. But why is it bad? When we talk about the evil of racism in our time, we usually say it's bad because it is unjust. Because everyone should be treated equally, and everyone should have the same opportunities. Racism is bad because it denies

people the right to be treated the same as everyone else. Racism is bad because it denies opportunities.

I'm not arguing with any of that. But in our modern haste to condemn racism as unjust, we often overlook the equally valid argument that racism is stupid. To the extent that a society denies equal treatment and opportunity to some segment of its own population, it's squandering its human capital. In a competition between two countries, one of which is racist toward some segment of its population and one of which is not, you would expect, all else being equal, that the second country would advance faster. Socially, scientifically, economically, in every way.

What I'm saying here is, if you can't treat all human beings equally because it is the right thing to do, you might at least do it for the sake of your own self interest. And if that's not enough of a reason yet, consider this related problem: racism may cause you to underestimate people. Which brings us to the Russo-Japanese War.

The Russian Emperor and his government regarded the Japanese as primitive barbarians. We've already seen Japan's dramatic modernization, and how it shocked the world with its ability to put modern weapons and training to use to defeat China, even though China is a much larger and wealthier country. You'd think the Russian elites would want to stop and think about that for a minute before dissing Japan. But the Emperor and his Court, even after that Sino-Japanese War, even after the Boxer Uprising, viewed the Japanese as a curiosity. Something like trained monkeys who could be dressed in uniforms and taught to march in formation and pilot battleships. And yes, I'm sorry to have to use that language, but that is exactly how they thought about it. The Russian elites could not grasp that the Japanese might possibly be just as clever and as talented as Europeans, or that they might pose a threat, even to a European power. This was worse than a crime. It was a mistake.

You may recall that General Kuropatkin managed to figure this out. He has visited Japan, has seen the people, seen their factories, seen their navy. Now of course, the Russian Emperor had visited Japan back when he was the crown prince, as you may recall, and has seen all the same things, but apparently did not learn the right lesson. Sadly, the Emperor lives in a bubble of sumptuously appointed Imperial palaces and sycophantic ministers and has a hard time grasping any idea that is inconvenient. And this is only going to cause him more troubles as the century unfolds. Which brings us to:

2. Autocracy kind of sucks.

Remember how this war happened? This war happened because the Russian Emperor foolishly dismissed two of his ministers for petty reasons. Ministers who fully understood the risks and costs of going to war with Japan. In their place, he had adventurers. We saw how these obscenely wealthy aristocrats traded Russia's national security in exchange for the chance to make a killing

on Korean timber futures. No, it was worse than that. They saw the Russian Navy, Russian diplomacy, the Russian state itself as just a means to an end, the end being more money in their own pockets.

I'm going to make a generalization about the Russian people here, which is a risky thing to do, but the fact is, Russia is going to be a very important country in the history of the twentieth century, and it's worth spending some time trying to understand it. The Russian people have a history of suffering in silence and enduring hardships that seem unimaginable to many of us in the English-speaking world. But one important lesson that I think Russian history teaches is that the Russian people are willing to suffer a great deal of hardship *if* they believe their sacrifices are strengthening the Russian state. When they see their nation prospering, they grit their teeth and strive and endure and work harder than ever. But! But, if they see the fruits of their sacrifices frittered away by a government that is wasteful or foolish or corrupt, then watch out. The revolution is at hand.

Perhaps this is true of all peoples, to one extent or another, but it seems particularly true of the Russians. We have seen this in 1905, and we are going to see it again.

The Revolution of 1905 was a problem for the Emperor, but it was also an opportunity. Russia's constitutional reforms created an opening to allow more diverse opinions into the arguments the next time the future of the Russian state was under debate. No longer would the fate of the nation be argued around a table by men who had financial interests in the debate ending a certain way.

Unfortunately, Nikolai II will spend the next ten years doing his best to reverse and undermine the civil liberties and democratic reforms that he had been forced to agree to, and as political violence in Russia spirals out of control, the Empire will become more and more a police state.

Sad to say, just as film director Zack Snyder refused to heed the lessons from the failed *Man of Steel* and instead doubled down on the catastrophic *Batman v. Superman* just a couple of years later, the Russian Emperor will refuse to heed the lessons from the failed war with Japan in 1904 and a decade later will instead double down on the catastrophic Great War. Which brings us to:

1. Do not use frontal assaults to attack an entrenched enemy armed with modern weapons.

Really, people, how many times do I have to say this? Don't do it. Just don't. You don't win battles by lowering your head and charging forward without thinking. It has never worked, and it never will, but it especially doesn't work in the early twentieth century. And it doesn't matter if you have a field marshal who is the Emperor's own good luck charm. That's poetry. We're talking tactics.

I quote from the United States Army Field Manual. This is near the beginning of the manual, by the way, not deep in the technical stuff. On the subject of offense, quote:

“When the commander decides to attack, or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of that attack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. Attackers must be determined to seek decision on the ground of their choosing through the deliberate synchronization and employment of the combined arms team.”

Yes.

Combined arms are not a thing, yet. We’ll get into that later in the century. But otherwise, there is great wisdom in what the field manual is saying for the people of 1905. You don’t win battles by charging in and hoping for the best. You are the attacker. That means you get to decide when, where, and how you attack. Choose to make your attacks in times and places and in manners where you are already sure of winning before you begin. If your attack is a crap shoot, then you are doing it wrong.

I wish—oh, Lord, do I wish!—that I could tell you that European military analysts of the period looked at the battle for 203 Hill and said, “Hey, modern weapons can kill a lot of soldiers very fast. We need to plan our attacks with an eye to avoiding mass casualties.”

But that is not what they said. Instead, they praised the courage and discipline of Japanese soldiers and wondered if European soldiers could do the same, or whether the comforts of modern society had made them soft and weak. They would find out soon enough.

We’ll have to stop there for today. If you like *The History of the Twentieth Century*, come like our Facebook page. Follow us on Twitter @History20th. That’s at-history-2-0-t-h. Visit our website, historyofthetwentiethcentury.com, and if you have a few bucks to spare, click on donate and send them our way. Your support helps keep us going. And thank you to Jannettja, Preston, and Randy, for contributing already. And you can also head on over to our iTunes page and leave a rating and review. That helps, too. And thank you to those of you who already have.

And I hope you’ll join me next week on *The History of the Twentieth Century*, as we take a look at science in 1905, the year that has been called *annus mirabilis*, the Year of Wonders. Because this is the year that an unknown twenty-something patent clerk in Switzerland, the ink still wet on his Ph.D., publishes four theoretical papers that will turn modern physics upside down, and will make the name “Einstein” into a synonym for “genius.” That’s next week, on *The History of the Twentieth Century*.

Oh, and one more thing? The Japanese were very proud of the performance of their army and navy during the Russo-Japanese War, and rightly so. For the next forty years—until 1945—every anniversary of the Battle of Mukden will be celebrated in Japan as Army Day, and every anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima Strait would be celebrated as Navy Day.

But they also learned a false lesson about the relative quality of Japanese versus Western militaries, or perhaps about the relative distance of Japan and East Asia from Western nations. Thirty-six years later, the Japanese military would try to run almost exactly the same playbook against the United States. Sneak attack on enemy fleet in port, rapid amphibious assaults to deploy Japanese soldiers to take Japanese objectives while the enemy is still reeling, followed by defeat of the naval units sent from the enemy's Atlantic fleet to replace earlier losses, and bob's your uncle. A year into the war, and the enemy is stymied, with no good choices other than to negotiate.

Yeah. We'll have to see how well that works the second time around.

[music: closing theme]